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MARY IN THE PLAN OF GOD

"All of Mariology is Christology"

— FR. RICHARD NEUHAUS



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

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

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

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

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

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Personalism and Apologetics

After reading Avery Cardinal Dulles' article "The Rebirth of Apologetics" (May), one would do well to consider another approach to apologetics—one that recognizes that people can also pursue "aspirations of the human heart for communion with the divine" through their vocations. Some of us are scientists; others are teachers, engineers, doctors, lawyers, businessmen, transportation workers, artists, athletes, priests, politicians, and so forth. Vocational practices and experiences influence our openness to apologetic approaches, leading some to be persuasive and others to appear to be irrelevant or even incoherent.

Will a personalist approach work equally well in every case? Does personalism have a monopoly on understanding the human heart's aspiration for communion with the divine? The answer to both questions is "no." Moreover, personalism operates from a significant epistemological weakness: to use the self or "personhood" as the basis for seeking—let alone witnessing to—the truth and the divine is to violate the cardinal rule that we ought to start from what is more known to us before proceeding to what is less known. A person knows many things before he can even acknowledge personhood.

This is not, by any means, to disparage the Pope's reminder that today's world needs witnesses more than arguments. On the contrary, it is to support this vision through an apologetics that channels the Christian witness so that it harmonizes with the outlook of the receiver's vocational experience. Focusing on the other by speaking his or her own language, rather than the subjectivistic abstractions of personalism, would better reflect the Pope's own call in *Fides et Ratio* "to enter into a relationship with [other human beings] which is intimate and enduring."

Cardinal Dulles seems to conclude that basing an apologetics on scientific evidence is somehow inferior to appealing to personal testimony. But for a modern-day scientist, such evidence would likely carry far more weight than arguments based on personal experience.

While it might be the case that nonscientists are less interested in proofs for the existence of God than in "a communion with the divine," it is also true that the general public's view of the world is strongly influenced by empirical claims. The general public ought to be interested in the objective truth, which is why science should be encouraged—in spite of Cardinal Dulles' claim that a scientific approach in apologetics "rarely leads to conversion."

Faith applies to mysteries beyond reason (Hebrews 11:1); knowledge applies to that which can be grasped by the intellect under its own powers—such as knowledge of the existence of God (see Wisdom 13 as a whole, but especially verse 5). The way to a scientist's heart is more often than not through his reason, and such an approach to witnessing to Christ is truly worthy of the "human desire to know."

Alexander Sich
Science and Technology Center
Kiev, Ukraine

We should build more airplanes, but not ones that fly. Similarly paradoxical is Avery Cardinal Dulles' call for a "rebirth of apologetics," but of an apologetics that does "not attempt to demonstrate the truth of the mysteries of faith." Isn't that exactly what apologetics does—attempt to demonstrate the truth of Christian doctrines? That is what is tradition-

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ally meant by "apologetics." There is one strand in contemporary apologetics, called "reformed epistemology" (promoted, for example, by Alvin Plantinga), which seeks to defend the rationality of Christian belief without giving arguments for its truth. Cardinal Dulles might be referring to this school of thought, but what he says positively about apologetics does not point in this direction. He suggests that apologetics provides "reasons for judging that what purports to be God's word really is His word." Isn't this an attempt to demonstrate the truth of a Christian doctrine?

A final note. Cardinal Dulles writes, "The apologetics of personal testimony is particularly suited to the genius of Catholicism." Particularly? Isn't it at least as suited to the other strands of Christianity, e.g., evangelical Protestantism? I couldn't agree more with Cardinal Dulles' conclusion that the rebirth of apologetics is urgently needed, if he means by "apologetics" the attempt to demonstrate the truth of Christian doctrines. Fortunately the rebirth is already underway. Many philosophers are working on it—for example, in the Society of Christian Philosophers and in the Evangelical Philosophical Society.

Daniel von Wachter
Department of Philosophy
University of Munich
Munich, Germany

Avery Cardinal Dulles makes many important points in his article, though he also makes some missteps.

The Cardinal states, "This exultation of blind faith frequently goes hand in hand with a strong predestinationism. Choosing whom He wants to save, God infuses faith in some and leaves the rest of the human race to sink into perdition. In this fideist framework apologetics would be quite pointless." First, God performs no forsaking evil. Romans 8 makes that quite clear. Second, in terms of choosing, who better than God to find in His omniscience those whom He wishes to be with Him for eternity. God, who is infinitely fair, is the only One for the job, and He has assigned his Son Jesus for the task. No one is "coerced" to believe: they are infallibly wooed. The motivation for apologetics then becomes joy and love, the happiness that ensues by being part of God's plan of salvation for others. What motivation could be more genuine?

Then there is Cardinal Dulles' perplexing reference to "strong" predestinationism. I see only one kind, the kind mentioned so often in Scripture. In the first paragraph of his article, the Cardinal declares that "the Church has consistently taught that even the first beginnings of faith depend on the working of the Holy Spirit." But is this not an example of predestination? From our point of view, our decision might appear to be a free and responsible choice. But how it is known to the all-knowing mind of God is and must remain a mystery.

The Cardinal then goes on to write, "They [the New Testament accounts] agree that he [Jesus] held forth a revolutionary ideal of human life, exalting poverty, humility, love of neighbor, and patience in suffering as the way to eternal salvation." Jesus may have held these as virtues that flow from salvation, but he never described them as a "way" to salvation. Repentance and belief as the consequence of the call of the Holy Spirit were Jesus' only ways of salvation. Otherwise, the Spirit's call would not

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always be effective, and that can't be the case because then God's power would be limited. The Church offers grace to all, but those accepting it are determined by God alone.

One last critical point: Cardinal Dulles remarks, "The apologetics of personal testimony is particularly suited to the genius of Catholicism." Does he mean to exclude the Protestant genius? Why the word "particularly"?

If I have focused too much on the negative, it is only because the virtues of the article are self-evident. Reflecting on "the aspirations of the human heart for communion with the divine" is indeed a sign that humanity is wired for and by God.

Gary Clason
Los Angeles, California

I agree wholeheartedly with Avery Cardinal Dulles when he points out the importance of "personal testimony" in evangelization, but what I don't understand is what he means when he claims that this personal testimony "is particularly suited to the genius of Catholicism." It has been my experience that such testimony is rare in Catholicism and that Catholics are usually uncomfortable about expressing their faith in words. It seems as if it is enough for them (and that "enough" can be very impressive) to live their faith without talking about it.

As a convert to Catholicism, it seems to me that the Church discourages personal testimony because it is concerned that many of the faithful may fall into theological error. This may be why most lay Catholics don't talk about their religion except occasionally to fellow Catholics. The only solution to this difficulty is, in my opinion, more education in apologetics for lay Catholics, especially on how they can answer doubters and critics without going astray themselves.

James J. Guthrie
Lowell, Massachusetts

Avery Cardinal Dulles replies:
Alexander Sich defends the value of science in the field of apologetics. A lot depends, of course, on what one means by science. I spoke of science "as commonly understood," which proceeds by formal argument or demonstration and seeks to comprehend the object within the investigator's own conceptual framework. For a conversion to come about, demonstration must be supplemented by forms of persuasion such as the testimony of persons who bring a radically new point of view. By listening sympathetically to such witnesses one can be set on the path to accepting what Paul describes as the "secret and hidden wisdom of God" (1 Corinthians 2:7).

The apologist should use philosophy and the various sciences to the fullest extent possible. With the tools of philosophy we can certainly know the existence of God, or even demonstrate it, though few believers are capable of performing the demonstration. But strict mysteries, which are the heart of Christian faith, are knowable only on the authority of witnesses to revelation. To accept the Trinity, the Incarnation, or the Eucharist as conclusions of pure reason (if such a thing were possible) would not be an act of theological faith.

Objective biblical scholarship can be very useful for demolishing certain objections and setting some basic parameters. The secular historian will often be willing to assert, by the methods of his discipline, that Jesus was reputed to have worked wonders and to have risen corporeally from the dead, but this historian will stop short of affirming God's supernatural intervention. The apologist, drawing on the committed testimony of believers, must be able to give reasons for holding that Jesus did have miraculous powers, did rise from the dead, and was the incarnate Son of God.

The "human heart's aspiration for communion with the divine," to which Dr. Sich and Gary Clason allude, makes people alert for signs of God's presence, but it cannot give rise to faith unless God emerges from His silence and freely manifests Himself. In public revelation He gives signs, treating us as free and intelligent subjects—that is to say, as persons. The structure of faith is necessarily interpersonal. An apologetics that evokes trust in committed religious testimony instills attitudes that are conducive to faith.

Daniel von Wachter is correct in judging that my position is not exactly that of Alvin Plantinga. I am not at ease with his description of Christian faith as a "basic belief." Most adult believers quite properly rely on signs of credibility or evidences, not indeed to prove the truth of revelation, but to establish the credibility of the testimony. Apologetics aims to show convincingly that the Christian religion is credible—in other words, that it can and ought to be accepted by a free and full submission of mind and heart to the word of God.

I gladly pay tribute to much of the work being done by the members of organizations such as the Society of Christian Philosophers and the Evangelical Philosophical Society.

I am grateful to Mr. Clason for his positive comments. As for predestination, it is a great mystery, as he acknowledges, and is differently understood in different Christian traditions. Insisting as I do on the priority of divine grace, I can accept the doctrine of predestination in certain forms. In my article I rejected only the view that because faith is a gift of God, we can do nothing to prepare ourselves to receive it. Some have denounced apologetics as a vain human effort to obtain faith by conquest.

Dr. von Wachter, Mr. Clason, and James J. Guthrie ask me to explain further what I meant by stating that an apologetics of personal testimony is particularly suited to the genius of Catholicism. The Catholic Church does not see faith as terminating in

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God alone to the exclusion of God's human witnesses. It does not see Holy Scripture as God's word to the exclusion of human authorship. On the contrary, it holds that faith in God (*credere Deum*) is intrinsically linked with faith in the Church (*credere Ecclesiam*). Holy Scripture is God's word as it comes to us through inspired human witnesses. The Church with its apostolic leadership is Christ's living and accredited witness, always assisted from above. Jesus, the great Witness of God, transmits his word by the words of others who speak in his name. Personal testimony, therefore, does not have to be private; it can be corporate and public, and is so in the Church.

Mr. Guthrie is unfortunately correct in saying that Catholics often fail to see the need for every believer to be a witness. In that respect they have much to learn from evangelicals. Calling for a "new evangelization," recent popes have been trying to overcome the passivity of the laity. As Mr. Guthrie says, they are often deterred by the Church's deep-rooted fear of heresy. Better religious education can help to build confidence. It would, however, be a mistake to imagine that every witness has to be a trained theologian. The quiet testimony of humble, honest, prayerful believers can be enormously effective. But laypersons should not hesitate to involve themselves in the intellectual apostolate. Many of the leading Catholic apologists, past and present, have come from their ranks.

Ghetto Catholicism?

In "World Order: What Catholics Forgot" (May), as well as in his reply to letters about a previous article, George Weigel appeals chiefly to Catholics who long for a return to the ghetto. His way of reading St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Christopher Dawson presumes that they would state their views as he does were they alive today. Such an assumption is not merely unhistorical; it does not do justice to their works.

Mr. Weigel's attachment to conservative politics is very much out of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century brand of American capitalism and nationalism. His effort to graft Catholicism onto this creature does enormous damage to the great work of reform that began under Pope Leo XIII and has continued even under the present pope.

Moreover, Mr. Weigel's explanation of the decline of European Catholicism has its origins in outdated seminary history texts. In fact, most professional historians today have left behind the kind of polemical narrowness that was still around in the 1950s. These historians provide a much more accurate picture of the developments of the period. Most recognize that the Church was not monolithic, that its leadership was often swayed by different political groups, that the bourgeois parties that seized church property were both conservative and liberal, that persecution of religion was often irrational, and that the unwillingness of church leadership to work with the opposition was also a major source of the problems faced by the Catholic laity. I could go on and on. The point is that at many moments the position of religion in Europe could have been altered for the better. In fact, when people from these same European countries came to the U.S. they found a climate much more conducive to the free exercise of their faith and free, for the most part, from the anticlericalism that was beginning to sunder the Church in Europe.

Unfortunately, Mr. Weigel is wedded to a sectarian view of history that was never really history at all, but rather a product of Catholics trying to defend their identity in a predominantly Protestant society. Ironically, Mr. Weigel's approach would marry this type of ghetto history to an alliance with evangelical Protestants who share his political sympathies. At a time when a small minority of Catholics is leaving the Church to join evangelicalism, one would think that Mr. Weigel would awaken to the fact that Catholicism has never and will never fit into the kind of narrow mold that he embraces.

James M. Powell
Professor Emeritus
Royal Historical Society
Fayetteville, New York

In his article, George Weigel, as usual, overstates the role of Pope John Paul II in bringing about the end of communism. The decisive event in the eventual collapse of the Soviet system that was imposed upon the satellite countries in Europe was the Hungarian revolution in 1956. It cost thousands of lives and some 150,000 escaped to the West after the defeat of the revolution.

In the aftermath, the Soviet Union began, very slowly, to initiate reform. The Polish revolution, twenty-three years *after* the Hungarian revolution, was a very mild affair in comparison.

Louis J. Mihalyi
Professor Emeritus
California University System
Newland, North Carolina

George Weigel replies:
Louis Mihalyi's devotion to the Hungarian cause is admirable, but it strains credulity to suggest that the brave Hungarian revolt of 1956 was the "decisive event in the eventual collapse of the Soviet system." In Hungary itself, the crushing of the revolt led to a weakened Catholic Church that was far less forthright than the Catholic communities in Poland and Czechoslovakia during the 1980s. One does no dishonor to the memory of the brave Hungarians who fought Soviet tanks with bricks and Molotov cocktails to record what the people who had made the Revolution of 1989 in east-central Europe told me shortly after those epic events: that Pope John Paul II ig-

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nited a revolution of conscience in 1979 that made possible a nonviolent political revolution a decade later.

I can't understand what article James M. Powell read. "World Order: What Catholics Forgot" was a call to Catholic intellectuals to engage the defining issues of world politics today through the prism of a developed Catholic international relations theory. How this amounts to a summons to the "ghetto" or an endorsement of a "sectarian view of history" is beyond my imagining. What was once called "Catholic international relations theory" was based on publicly accessible moral arguments that could be engaged by all intelligent people of good will. That's precisely the kind of Catholic engagement with international relations theory I called for in my article. This is a "narrow mold"? I don't think so.

The Languages of Theology

I applaud Peter Leithart's case in "Rhetoric and the Word" (May) for a revival of rhetoric in theological discourse. We should never suppose that Truth is conveyed most appropriately in arid Thomistic parlance. The Bible itself is anything but a textbook in systematic theology, and it never invites us to fashion one. In short, as Mr. Leithart indicates, if rhetoric is good enough for the Bible, it should be good enough for theologians.

I have mixed feelings, however, about the evangelical preoccupation with "textuality." The problem is that preoccupation with the text can often lead (and often has led) to an underemphasis on the reality to which the text points. Christianity, after all, is not so much a text-religion as it is an event-religion—or, more accurately, it is an event-religion one of whose events was, and remains, a text. The Bible is not a stand-alone proposition that elicits fastidious attention to its literary dimension, but rather the enumeration, attestation, and interpretation of redemptive events centering on the crucified and risen Jesus of Nazareth. Text, though vital, is ancillary and instrumental.

Andrew P. Sandin
President
Center for Cultural Leadership
La Grange, California

Among the many complementary practices that signal the working of God in the world, there is the balance between scientific theology as perfected by Thomas Aquinas and the more rhetorical and Augustinian approach that Peter Leithart recommends.

We need both. A philosophically informed theology operates at the level of the universal, while rhetorical theology (if such I may call Mr. Leithart's alternative) would return us to the historical specificity from which we universalize in the first place. Human knowing inevitably involves a tension between particular and universal, between the multiplicity of reality as it presents itself and the unity toward which all things tend. Intellect grasps both more and less than the senses, and our abstract mode of knowing, while alone enabling us to rise above cosmological flux (and so to communicate with one another), remains in a sense "outside" the fullness of concrete existence.

For the Aristotelian tradition that dominated the later Middle Ages, rhetoric involves reasoning from particular, not universal, premises; it appeals to individual cases and even to emotion (which involves the particularity of corporeality) wherever definitions based on the universal natures of things cannot be employed in properly demonstrative reasoning. This does not mean (at least until modern times, when all things Aristotelian came under a cloud of suspicion) that rhetoric was considered vain or ignoble, only that its acknowledged role was in establishing not *truth* so much as *right conduct*—in persuading rather than convincing.

In the rhetorician's art the singular is presented in such a way that we may discern the universal; in the theologian's science the universal is presented so that we may rightly construe the singularity of life. If, historically, the tide of scholarly favor has swung between the two, perhaps it is Providence's way of ensuring a balance. And surely it would do no harm if our theologians strove also to be poets, and our poets theologians.

Stan Grove
Anchorage, Alaska

Defining Secularism

In "The Politics of Partisan Neutrality" (May), Louis Bolce and Gerald De Maio parrot a common misunderstanding about secularist politics. They write: "What the journalists leave out of their accounts is the fact that the nonreligious have also become aggressive actors on the political stage and that they possess and promote, in fact, an overarching religious worldview of their own—one that can fairly be called secularism." Note the use of the singular form of the word "fact," followed by two observations. The first of these observations ("the nonreligious have become aggressive") *may* be a fact; the second ("an overarching religious view") is an inference, and is completely false.

Pursuing a secularist policy in American politics is not, as Professors Bolce and De Maio want to imply, the same thing as holding a personal, dogmatic, "religious," secular philosophy. The activities are completely different.

All Americans, whatever their personal religious beliefs, can and should support—even "aggressively"—a radically secular vision for the government of the United States. The only way we can be free to hold any religious beliefs that we individually wish to hold is for all activities of the government to be resolutely secular. This is what the Democratic Party stands for: not *personal* secularism,

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but *government* secularism, in accordance with the Constitution. Democrats are not saying, "All you folks out there should be secularists." They are saying, "Our government works best when it is secular."

The religious right, by contrast, is trying to convert its personal religion into public policy. The secularists do not have a similar agenda. Try this analogy. The religious right says, "Thou shalt eat vanilla ice cream." The secularist says, "Eat any flavor of ice cream thou preferest." Then the right accuses the secularist of "aggressively" pushing a "not-vanilla" policy. This is a lie. The policy is not against vanilla, it is against folks dictating to each other which flavor they should prefer.

Secularism is not the position, "Thou shalt not believe in God." It is the constitutional position, "Thou shalt not tell other people what to believe." Secularism is not against religion; it is for freedom. The Constitution says that religious preferences must not be used to set public policy. This implies that individual politicians must be willing to set aside their own beliefs, to consider their own beliefs almost irrelevant when setting policy. The secularists are big enough to do this because they know that only a secular government can be free. The religious right seems incapable of understanding the point.

Roy Sablosky
Takoma Park, Maryland

Louis Bolce and Gerald De Maio reply:

Roy Sablosky ignores the central point of our article—that secularists since the 1970s have had a stranglehold on the Democratic Party's cultural agenda. Rather than dealing with our evidence and arguments, Mr. Sablosky faults us for not placing our thesis in the context of his ahistorical, and extremely secularist, understanding of the Constitution. He might consider the following. The First Amendment in the Bill of Rights begins with these words: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." During the debates over the two provisions of the religion clause, Virginia congressman James Madison said that he "apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience."

Congress could accommodate religion if it chose to do so, even though it is viewed primarily as a policy matter to be left to the states. Shortly after the first Congress sent the Bill of Rights to the states for ratification, it enacted provisions for House and Senate chaplains and adopted the Northwest Ordinance, which provided in Article III that "religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged."

The legality of state accommodation of religion has been affirmed by the Supreme Court. In the recent *Zelman v. Simmons-Harris* (2002) and *Locke v. Davey* (2004) cases, the Court ruled that the Constitution permits states (1) to provide low-income parents publicly funded vouchers to educate their children in parochial schools and (2) to offer scholarships to college students who wish to pursue clerical studies if they so wish, though they are not constitutionally required to do so. The Court, moreover, in *McDaniel v. Paty* (1978) struck down state laws disqualifying clergy from holding public office. Religiously informed political values have as much right to be part of legislative deliberations as policy preferences motivated by other concerns.

The American people are much more in accord with James Madison's interpretation of the Constitution's religion provisions and with the Supreme Court's accommodationist rulings than with Mr. Sablosky's idiosyncratic interpretation of the First Amendment. According to American National Election Study surveys and public opinion polls conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, majorities support school vouchers, state and federal accommodation of religion in other arenas, the legitimacy of organized religious groups participating in the political process, and a role for religious values in debates over public policy. The view held by Senator John Kerry, the vast majority of congressional Democrats, and Mr. Sablosky is a minority perspective. Moreover, even if one argues that the First Amendment's religion provisions are ambiguous, Mr. Sablosky's reading of the Constitution is dogmatically narrow and ignores the historical fact that experimentation with ways to accommodate religion is an integral part of the American political tradition.

Requirements of Reform

In "The Catholic Reform" (Public Square, May), Richard John Neuhaus comes out in opposition to the zero tolerance policy of the bishops. In this he is wrong. The reasons why are complicated. The policy is necessary because of the collapse of public morality, the pitiful state of the American bishops, and the inaction of Rome. The bishops cannot reform themselves; there are simply too many Mahonys, Trautmans, Weaklands, etc., and not enough Georges or Vignerons in the U.S. episcopate. Collectively, they don't have what it takes, and the Vatican, with its "languid attitude," is not able, or willing, to deal with them individually. (Remember, it only accepted Archbishop Weakland's resignation when the whole sordid affair became a public scandal. A full list of these failings would require several pages.)

The Holy Father has refused to

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intervene personally in U.S. affairs, apparently preferring to wait for things to sort themselves out with the help of the Holy Spirit. I've got news for him: they won't. I read somewhere that the Pope has publicly wondered if he has been too soft on dissidents in the past; the answer to that one is an emphatic "yes." The Holy Father has hoped for a springtime for Christianity; instead his legacy is likely to be a gay priesthood, a vapid, "happy-clappy" liturgy, and empty churches, largely because he refuses to act. His answer to problems seems to be to write more encyclicals—encyclicals to which people pay lip service but which they then promptly ignore. What is needed is papal action, not talk.

James Roth
Ridgefield, Washington

RJN replies:
Whatever one might think of the Pope's administrative strengths or weaknesses, or of the general state of the Church, "zero tolerance" refers specifically to the Dallas 2002 policy of removing from ministry anyone who has ever been plausibly accused of sexually abusing a minor, even if it happened twenty or thirty years ago, even if the "abuse" was no more than a hug of affection, even if the priest denies it happened, and even if he has an otherwise impeccable record of faithful service. Such peremptory removal is an elementary injustice that cannot be a remedy for anything wrong in the Church.

Unworshipful Darwinism

In "Believing in Evolution" (Public Square, May), Richard John Neuhaus reminds us of the persistent controversy between evolutionary theory and intelligent design. As a behavioral scientist, I use evolutionary theory as a conceptual tool to do research into human nature; as a Christian, I pray as a way to thank and honor God. Despite the arguments of Richard Dawkins and some Christian fundamentalists, I can't find any reason to reject either religion or evolutionary science. Of course, it is possible I am a very slow learner or delusional. If so, I hope such traits are not easy to prove empirically.

I address evolutionary arguments here because I know them better than intelligent-design arguments. So far evolutionary theory is holding up very well in specific areas such as the origins of human anatomy and physiology, and some basic human behaviors. More complex human features such as higher cognitive functioning (mathematics, language, artistic creativity, religion) are another matter. For example: evolutionary psychologists (for whom the uniqueness of humans is a myth) are scrambling to show that evolutionary theory can account for the origins of such high-order features. They do this mainly by showing cognitive similarities between humans and other species (Darwin's great hope). So far, they are partly successful, but the cognitions they deal with are pretty rudimentary (for example, knowledge of kinship and dominance hierarchies, some language skills, and tool-using).

The complex abstract thinking that characterizes philosophy, science, and theology is very different. Such thinking is not found in any other species, and I doubt if they ever will be. Darwin's remark that "he who understands baboon would do more toward metaphysics than Locke" suggests that he did not know many baboons and had trouble understanding both Locke and the purpose of metaphysics.

Alfred Russell Wallace, who "co-authored" evolutionary theory with Darwin, was never convinced that genetic mutation and environmental selective factors could alone account for the appearance of human higher intellectual functioning (including spirituality). His lack of conviction came from his observations of so-called primitive peoples who create lavishly complex myths, taboos, and kinship rules to give meaning to their lives and to regulate social behavior. Such traits apparently serve valuable adaptive functions. But the question of what external environmental factors (and gene mutations) go into producing such high-level cognitive abilities in these peoples still needs to be answered.

Darwin's theory, like any good scientific account, needs to be appreciated and tested but not worshiped. The same applies to the theory of intelligent design.

William R. Charlesworth
Professor Emeritus
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, Minnesota

Parachurches Offended

Evangelicals in parachurch movements are the migrant workers of God's kingdom. They work hard, trooping into fields white unto harvest while proper, traditional churches have other things to do. And they get no respect. In Richard John Neuhaus' one-paragraph summary of *Deconstructing Evangelicalism* (While We're At It, May), D. G. Hart describes them using a series of unflattering terms: "spiritually adolescent," "formlessness and shallowness," "obsession," "parasitic," "grave ecclesiological deficit," and "collection of spiritual enthusiasms." Pass the lettuce, please, and for God's sake let's get a handle on this immigration problem.

Dean C. Bruckner
Annandale, Virginia

Correction

In "Catholic Reform II" (June/July) it was said that a New York public relations firm suggested to the Catholic bishops conference that it adopt the slogan "Promise to Protect, Pledge to Heal." In fact, the slogan emerged from the Conference's Office of Child and Youth Protection.

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Opinion

Unsettling Canada

Raymond J. de Souza

For Canada's social conservatives, the recent federal election offered cause for encouragement, cause for anxiety, and cause for alarm. That one election could produce such unsettled and unsettling results is evidence of what a tumultuous year it has been in Canadian politics.

Since 1993, the Liberal Party of Canada has dominated the federal scene, winning large majority governments in 1993, 1997, and 2000. Liberal dominance under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien was owing to several factors: Chrétien's personal popularity, a prosperous economy, record budgetary surpluses, and an opposition that was fractured between two political parties on the center-right—the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives. The former was a new, self-consciously conservative party with a strong base in western Canada. The latter was the rump of a one-hundred-fifty-year-old party that had given Canada prime ministers such as Sir John A. MacDonald and Brian Mulroney but that had been reduced to a shrinking base in Atlantic Canada. It was decidedly more progressive than conservative.

With the continued failure of efforts to "unite the right" and with the replacement of Jean Chrétien by the even more popular Paul Martin, formerly finance minister, it was thought as recently as a year ago that the Liberals would take another majority in the next election and perhaps would even take more than two hundred out of 308 seats.

Instead, on June 28, 2004, Paul Martin managed to squeeze out only a minority government, claiming just 135 seats—a significant setback. The Liberals will now have to rely on the votes of one or more of the other parties to pass any legislation. But they were relieved to have survived in power at all. What happened between the summers of 2003 and 2004?

One important development was the unification of the right. Through skillful diplomacy, Stephen Harper, the leader of the Canadian Alliance, managed to pull off a merger of his party with the Progressive Conservative remnants to create, in December 2003, a new "Conservative Party" (the "Progressive" part of the old name being cast aside). In March 2004, Mr. Harper won the leadership of this new party, which offered Canadians a leader who was unapologetically conservative on fiscal and economic issues, committed to a more pro-American foreign policy, and open to social conservatism—he was against same-sex marriage and amenable to a debate about trimming Canada's unlimited abortion license.

Meanwhile, a major corruption scandal erupted beneath the Liberal government when it was revealed that as much as one hundred million Canadian dollars in advertising commissions had been paid to firms with connections to the Liberal Party for doing little or no work. The scandal rocked the Liberal Party, especially in Quebec, where the corrupt deals had been done.

The results of June 28 reflected both developments. The Conservative Party, no longer plagued by vote-splitting between two parties, increased its seat total to ninety-nine and the Liberal Party was trounced in Quebec by the Bloc Québécois, as angry voters shifted to Quebec's nationalist/separatist party.

The Liberal Party of Canada ruled Canada for seventy years in the twentieth century. It even came to be known as the Natural Governing Party for its string of successes. In the 1990s, the fractured opposition made it not only likely but practically inevitable that the Liberals would govern. Now functioning democracy has returned to Canada and real choices are available to Canadians, which is cause for encouragement. While the Liberals are self-consciously pragmatic and claim to eschew ideology of any kind, Mr. Harper is a true conservative who is philosophically committed to smaller government, a more entrepreneurial economy, and a state that does not impose social innovations on the culture.

Nevertheless, despite their gains, Canada's conservatives still had cause for anxiety after election night. In the early weeks of the election campaign the Conservatives had surged, and many of their supporters had gone to the polls hoping to elect a minority government of their own. That the Liberals clung to power was a bitter disappointment.

In the face of this Conservative surge, the Liberals had employed a favorite tactic of the aggressively secularist Jean Chrétien, who liked to paint his conservative opponents as threats to what he called the "social peace" achieved on the abortion license and other controversial social issues. The Liberals attacked Mr. Harper as a "threat to a woman's right to choose" and a man who wanted to re-ignite divisive issues. The Conservatives played down the whole issue, saying that while the party had no plans to introduce legislation on abortion, individual members of Parliament

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would be free to do so if they wished. Mr. Martin raised the stakes, saying in effect that he would not permit Liberal MPs to touch the abortion license in any way.

Interestingly, though, these Liberal charges regarding abortion and similar ones about same-sex marriage did not reverse the Conservative surge. Seeing this, the Liberals began to frame the issue differently, claiming that the Conservatives would weaken the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. (Part of the constitutional reforms of 1982, the Charter is analogous to the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights.) Under Canada's adventurous judiciary, the Charter has become the primary vehicle for imposing social liberalism. It enjoys stratospheric levels of support in Canadian public opinion (as would the Bill of Rights among Americans), so these attacks were damaging. At the same time, a similar attack was launched with respect to health care—another sacred cow of Canadian politics—with Liberals suggesting that the Conservatives would privatize parts of the publicly funded health system.

While the winning campaign strategy of the Liberals was itself a cause for anxiety among social conservatives, the post-election analysis was more so. Pundit after pundit argued that it was social conservatism that caused the Conservative campaign to stall. The generally conservative *National Post* even offered an unconditional surrender on these issues: "The fact is that Canada is a socially liberal nation: if he hopes to win in the future, Mr. Harper will need to leave no doubt about his party's positions on issues such as abortion and gay rights—perhaps even going so far as embracing gay marriage as a means to take the bigot card away from the Liberals."

A consensus quickly emerged across the commentariat that social conservatism is a sure loser in federal politics. While the survey data say otherwise—polls do not show a majority of Canadians in favor of same-sex marriage or the unlimited abortion license—this consensus in the media will make it difficult to raise such issues without immediately encountering the charge of extremism. Canada's major national media are smaller, more ideologically leftist, and more homogeneous than the U.S. media, and if they have agreed that socially conservative statements constitute an ipso facto campaign gaffe, then it is undeniable that a major obstacle has been established.

Also worrisome is the effectiveness of the "Charter strategy" that the Liberals employed. While survey data need to be further examined, it appears that the popularity of the Charter itself is readily transferred to all the decisions of the Supreme Court, even if they fly in the face of public opinion on the particular issue in dispute. Same-sex marriage, for example, does not enjoy majority support in Canada, but it appears that doing what is necessary to protect traditional marriage—namely, reining in the courts in some fashion—can be conveniently portrayed as an attack on the Charter itself, which has come to occupy a central place in Canada's search for national identity. As Justice Ian Binnie of the Supreme Court said last April in a breathtaking analysis of the Charter's place in Canadian public life: "There was slow recognition that the Charter really would change the way society functions. It's the glue that holds the country together. We have no common origins, we have no common language; we now associate who we are with the rights we have as Canadians."

To hear the principal warrant for social engineering by the judiciary called the country's "glue" is disturbing enough. Beyond that, however, there is cause for genuine alarm in the Liberal Party's new forthrightness under Mr. Martin, whose support of both unlimited abortion and same-sex marriage in his campaign against the Conservatives was a departure from the norm. Heretofore, both the Liberals and Conservatives had adopted a neutral stance on contested "moral" issues, leaving individual MPs free to vote as they wished. Mr. Chrétien had moved the Liberals toward a more pro-abortion position in the 2000 election campaign, but it was not a central theme, and he dropped it after the election. Mr. Martin had previously fostered an image of himself as a devout Catholic who was more reticent than Mr. Chrétien about the liberal social agenda. During the 2004 campaign, however, he came out so clearly for the abortion license and same-sex marriage that he earned a public rebuke from several Catholic bishops.

The Liberal Party includes a large proportion of voters who vote Liberal for economic reasons, but who are rather traditional on social matters. The Liberals themselves voted in 1999 in favor of traditional marriage—a vote that included Messrs. Chrétien and Martin. In 2003, the Liberal cabinet reversed itself and declared support for same-sex marriage, but more than fifty Liberal backbenchers refused to toe the new party line. Many Liberal MPs also refused to support a recent Liberal bill that allows embryonic stem cell research while banning cloning and the creation of embryos for research purposes (the bill passed anyway).

The Liberal Party is not monolithic and has, up to now, left room for pro-life, pro-family MPs. The recent campaign suggests that this may no longer be the case. What that will mean for the Liberal Party remains to be seen, but it would be an alarming development if Canada's Natural Governing Party declared itself

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squarely in support of the libertarian orthodoxy on social issues and refused to allow its pro-life members a significant role in the Party.

The upshot may be that social conservatives in Canada will slowly be purged from the Liberal Party and will ultimately survive in the Conservative Party only if they agree not to press their issues too forcefully, if at all. But it is difficult to say at this moment exactly how bleak the outlook really is. Since the election, Mr. Martin appears to be devoting his attention to other issues, with health care being first among them. There remain many Liberal Party backbenchers whose social conservatism did not prevent them from being re-elected, even though it may be keeping them out of Mr. Martin's inner circle. Mr. Martin will not want to alienate them irretrievably, given his party's unstable minority in Parliament. On the Conservative side, many of the brightest and most politically savvy MPs are stalwarts of social conservatism—and many of them are young—so it is unlikely that they will be completely silenced or pushed out, media preferences notwithstanding.

With the Liberals' minority government now vulnerable to the combined opposition of Canada's other parties, it will likely be only another year or two before Canadians head back to the polls. It is also likely that the next campaign will clarify the status of social conservatism in Canada. After the next election, the mix of encouragement, anxiety, and alarm that social conservatives now feel may give way to a less ambiguous result.

Raymond J. de Souza, a prominent commentator on Canadian affairs, is a priest of the Archdiocese of Kingston, Ontario.

Discovering Our Dependence

Mary Ann Glendon

When Otto von Bismarck established the world's first social security system, he never dreamed that a large proportion of the populace would live long enough to draw pensions. With a tight grip on the public purse, the Iron Chancellor set age sixty-five as an eligibility threshold that few could be expected to cross. When the U.S. version of the welfare state came into being fifty years later, the labor force was still relatively large in comparison to the population of those receiving benefits. Few in the New Deal era could have anticipated the demographic developments that in our day threaten all of the institutions on which people rely for support and security. Impeding any easy solution is the fact that many of the current pressures on families, welfare systems, and benevolent associations are the by-products of genuine advances in health and opportunity.

Longer life spans have expanded the population of frail elderly persons, including victims of dementias characterized by lengthy periods of disability. Changes in women's roles have greatly reduced the traditional pool of caregivers for the very young and the very old alike. Low birth rates are decreasing the ratio of active workers to pensioners and persons requiring social assistance. In combination, declining birth rates and improved longevity mean that the dependent population now includes a much smaller proportion of children and a much larger proportion of disabled and elderly persons than ever before. But with increased divorce and unwed parenthood, the impoverished population is now composed largely of women and children.

The increasing pressure on economic and human resources from both ends of the age spectrum has received remarkably little attention from policy makers. And this despite a warning from the Senate Special Committee on Aging, which argued in a 2002 report that, without significant reform, "the United States could be on the brink of a domestic financial crisis." The issues cannot be ignored much longer, however, for the first wave of the nation's seventy-seven million baby boomers will reach age sixty-five in 2011. According to Alan Greenspan, the country "will almost surely be unable to meet the demands on resources that the retirement of the baby boom generation will make."

The pinch is already provoking generational conflict in the ambitious welfare states of northern Europe, where birthrates and immigration rates are lower than in the United States and where, as here, the elderly wield considerable political clout. Modest proposals to cut back on pensions or to raise the retirement age in France and Germany have met with strikes and protests from the groups affected. At the same time, young Europeans are complaining about the high cost of health care for the elderly, and are resentful of fees that are eroding the tradition of free university education. (One German youth leader gained notoriety by suggesting that old folks should use crutches rather than seeking expensive hip replacements.)

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That the coming economic crunch is only one aspect of the dilemmas our aging society will confront was emphasized at two recent interdisciplinary meetings. After hearing testimony on aging, dementia, and caregiving at its June 2004 meeting in Washington, the President's Council on Bioethics concluded that discussions of these matters tend to neglect important medical, psychological, ethical, and social issues. The Council is currently in the process of deciding whether to explore the area further with a view to producing a report that might aid in the search for practices and ideals adequate to the new culture of longevity.

That such investigations are urgently needed was one conclusion of another recent meeting, that of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, which devoted its annual spring gathering in Rome to a conference on the ways that changing relations between generations have affected the very young, the frail elderly, and the severely ill or disabled—both in welfare states and in places where the welfare state is minimal or nonexistent. (The Academy was established in 1994 by Pope John Paul II and is charged with the task of contributing to the advance of the social sciences while helping to find "solutions to people's concrete problems, solutions based on social justice." Its membership, drawn from five continents, is composed of experts in the social sciences, including two American Nobel laureates in economics, Kenneth Arrow and Joseph Stiglitz.) Like the U.S. President's Council, the Academicians concluded that underlying the welfare crisis is a deeper crisis involving changes in the meanings and values that people attribute to aging and mortality, sex and procreation, marriage, gender, parenthood, relations among the generations, and life itself.

The papers presented to the Academy, soon to be published by Libreria Editrice Vaticana, should be of wide interest since several were based on cross-national studies. The speakers included, for example, Francis Fukuyama, whose book *The Great Disruption* treats the late twentieth-century revolution in behavior and ideas in affluent nations, and Jacques Vallin, Director of the French National Demographic Institute, who has studied the changing age structure of populations throughout the world.

The presentations led to much debate about the implications of the dramatic alterations in social norms that took place in many countries in recent decades. Where children are concerned, changes in the sexual and marital behavior of large numbers of adults have altered the very experience of childhood. Moreover, as the proportion of childless households has grown and societies have become more adult-centered, the general level of concern for the well-being of children has declined. They are out of sight and increasingly out of mind. Cambridge economist Partha Dasgupta noted an interesting "free rider" problem: childless individuals (who as a group enjoy a higher standard of living than child-rearing persons as a group) expect to be cared for in old age through benefits financed by a labor force that they are not helping to replenish.

With widespread acceptance of the notion that behavior in the highly personal areas of sex and marriage is of no concern to anyone other than the "consenting adults" involved, it has been easy to overlook what should have been obvious from the beginning: individual actions in the aggregate exert a profound influence on what kind of society we are bringing into being. Eventually, when large numbers of individuals act primarily with regard to self-fulfillment, the entire culture is transformed. The evidence is now overwhelming that affluent Western nations have been engaged in a massive social experiment—an experiment that brought new opportunities and liberties to adults but has put children and other dependents at considerable risk.

Disarray in one sustaining cultural institution weakens others. The spread of family breakdown has been accompanied by disturbances in schools, neighborhoods, churches, local governments, and workplace associations—all of the structures that have traditionally depended on families for their support and that in turn have served as important resources for families in times of stress. The law, too, has changed rapidly, becoming a testing ground for various ways of reimagining family relations and an arena for struggles among competing ideas about individual liberty, equality between men and women, human sexuality, marriage, and family life. It does not seem an exaggeration to speak, as some at the Rome conference did, of a breakdown in social norms.

Perhaps no single development, apart from the epidemic of fatherlessness, has had more impact on the environment of childhood, the care of dependents, or the health of the mediating institutions of civil society than the mass movement of women, including mothers of young children, into the paid labor force. It is a mark of great progress that we now live in a world where women have more opportunities than ever before in history. No society, however, has yet figured out how to assure satisfactory conditions for child-rearing when both parents of young children work outside the home. And no society has

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yet found a substitute for the loss of other types of caregiving previously provided mainly by women.

For many women, moreover, the picture of progress is ambiguous. Though birth rates are declining, the majority of women still become mothers. When mothers of young children enter the labor force, whether because of necessity or desire, they tend to seek work that is compatible with family roles. That usually means jobs with lower pay, fewer benefits, and fewer opportunities for advancement than those available to persons without family responsibilities. So, ironically, the more a woman forgoes advancement in the workplace for the sake of caring for her own children, the more she and her children are at risk of poverty if the marriage ends in divorce. On the other hand, the more she invests in her work, the greater the likelihood her children will have care that is less than optimal. It is not surprising therefore that women are hedging against these risks in two ways: by having fewer children than women did in the past, and by seeking types of labor force participation that are compatible with parenting. In so doing, they often sacrifice *both* their child-raising preferences and their chances to have well-paid, satisfying, and secure employment.

Thus, while enormous advances have been made by women without children, mothers face new versions of an old problem: caregiving, one of the most important forms of human work, receives little respect and reward, whether performed in the family or for wages outside the home. Despite these risks, most mothers still accept primary responsibility for childcare, thereby incurring disadvantages in the labor force. If divorce or separation occurs, most mothers seek and accept primary responsibility for the care of their children even when they are not well-equipped financially to do so. Indeed, if women did not continue to shoulder these risks and burdens, it is hard to see how any social institution could make up for the services they now provide.

The main solutions proposed by the feminism of the 1970s (at the zenith of the welfare state) were the socialization of caregiving and the equalization of child-care responsibilities between fathers and mothers. But those ideas have not had broad appeal—either for parents or for taxpayers. Such ideas ignore the fact that for many women, caring for children and other family members is central to their identity, sustaining the relationships that make their lives meaningful.

What makes the dependency-welfare crisis so confounding is that all of society's sources of support and security are implicated. Families, still the central pillar of our caregiving system, are losing much of their capacity to care for their own dependent members, just when government is becoming less capable of fulfilling the roles it once took over from families. It seems that the ambition of welfare states to free individuals from much of their dependence on families, and to relieve families of some of their most burdensome responsibilities, may have succeeded just well enough to put dependents at heightened risk now that welfare states are faltering.

At the Rome meeting, the British social theorist Margaret Archer pointed out a curious fact that may have impeded reform efforts: the overemphasis on self-sufficiency in contemporary political thought coexists with an approach to welfare that underrates human capacities and ignores important dimensions of personhood. Social policy, she noted, has been influenced by mindsets that treat human beings as passive subjects or instrumental rationalists rather than as active agents whose decisions are influenced not only by calculation of self-interest but also by strongly held values. In a similar vein, the Italian sociologist Pier Paolo Donati pointed out that the prevailing concepts of what society is also inhibit constructive solutions: society, Donati noted, is not just a collection of self-seeking individuals, but is "a fabric of relationships, to a certain extent ambivalent and conflicted, in need of solidarity."

Perhaps the most important conclusion reached by the Pontifical Academy was that if political deliberation about the impending dependency-welfare crisis proceeds within a framework based solely on the idea of competition for scarce resources, the outlook for dependents is grim. As noted, divisive intergenerational conflict is already observable in Europe. The most ominous development, of course, is the growing normalization of the extermination of persons who have become inconvenient and burdensome to maintain at life's frail beginnings and endings.

To state the obvious: if the outlook for dependents is grim, the outlook for everyone is grim. Despite our attachment to the ideal of the free, self-determining individual, we humans are dependent social beings. We still begin our lives in the longest period of dependency of any mammal. Almost all of us spend much of our lives either as dependents, or caring for dependents, or financially responsible for dependents. To devise constructive approaches to the dependency-welfare crisis will require acceptance of this profound and unchangeable fact of life.

Mary Ann Glendon is the Learned Hand Professor of Law at Harvard University and president of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences.

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Don't Call it Proselytism

Lawrence A. Uzzell

Several years ago, during an interview I was conducting with him on church-state relations, an adviser to a provincial governor in Siberia asked me suspiciously if I believed in "proselitizm." I replied that I not only believed in it but actually practiced it, having sponsored several American converts to Orthodox Christianity from Protestantism or Roman Catholicism. From his surprise at my admitting I was a proselytizer, it was clear that he had never before heard the word used except as a term of abuse.

The word "proselytism," which derives from the Greek Septuagint translation of the Old Testament, is now used more often in more languages than ever before in its history. Its connotation is almost always negative, even sinister. One cannot imagine a missionary organization today describing its own activities as "proselytism," though the original meaning of the term "proselyte" was positive. In the Septuagint and the New Testament it referred to Gentile converts to Judaism, such as those who were among the witnesses to the miracle at Pentecost (Acts 2:11). According to Acts 6:5 a certain "Nicolaus, a proselyte of Antioch," became one the Church's first deacons; he thus presumably converted twice, first from paganism to Judaism and then from Judaism to Christianity. (If he were our contemporary, would he be considered a double victim of religious fanaticism?)

We live in an age of persuasion, in which we are bombarded by political and commercial messages designed to change our thoughts and actions, but the unfavorable term "proselytism" is reserved for specifically religious persuaders. Phrases such as "feminist proselytism" or "environmentalist proselytism" are unknown; it is considered natural, even laudable, for adherents of those secular belief systems to seek converts all over the world, even in cultures where their beliefs are profoundly alien.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the term had broader application. In 1790 Edmund Burke applied it to the anti-Christian *philosophes* of the French Enlightenment, who he said "were possessed with a spirit of proselytism in the most fanatical degree." The 1828 edition of Webster's dictionary defined "proselytism" as "the making of converts to a religion or religious sect, or to any opinion, system, or party." The high-church Anglican Edward Pusey expressed regret in 1842 that "any exhibition of ourselves as a proselytizing Church would unsettle many of our own children."

Today's Christian missionaries often contrast "proselytism" with "evangelism"; the former is what they accuse rival denominations of doing, while the latter is what they claim to do themselves. Surprisingly, there is no rigorous distinction between the two terms in canon law or in theological dictionaries—or for that matter in legal dictionaries. The Greek Constitution, for example, has outlawed "proselytism" since 1911 without ever defining it. The term is sometimes used to denounce Christian "sheep stealers" who seek converts among those who are already members of some other Christian confession, as distinct from missionaries who appeal to those who have never been baptized—but no Church council or other authoritative religious organ has ever formalized that usage.

As with "fascism" in the 1960s and "terrorism" today, the definition of "proselytism" seems to grow less and less precise the more often the word is used. Sometimes it is vaguely characterized as the use of inappropriate methods, one of which is said to be vigorous criticism of the belief system from which the target of proselytism is being wooed. Again, that standard is almost never applied to secular ideologies. Imagine trying to persuade someone of the merits of free-market capitalism without discussing the defects of socialism, or vice versa. Bribery, fraud, and coercion are also frequently mentioned as accompaniments of proselytism (though presumably these are wrong in and of themselves, whether or not they accompany missionary activity).

Consider the following examples. In 1961 the World Council of Churches pronounced "proselytism" to be "a corruption of Christian witness" that uses "cajolery, bribery, undue pressure, or intimidation, subtly or openly, to bring about seeming conversion." In a footnote to the documents of Vatican II the Roman Catholic Church defined proselytism as "a corruption of the Christian witness by appeal to hidden forms of coercion or by a style of propaganda unworthy of the Gospel. It is not the use but the abuse of the right to religious freedom." Cardinal Edward Cassidy, president of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, wrote in 1998 that by "proselytism" he meant "the use of unworthy means to attract members of other churches or even unchurched persons to their fold. Misrepresentation of the other, or of one's own community, is a common source of tension. Some of the tension between churches comes from the way in which new converts to one community denigrate their

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former ecclesial home." A statement from the National Council of Churches (NCC) in 2003 defined "coercive proselytism" as that which "violates the right of the human person, Christian or non-Christian, to be free from external coercion in religious matters."

That last statement in particular has more than a hint of disingenuousness about it: Can one imagine the National Council of Churches supporting *non*-coercive proselytism? The word "coercive" seems to have been added not to help make precise distinctions, but rather as a rhetorical flourish to help further discredit activities that the NCC already disapproves of. On this subject as on so many others, the NCC has chosen fuzziness over clarity.

From my fellow Orthodox Christians, such willful fuzziness often appears in terms such as "canonical territory," which imply that other Christian confessions should treat as off-limits large geographical areas in which, it is claimed, only one faith has deep roots and historical legitimacy. With demographic mixing (which has been going on in most countries much longer than ultra-nationalists are willing to admit), such demarcations inexorably come to be drawn along ethnic rather than geographical lines. In effect, today's Moscow Patriarchate is arguing that if you are an ethnic Pole living in Russia you should be Roman Catholic, if you are an Uzbek you should be Muslim, and so on—contradicting the New Testament teaching (Galatians 3:28) that in Christ "there is neither Jew nor Greek." The Patriarchate has thus turned its back on its own rich heritage of missionary service among the Muslims of Central Asia and the aboriginal pagans of Siberia and Alaska. In an age of globalization, renouncing the right to evangelize foreigners ultimately means renouncing the right to evangelize our next-door neighbors and even our own grandchildren.

Secular specialists on human rights and international law, even those who defend freedom of conscience, now use the word "proselytism" to mean any attempt by any religious believer to win converts from other religions or from irreligion. The term appears repeatedly in the U.S. State Department's annual country reports on international religious freedom. Intentionally or not, this usage gives to all missionary activities a color of fanatical sectarianism.

Pushing actively for the denigration of proselytism are two different forces, which overlap in organizations such as the NCC. Lukewarm relativists constitute the first of these forces. Their need is for psychological defenses and social barriers against those who would vigorously advocate eternal truths. The bureaucratic, corporate, and academic elites who set the rules of public discussion in Western Europe and North America are uncomfortable with ultimate questions and with theological answers to those questions. They wish to avoid not only answering such questions but even hearing them asked. If possible they would like to do with the whole of society what they have already done to the public school systems: turn it into a "religion-free zone" undisturbed by prophets and saints or even by the memory of them. Along with other new rules this means a new etiquette, in which religious believers must scrupulously refrain from "offending" unbelievers (though there is no reciprocal obligation for unbelievers to refrain from what used to be called blasphemy). In effect the relativists seek selective protectionism in the marketplace of ideas, while continuing to depict themselves as defenders of robust intellectual freedom.

The other force pushing to discredit a broad range of activities related to proselytism is made up of those religious leaders who fear that their organizations could not effectively compete with others. Among these are the Protestant bodies that have hitched their fate to fading ideologies such as twentieth-century secular liberalism, as well as those Orthodox churches that have allowed themselves to function primarily as ethnic clubs. Even while Orthodox Christianity is making unprecedented progress among ex-Protestants in the American Bible Belt, Orthodox bishops in Moscow continue to rely on the patronage of the authoritarian Russian government.

The world's largest and most complicated religious organization, the Roman Catholic Church, is tugged in several directions. On the issue of proselytism, Roman Catholics should have less in common with the dwindling Protestant mainline than with evangelical Protestants, who really believe in the objective truth of their own faith and in their mission to preach it universally. But in much of Western Europe, Roman Catholics have more in common with today's Orthodox nationalists, lured by the same self-defeating temptation to exclude novel religions not because they are false but because they are foreign. Like the Orthodox, they risk losing opportunities to win new converts because they put their energies into suppressing persuasion rather than into being more persuasive.

On the most important theological issues, including ecclesiology, Roman Catholics are genuinely closer to the Orthodox than to Protestants. Pope John Paul II's model of a Church that must breathe with "two lungs" provides a principled basis for the Vatican to renounce "sheep stealing" from the Orthodox—but even that model should be seen as a matter of ecclesiastical policy and not of secular law. To encourage the legislators and bureaucrats of today's highly secularized governments, even in nominally Orthodox countries, to

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enforce prohibitions on proselytism is to invite them into matters that they are ludicrously ill-equipped to judge—and to encourage even more dangerous meddling in other areas of church life.

Another group that is bound to be unhappy about proselytism is the Jews—both the religiously observant and the nonobservant. Like it or not, on this point Jews and Christians face a fundamental disagreement on first principles. We Christians are commanded (Matthew 28:19) to "go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." Judaism, by contrast, has evolved into a culture that generally rejects all missionary appeals of any kind to other ethnicities. (That this was not always so is shown by the very origins of the term "proselyte.") Mainstream Jewish law insists on a positive duty to discourage Gentiles who want to become Jews and denies that it is even possible for an ethnic Jew to convert out of Judaism. In this as in other areas, Jews would feel more comfortable if we behaved like them—if we abandoned all efforts to win new Christian converts, except perhaps among traditionally Christian ethnicities. But for us the very phrase "Christian ethnicity" is problematic; we do not believe that faith is transmitted by genes. The Jews are so unusual, even unique, among the major world religions in this respect that it seems absurd for the rest of us to be guided by their rules.

Proselytism has become the world's most overused religious term and is most often invoked by those who ultimately oppose all forms of Christian evangelism. If the Apostles had refrained from everything that today is lumped under the term, there would have been no carrying out of the Great Commission and the Church might have died in its infancy. Precisely because it labels all missionary activity pejoratively, the term is no help in distinguishing the legitimate from the illegitimate; it makes no distinction between, say, St. Paul and those missionaries who use such unscrupulous tactics as, for example, requiring that desperately poor Russians sit through Protestant worship services before free meals are provided to them. (Sadly, I am not making that up.)

The Adventist scholar Bert Beach persuasively argues that this "equivocal term, rife with misapplications" should be dropped in favor of the term "improper evangelism." In an essay posted on the website of the International Religious Liberty Association (*www.irla.org*), Beach proposes a voluntary good-conduct code to guide missionaries in "principles of proper dissemination of religion and belief." His suggested principles may seem self-evident, but I have seen almost every one of them violated by foreigners seeking converts in Russia. He offers a list of things that a missionary will not do. "Not exploit or take advantage of poor, vulnerable segments of the population. Not knowingly make false or questionable claims of miraculous healings or interventions. Not offer financial or other material inducements or educational benefits in order to 'convert' people. Not knowingly spread false information regarding the teachings of other religions or ridiculing their beliefs and practices. Not incite hatred, internecine strife, and antagonistic competition. Not use coercive or manipulative methods of evangelism to get church members, including certain advertising that preys on human gullibility."

If Orthodox Christians and Roman Catholics have been too eager to embrace state coercion as an antidote to improper evangelism, many Protestants have been insufficiently zealous about monitoring one another for fraudulent or otherwise improper methods. Those who are serious about Christian missions should work not only to develop their own specialized code of ethics but to name and shame its violators. That would make it easier to retire the hopelessly inflated term "proselytism" to the linguistic museum where it belongs.

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The Supreme Court Rules: 2004

Michael M. Uhlmann

For those old enough to remember the way things used to be, the media hoopla that now attends the conclusion of almost every Supreme Court term can seem, well, a bit unseemly. The old order, to be sure, had its dramatic moments when national attention focused on the Justices. One thinks, for example, of the school desegregation cases or the appeal of the Rosenbergs' espionage conviction; such cases, however, were the exception. Most of the Court's work was left to be sifted by professional musing, which for the most part took place in highbrow public policy journals or more specialized law reviews.

The old understanding rested on a kind of noble lie, namely, the presumption that the Court was essentially a neutral umpire, not a conjurer of novel constitutional doctrine. The Constitution, understood as the repository of timeless wisdom about the political order, was what truly mattered, not the will of the Justices. The Court drew its legitimacy and strength from the Constitution, not vice versa. The Justices were there to ensure the proper understanding of the Constitution as the ultimate expression of the people's will. This essentially conservative understanding of the Court's limited function, though not always honored, induced a certain caution among the Justices. Constitutional novelty was seen as rather more a vice than a virtue, and when it did occur an effort was made to disguise the fact. All of this changed with *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) and the judicial revolution that followed in its wake. With surprising swiftness, the Court came to be seen—and the Justices came to see themselves—as the voice of a "living Constitution," by which was meant a Constitution no longer bound by original meaning or *stare decisis*. Henceforth, constitutional novelty became a virtue, celebrated by the organs of elite opinion and aggressively encouraged by the legal professoriate.

Under the new dispensation, it was inevitable that legal scriveners would begin coming out of the woodwork. If the Court was going to be the premier agent of redefined constitutional meaning, why should it not also be the object of heightened media attention? One can hardly turn on the television these days without encountering a platoon of professors and pundits expounding on the Court's doings. Much of this commentary, like most television news, soon dissipates into the ether, never to be thought about again. The significance of the phenomenon is not what the legal pundits say but that they are there in such great numbers to say it. Arousing and feeding the public's appetite for news about the Court is now the "in" thing to do. The Court, in a word, is understood to be a political player. Whether its reputation for neutrality, on which its authority ultimately rests, can withstand that understanding is another question altogether.

Intense media scrutiny is driven, no doubt, by the 24-hour news cycle, the now ubiquitous presence of cable television, the endless search for juicy sound bites, and, perhaps above all, by the celebrification of nearly everyone and everything in our time. The new focus on the Court is also driven, however, by the growing sense that the judiciary has as much to say

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about the character and course of our political culture as do the elected representatives of the people. One would be hard-pressed to find a subject on which the Justices are indisposed to opine, or about which they are disinclined to make new rules. The wide reach of the modern administrative state brings all sorts of matters before the judiciary that judges in previous eras never had to grapple with. Modern government's relentlessly expanding agenda has been made more expansive still by the Justices' self-appointed role as the ultimate guardians of democracy. The rise of judicial supremacy means that every nuance of the Court's deliberations will be examined with unusual care. Even a President's nominations for lower-court judgeships, which with rare exceptions used to sail through the Senate, have become matters of intense political controversy. And why should they not be?

The drama attending this year's end of term, therefore, was no surprise. It is an election year, and the President's opponents have sharply criticized his command of the war on terrorism, so the media were riveted on the enemy combatant detention cases. The liberals' hope was that the Court would rebuke the President for making unfounded claims about the reach of presidential war powers. In this hope they were sorely disappointed, as the Court's decisions in the detainee cases were a mixed bag. Taken together, they sustained presidential discretion in wartime even as they placed certain procedural limits on the manner of its exercise. Two cases concerned constitutional claims asserted by American citizens; the third addressed similar claims advanced by foreigners. At the heart of all three was the irreducible tension between national security and protection of civil liberties in time of war.

The roots of this controversy stretch back to the early days of the Republic. Heated disputes about how to strike a proper balance between presidential authority and personal liberty began before the ink was dry on the Constitution, and they will likely continue ad infinitum. In the civil libertarians' telling of the tale, Presidents are ever prone to abuse their authority, never more so than when war or the threat of war provides a ready excuse for the expansion of their discretionary powers in unnecessary and dangerous ways. With the cooperation of a compliant Congress dominated by his own party, President John Adams gave his approval to the much-decried Alien and Sedition Acts, which, it is alleged, were used to punish Adams' political critics. The next major chapter in the story tells the tale of Abraham Lincoln's extraordinary (and some say unconstitutional) assertions of presidential prerogative during the Civil War. This is followed by accounts of civil liberties abuses during World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. The most prominent episode of the World War II story is the internment of Japanese-American citizens; the major elements in the story from 1945 to the fall of the Berlin Wall are the real or imagined foul deeds of the House Un-American Activities Committee, the evil omnipresence of Joe McCarthy, the almost equally nefarious Richard Nixon and J. Edgar Hoover, and the Watergate scandal.

One form or another of the civil libertarian account has pretty much become the received wisdom, thanks to countless books, movies, and television productions on the subject. But that account, dominated as it is by conflict between black hats and white hats, is hardly the whole truth. What it omits or dismisses is any adequate account of the urgent necessities of state that can prompt Presidents to expand their discretionary powers. For every example of a Nixon using the pretext of national security to advance personal or political goals, there are dozens of examples of Presidents asserting their authority in the reasonable belief that the national interest requires it. It must be remembered, moreover, that every major assertion of presidential power must sooner or later receive the formal or informal assent of Congress, the body to which the Constitution grants a considerable portion (some would say the greater part) of the war power. Nor can one ignore the constraints placed upon the exercise of presidential discretion by the threat of potentially adverse Supreme Court rulings. In short, Presidents, even those to whom the basest motives may be attributed, can seldom act alone and, even if they manage to, can seldom do so for long.

With war-making, as with most things, Congress often likes to have it both ways. Legislators are quick to lead the parade or fall in line behind a President when war or its prospect seems popular: witness the patriotic enthusiasms expressed by virtually every elected representative in the days following the successful terrorist assaults on New York City and the Pentagon; witness, too, the speed with which Congress passed the Patriot Act and delegated to the President broad discretionary authority for the use of force against terrorists and their supporters. But when a war appears to be going badly (as they all do at some point), legislators can leap off the bandwagon with alacrity, or display the kind of agility that lets them have one foot on and one foot off.

Presidents, of course, do not enjoy the luxury of having it both ways once military forces are engaged. They must see things through to victory or to some other reasonable accommodation, despite the whims of public opinion and the fair-weather friendship of Congress. Presidents will reach in time of war for as much discretionary authority as they can muster, either

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by delegation from Congress or by capacious interpretation of their independent constitutional powers. The exigencies of war, once engaged, almost always drive a President to assert some version of "inherent" executive power, based on the "take care" clause of the Constitution, his oath of office, and, above all, his status as commander in chief.

This necessarily pushes Presidents up against the Constitution's grant to Congress of considerable war powers, not to mention the more general power of the purse. Countervailing constitutional assertions, each based on plausible interpretations, are invariably freighted with great passion. Sometimes the conflict takes the form of a legal case that wends its way to the Supreme Court. On such occasions many Justices would no doubt wish they had chosen some other calling. The separation of powers invites conflict between Congress and the President over war powers, and while the Court can and should have its say in appropriate cases and controversies, it must tread a careful path lest it intrude upon the jealously guarded prerogatives of the political branches or, worse, hamper the nation's ability to defend itself. In the mother of all modern war-powers decisions, the so-called Steel Seizure case of 1952, the Court checked Harry Truman's order authorizing the federal government to take possession of, and to operate, private steel mills threatened with closure by a union strike. Truman's political justification rested on his need to prosecute the Korean War, and although he cited "the Constitution and the law of the United States" (especially the commander-in-chief clause) as his legal ground, he cited no specific statutory authority.

The President's action was enjoined by a 6-3 majority of the Supreme Court, which was understandable enough, but, significantly, no written opinion could command the signatures of a majority of the Justices. Not only that, but seven of the nine Justices accepted in principle the idea of "inherent" executive power. Thus, even as they condemned the particular application of Truman's claimed authority, a strong majority of the Court refused to tie down the exercise of presidential discretion by means of a rigid constitutional formula. The rules of the game were perhaps best summarized by Justice Robert H. Jackson's concurring opinion: presidential authority is at its height when undertaken pursuant to, or consonant with, an Act of Congress, and at its low point when executive action appears to contravene congressional intent. In between, Jackson said, was "a zone of twilight" in which the President and Congress must contend for authority.

Jackson's tripartite scheme is an accurate summary of the problem, but its application depends decisively on how one reads congressional authorizations. Legislation typically does not and cannot anticipate every particular set of facts that might affect the exercise of presidential discretion; nor can it properly contravene the independent sources of presidential authority radiating from Article II of the Constitution. Congress must necessarily paint with a broad brush, and that is precisely what it did when it authorized President Bush on September 14, 2001, to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks." What exactly that grant of authority implied and how it amplified such inherent authority as the President may possess form the heart of the controversy animating the three enemy-combatant detainee cases decided by the Court in June, *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, and *Rasul, et al. v. Bush*.

The *Padilla* case involved an American citizen accused of conspiring with al-Qaeda to carry out terrorist attacks within the United States. Based on particular factual findings about Padilla's activities, and invoking his authority as commander in chief as well as the authority delegated by Congress (cited above), President Bush designated Padilla as an enemy combatant and committed him to military custody. He has been held at the Navy brig in Charleston, South Carolina, since June 2002. Padilla's attorney filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court in New York City, where Padilla had originally been incarcerated in apparent anticipation of a criminal trial. Various constitutional and statutory claims were asserted, among them the contention that Padilla's designation as an enemy combatant was unlawful and that he was being held in violation of the so-called Non-Detention Act ("No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.").

The government responded by defending President Bush's actions on the merits, citing constitutional and statutory grounds as well as authority derived from a 1942 Supreme Court decision. The government also argued on procedural grounds, asserting that the New York federal court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, and that a proper habeas motion would have to be filed with the Federal District Court in Charleston, directed against the commandant of the military prison.

When these opposing arguments reached the Second Circuit, a divided panel ruled against the government on both the merits of Padilla's habeas claim and on the jurisdiction question. The Supreme Court was also narrowly divided. Although four Justices thought Padilla's claim should be heard on the merits, the majority upheld the government's position on the

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jurisdictional question. Padilla will thus have to begin all over again in Federal District Court in Charleston, a less hospitable forum for his claims, one supposes, than the Southern District of New York. It is also located within the bailiwick of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, whose decision in *Hamdi* was also reviewed by the High Court in June.

The legal issues in *Hamdi* are similar to those raised by *Padilla*, but the facts are quite different. Although born in Louisiana, Yaser Hamdi was raised in Saudi Arabia. His father filed a habeas motion on his son's behalf contesting the latter's designation as an enemy combatant and claiming that Yaser had gone to Afghanistan on a humanitarian "relief" mission. The government asserts that he was captured in battle while bearing arms in support of the Taliban. Like Padilla, Hamdi challenged the factual and legal grounds of his designation as an enemy combatant. On three occasions, a federal district judge in Norfolk, Virginia, found for Hamdi, and on all three occasions he was reversed by the Fourth Circuit. In the final appeal, a unanimous three-judge panel agreed that while Hamdi was entitled to challenge his detention, the likelihood of his prevailing on the merits was small: the judiciary ought properly to defer to the executive when it comes to military judgments in the field. The procedural safeguards that citizens might normally enjoy in criminal prosecutions "do not translate neatly to the arena of armed conflict. . . ." The judiciary's role is necessarily circumscribed because "the Constitution does not specifically contemplate any role for the courts in the conduct of war, or in foreign policy generally."

On appeal to the Supreme Court, Hamdi argued that the Fourth Circuit ruling effectively eliminated all constitutional restrictions on the exercise of presidential discretion in wartime, permitting citizens like himself to be held in prison indefinitely "without charge and without access to counsel or the courts." (In February 2004, the government granted Hamdi limited access to counsel as a matter of privilege but not of right, and imposed tight restrictions on what might be discussed.)

By a vote of 8-1, with Justice Clarence Thomas dissenting, the Court ruled that Hamdi was entitled to challenge the factual basis of his detention before a neutral decision maker. The ruling, however, produced an unusual split among the Justices, and no opinion commanded more than four signatures. The plurality opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor concluded that although Hamdi might contest the factual basis of his detention, the President is legally authorized during armed conflict to designate American citizens as enemy combatants. Further, they may be held without charge or criminal trial *pendente bello*. Justice Thomas would have gone further, saying that the President's discretionary authority in such cases was for all intents and purposes beyond the purview of the courts. "In this context," he wrote, "due process requires nothing more than a good-faith executive determination." Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred on the necessity for a factual hearing, but dissented on the adequacy of the President's legal authority: the Non-Detention Act, in their view, prevents the detention of an American citizen absent a criminal charge. The unlikely pair of Justices Antonin Scalia and John Paul Stevens went them one better, contending that the government faced a stark constitutional choice that no amount of judicial glossing could obscure. For Scalia and Stevens the Constitution is plain, simple, and direct in its instruction: only Congress may suspend the right to habeas corpus, and because Congress had not enacted the required legislation, Hamdi must either be tried as a criminal or set free.

In short, there are five votes rather strongly sustaining presidential authority. Due process, Justice O'Connor said, requires only that a citizen-detainee be granted an opportunity to challenge his designation as an enemy combatant before "a neutral decision maker." Moreover, the neutral decision maker need not be a federal court; the "standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal." Further, once the government "puts forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy combatant criteria," the burden of proof shifts to the detainee to prove that he is *not* an enemy combatant. In these proceedings a detainee would be entitled to assistance of counsel. The military is competent to execute these Court-imposed tasks, and it can do so without undermining national security. Consistent with many of its past decisions, the Court did not venture to undercut presidential authority in time of war. The civil libertarian perspective will live to fight another day if and when *Padilla* and *Hamdi* return for further consideration. But for the moment, there is little in either decision to give it much purchase.

The question presented by the third detainee case, *Rasul*, was a narrow procedural one: whether federal courts have jurisdiction to hear challenges by *alien* enemy combatants who were captured abroad and are now quarantined more or less incommunicado at Guantanamo Bay. The litigation was brought on behalf of two British subjects, two Australians, and twelve Kuwaitis. Although the facts pertaining to each differ in detail, the common cause alleged violation of due process rights, including the right to be informed of the

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charges against them and the right to meet with counsel and relatives. The government responded that because they are aliens who are being held outside the "ultimate sovereignty" of the United States, a federal court has no jurisdiction to hear the case. To this, the complainants argued that the U.S. has de facto control over Guantanamo, which is the effective equivalent of formal sovereignty.

At the heart of the litigation is the validity of the 1950 *Eisentrager* decision of the Supreme Court, which held that aliens who had been captured, tried by a military tribunal, and incarcerated outside the sovereign territory of the U.S. could not seek habeas relief in federal courts. (The *Eisentrager* prisoners were German nationals who had been captured in China, tried for aiding the Japanese war effort, and confined eventually in a U.S. military brig in Germany.) The *Rasul* detainees lost in district court, and the judgment was sustained by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. (Meanwhile, in a similar case, the Ninth Circuit had ruled to the contrary, arguing that territorial control rather than formal sovereignty was the relevant test, and inasmuch as the U.S. exercises such control over Guantanamo, the detainees were entitled to be heard.) On appeal to the Supreme Court, Rasul and the other detainees prevailed on the jurisdictional question. In an opinion joined by four of his colleagues (with Justice Anthony Kennedy concurring in the result), Justice Stevens effectively gutted *Eisentrager* without formally overruling it. He argued that subsequent Court decisions had broadened the habeas corpus statute to convey certain rights to noncitizens, including the right to challenge their detention status in federal court. On the critical sovereignty question, Stevens argued that de facto U.S. control sufficed for jurisdictional purposes.

Justice Scalia issued a stinging dissent, also signed by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, describing the majority opinion as "irresponsible," "judicial adventurism of the worst sort," and "a wrenching departure from precedent" that "springs a trap" on the government's reasonable expectation that Guantanamo Bay is beyond the reach of federal court jurisdiction. The "breathtaking" consequence of the holding, he continued, is ominous both in its implications for federal judicial power and in its harmful effects upon national security in a time of war. The result, he feared, would enable the Guantanamo detainees to file petitions for relief in any of our ninety-four federal district courts.

Whether the results of *Rasul* will be as baneful as the dissenting Justices fear is not clear. During oral argument, Justice O'Connor extracted from detainees' counsel the concession that if the detainees were to be tried by military tribunals, the ground for access to federal courts would be removed. The burden of having to conduct such proceedings is bad enough, but it moots the specter of habeas proceedings being conducted in federal district court. More importantly, both sides acknowledge that inasmuch as *Rasul* turned on an interpretation of a federal statute, Congress could cure the problem simply by amending the statute.

Standing back from the three detainee cases in an effort to see them as a unit, one beholds a Supreme Court troubled by the claim of essentially unfettered discretion on the part of the executive. Its decisions in these cases may be read as a shot across the bow of that claim. The Court postponed the merits of *Padilla* to another day and gave the President a substantial victory in *Hamdi*. *Rasul* is certainly liberal adventurism of the worst sort, but its effect can be mooted either by congressional correction or by the execution of procedures akin to those spelled out in *Hamdi*. *Hamdi*'s procedures concerned only the rights of American citizens; as events unfold with respect to both citizen and alien claims, it seems improbable that the Court will grant greater due process protection to aliens than is available to citizens. Presidential authority to designate and detain enemy combatants in time of war, and to hold them outside the criminal justice system for the duration of hostilities, remains essentially intact. A heavier burden has been placed upon the military justice system, but it is one that the military is capable of handling despite the theoretical pretensions of *Rasul*. Doctrinally, the cases are messy and convoluted, and their resolution will not satisfy those who might prefer a theoretically consistent approach. On balance, no great harm has been done to the war effort, the executive has been modestly chastised, and the Court has preserved its largely self-appointed role as the ultimate guardian of democracy. One might wish for a lower judicial profile when it comes to national security and foreign affairs, but given the presumptions of judicial supremacy in our time, we should count ourselves fortunate that the Court did not do more damage.

Coming just behind the detainee cases in terms of media attention was, of course, the Pledge of Allegiance litigation, which asked whether public schoolchildren might continue to acknowledge the divine Author of their rights when saluting their nation's flag (*Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow*). Earlier in the year, the Court also decided a case arising from the state of Washington, where an otherwise eligible student was denied scholarship assistance because he wished to pursue a degree in theology (*Locke v. Davey*; see Robert T. Miller, "Religion Uniquely Disfavored," FT June/July). With these cases we enter once again the bewildering wonderland of the

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Supreme Court's religious rights jurisprudence. For sheer confusion, not to mention arbitrary and gratuitous assertions of judicial supremacy, this body of judge-made law has few competitors.

The Court punted on *Newdow* by avoiding altogether the merits of the First Amendment claim and deciding the case on procedural grounds. Michael Newdow, a noncustodial parent of a minor child on whose behalf he had filed his original suit, was found not to have standing to pursue the case. Justice Stevens' opinion for the eight-Justice Court (Justice Scalia having recused himself) was joined by four other Justices. Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Thomas, while concurring in the decision to dismiss the case, disagreed with the majority on the question of Newdow's standing.

Justice Stevens' argument on standing will be left for another day. Suffice it to say that whatever one may think of it, it only postpones the inevitable. At least three other cases dealing with the Pledge are lumbering along in three states, and new plaintiffs with unquestioned standing are being solicited in Newdow's home state of California. The issue will be back before the Court soon and it will have to be confronted. Everyone on the Court knows that, which is no doubt why Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Thomas each wrote concurring opinions that addressed the substance of Newdow's claim.

Chief Justice Rehnquist's take was essentially identical to the argument advanced by the Bush administration in its briefs against Newdow: the phrase "under God" represents not an endorsement of religious belief but only the recognition of historical fact, namely, that the United States was founded "on a fundamental belief in God." The case for retaining the Pledge in its present form, in Rehnquist's view, does not require an affirmation of any truth of a metaphysical or religious nature. It requires only the affirmation that the nation's founders believed in God.

Justice O'Connor joined the Chief's views *in toto* but added her own observations on what does or does not constitute an "endorsement" of religion. As the principal exponent of the endorsement test, Justice O'Connor has not shied from expounding its seemingly endless nuances. Her *Newdow* opinion was perhaps the fourth or fifth time that she has elaborated on the subject, but each new iteration seems to add more confusion than clarity. The phrase that so offended Mr. Newdow, she averred, does not violate the establishment provision of the First Amendment, but one must attend carefully to learn why. O'Connor believes that establishment jurisprudence cannot be encompassed by a single test; different categories of cases may call for different approaches. The endorsement test, however, is the rule du jour when it comes to government-sponsored speech or displays. Government "must not make a person's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the political community by conveying a message 'that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.'" The crux of the endorsement test, accordingly, is that it seeks to prevent government action that makes nonbelievers feel "that they are outsiders," or something less than "full members of the political community."

The endorsement test has been criticized as being hopelessly subjective. How is one able to determine, much less evaluate, another's "feeling"? And, in any event, sooner or later almost every government action is bound to offend someone's beliefs. To avoid the so-called heckler's veto problem, Justice O'Connor has invented the "reasonable observer" sub-test of the endorsement test. The "reasonable observer" embodies "a community ideal of social judgment, as well as rational judgment." The reasonable observer must also be aware of the history of the government action in question, including its place in the nation's "cultural landscape." A remarkable person indeed, this reasonable observer. He or she not only personifies, in some mystical way, the better angels of an entire community but also exemplifies dispassionate reason and comes armed with encyclopedic historical and sociological learning. One may be forgiven for concluding that Justice O'Connor's trope is a convenient way of restating the inherent subjectivism of the endorsement test in a different form. One may also be forgiven for suspecting that the reasonable observer is very much a projection of O'Connor's own beliefs about what is or is not an unconstitutional endorsement. The heckler has simply reappeared as a Supreme Court Justice who uses a contrived legal fiction rather than a bullhorn to veto government-endorsed religious expression she doesn't like.

Be that as it may, Justice O'Connor has no objection to the religious invocation contained in the Pledge. Government-endorsed religious expression—e.g., crèches on public property, or the long-standing custom of legislative chaplains—has sometimes been sustained. Although the Court, she notes, has deployed various conflicting rationales to justify its conclusion in such cases, her own opinions, she believes, are marked by a consistent theme: although certain public practices may be expressed in religious terms, the idiom is deployed for essentially secular purposes, chief among them the commemoration of religious customs in our history. Government-sponsored religious expression, Justice O'Connor continues, may also serve "to solemnize" public occasions.

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Such expression, however, must stop short of invoking a "divine provenance" lest nonbelievers be made to feel like "outsiders" in the community.

By this argument, the Justice seems to be saying—one cannot be altogether sure—that the use of religion for historical commemoration or public solemnization is acceptable so long as the government doesn't take the underlying religious sentiment seriously. The example comes to mind (though Justice O'Connor does not allude to it) of the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence. On Justice O'Connor's reckoning, presumably, the Preamble might be posted or recited with government approval, but the government must not give the impression that it actually subscribes to its proclaimed self-evident truths.

The Justice continues by noting "a discrete category of cases" in which the government may acknowledge or refer to religion without offending the Constitution. The category she has in mind is labeled "ceremonial deism," a phrase suggested some years ago by the late Eugene V. Rostow, former Dean of Yale Law School. It has appeared from time to time in dicta penned by various Justices, by way of tentative justification for the Pledge or for allowing "In God We Trust" on currency and coinage. Is the current text of the Pledge a form of acceptable ceremonial deism? This is, Justice O'Connor says, a "close question," one that will require yet another multi-part test before it can be answered. Multi-part tests have become a hallmark of O'Connor's jurisprudence. They convey the impression of analytic comprehensiveness, but only at a price. The more comprehensive a test purports to be, the more parts it must have. The more parts there are, the greater the opportunity to make the test yield any result one wants. Multi-part tests give the appearance of a fair-minded approach (the reasonable observer yet again?), but their application in a given circumstance can be as arbitrary as a flat-footed *ipse dixit*. They carry the additional disadvantage of making each case one of a kind: when a multi-part test is heavily in play, one never quite knows how a slightly different case will be decided in the future.

That is why First Amendment litigators approach each case with a certain dread. Which of the Court's various establishment tests will capture the majority's imagination this time? Will they invoke the mortally wounded but still-breathing tripartite approach of *Lemon v. Kurzman* (1971)? (Is the government's purpose secular? Does its primary effect advance or inhibit religion? Will the government action lead to "excessive entanglement" between church and state?) In addition to, or in lieu of, the *Lemon* test, will the Court fasten upon "coercion" as the operative rule of decision (see *Lee v. Weisman*, 1992, the high school graduation prayer case)? Alternatively, or perhaps sequentially, will a majority embrace one form or another of Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" test? In the wake of O'Connor's *Newdow* opinion, are we to understand that "ceremonial deism" is now actively in play? With all these tests (and their sub-parts) wandering around the landscape of First Amendment jurisprudence, there is no way to know. Reading between the lines of the Ninth Circuit's decision overturning the Pledge in *Newdow*—which uses *Lemon* and *Weisman* and a variety of endorsement tests—one senses a certain glee. The Ninth Circuit opinion has a "how about them apples?" quality that no amount of legal parsing can dispel. *Newdow* presented the Ninth Circuit liberals with an irresistible temptation. "If you mean what you say," their opinion in effect says to the Supreme Court Justices, "you've got to find the Pledge unconstitutional, and lest you try to wriggle out of the trap, here's chapter and verse from your own leading opinions."

The Supreme Court, for its part, must have been singularly embarrassed in having to confront *Newdow*—not because its liberal Justices would be reluctant to follow the Ninth Circuit as a matter of principle, but because the rules of the establishment game require a certain discretion in not revealing the full implications of the Justices' long march toward a secular society in which religion becomes a wholly private matter. To remove God from the Pledge, though it logically follows from the Court's major opinions, would be to pull the veil back and thus to alarm the vast majority of the public. Members of the Senate and House couldn't vote fast enough to endorse a resolution keeping the Pledge just as it is, and they did so almost unanimously. It is no surprise, then, that a majority of the Court chose to evade confronting the merits of *Newdow*. What they will do when a similar case returns, as it certainly will, only God knows. But Justice O'Connor's apparent embrace of ceremonial deism may give even the most rabid secularists on the Court a way out, if they employ her newly contrived four-part test:

Part A: *History and ubiquity*. Justice O'Connor's reasonable observer would acknowledge that an "unbroken practice is not something to be lightly set aside." (Except, of course, when the Court chooses to—as in the school prayer cases—but let that pass.) Moreover, Justice O'Connor adds, the Pledge, unlike certain other government practices, does not appear to be the cause of social divisiveness or ire. It would follow from this observation, which the Court has iterated at various times, that the presence or absence of an establish-

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ment violation will be determined by how often or how loudly a given practice is challenged. The heckler's veto, it would seem, is alive and well.

Part B: Absence of worship or prayer. The Court has sustained the practice of public prayer only once, Justice O'Connor notes, citing the state legislative chaplains case (*Marsh v. Chambers*, 1983). The principle by which that custom is justified, however, has no legs. O'Connor argues that any government-sponsored statement which seeks to invoke penitence, spiritual communion, or divine aid is a definite no-no, as is religious speech that "strays from the legitimate secular purposes" of solemnizing or recognizing "a shared religious history." The effort to induce a sense of public solemnity, however, must not become a prayer in disguise. (How one is to tell the difference, the Justice does not precisely say.) For the moment, Justice O'Connor is content to conjure up once again her reasonable observer, who will of course be "fully cognizant of the history, ubiquity, and context of the practice in question." For this reasonable observer, it would be impossible to conclude that the Pledge constitutes a form of worship. As it happens, Mr. Newdow is thoroughly familiar with the history of how "under God" got into the Pledge, despises the ubiquity of the practice, and believes the context is obnoxiously religious. What Newdow doesn't understand, Justice O'Connor implies, is that the offending phrase is not to be "taken literally." It is meant, rather, to be "merely descriptive; it purports only to identify the United States as a nation subject to divine authority." The ostensibly offending phrase "cannot be seen as a serious invocation of God or as an expression of individual submission to divine authority." But that, of course, is precisely how Newdow views the Pledge. He would say that if "under God" is mere words without substantive content, no one should object to his effort to have the phrase removed. To that, O'Connor has no response other than to invoke her reasonable observer as the only permissible source of opinion. But why is her reasonable observer to be preferred over Newdow's? No answer was provided.

Part C: Absence of reference to particular religion. Here, Justice O'Connor borders on the incoherent. Rightly understood, she argues, ceremonial deism cannot be used to justify preference for "one particular religious belief system" over another. The Pledge is defensible because it merely invokes religion in general; it is not the equivalent, *contra* the Ninth Circuit, of invoking Jesus or Vishnu. It is true, she adds, that Buddhists, for example, don't believe in a distinct Supreme Being, but almost every kind of solemnizing expression will run afoul of someone's belief system, and we have to draw a line somewhere. Even though "under God" was added to the Pledge at a time when the nation had less religious diversity than it does now, it represents "a tolerable attempt" to invoke religion's "solemnizing power" without favoring individual religious sects or belief systems.

The problem with this rationale, of course, is that the Court has said on many occasions that nonreligion has the same First Amendment rights as religion. Is Justice O'Connor here carving out a new exception, one that distinguishes between the rights of believers and nonbelievers but only on those occasions when ceremonial deism is the governing legal mantra? Besides, what's so important about ceremonial deism? If it is just ceremonial—if, that is, we are not meant to take its content seriously—whence comes its power to effect solemnity? If the government may not in any way act on the supposition that God in fact exists, on what basis may it hope that divine invocation, even of the most general sort, will or should have any sort of solemnizing effect? Under Justice O'Connor's version of ceremonial deism, apparently, the government must put itself in the impossible position of simultaneously invoking God and denying the truth of the proposition on which the invocation rests. Put into practice, her ceremonial deism will cease to be either ceremonial or deistic. It will in short order become a recipe for establishing a national religion of atheism.

Part D: Minimal religious content. The Pledge's religious reference is minimal, O'Connor adds, and it neither dwells offensively on, nor makes it difficult to opt out of, the recitation. It consists of but two of thirty-one words, and the two are not essential to patriotic exercise in any event—as witness the fact that the Pledge got along without them until 1954. Besides, children and others who may object to the offending two words can easily omit them without anyone's noticing. Once again, Justice O'Connor's solution consists in treating the words as if they had no significance. The message of her rationale is that since the government may not take the words seriously, neither need anyone else. In the end, O'Connor's defense of the Pledge reduces itself to the argument that the offending words have no meaning. Some defense.

Having delivered herself of this new four-part test for sustaining the Pledge on endorsement grounds, Justice O'Connor adds that the same result would be achieved by employing the coercion test. One really can't be coerced, after all, by a gesture of essentially meaningless ceremonial deism "because such acts are simply not religious in character." That is certainly true

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on her reckoning, as she has spent the preceding eleven pages of her opinion emptying "under God" of any content whatsoever. Notably, in her comments about coercion, Justice O'Connor studiously avoids any reference to the Court's decision in *Lee v. Weisman*, which outlawed religious benedictions at public school graduations. O'Connor joined the Court's majority opinion in *Weisman*, in which Justice Kennedy contrived what can only be described as an atmospheric coercion test. As the rabbi said a prayer of thanks, the audience was not required to pray along or even to bow their heads; in fact, students were not even required to attend these graduation ceremonies. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy argued, the atmosphere of the proceeding was by its very nature psychologically coercive, and on that ground he voided the practice. Justice O'Connor not only joined Justice Kennedy's opinion, she joined Justice Harry Blackmun's and Justice David Souter's concurrences as well, making of the day a perfect establishment provision trifecta—and never mind that the three opinions went off in different directions. Coercion, endorsement, whatever, it's all ultimately the same thing.

In adding a new four-part test to her endorsement theory and developing a full-fledged rationale for ceremonial deism, O'Connor merely piles redundancy upon redundancy. But if she still thinks *Weisman*'s atmospheric coercion theory makes sense, her failure to cite it when arguing her case for ceremonial deism in her *Newdow* opinion is telling. Every argument made in *Weisman* about psychological coercion of high-school students carries even more force in a case involving young schoolchildren—as the Ninth Circuit pointed out. In failing to address the Ninth Circuit's perfectly logical application of *Weisman*'s premises to the Pledge controversy, O'Connor may be implying by her silence that the Ninth Circuit was right. When the Pledge litigation returns to the Court, she will either have to forsake *Weisman* or develop a coherent rebuttal to the Ninth Circuit's adoption of *Weisman*'s rationale. Stand by for yet another multi-part test.

If O'Connor's opinion is indicative of where the Court is likely to go when it is next presented with the Pledge controversy, Justice Thomas' *Newdow* opinion indicates what the Court should but will not do to extract itself from its establishment chaos. Thomas, in effect, would acknowledge that the Court took a wrong turn in *Everson* in 1947, when it first incorporated the establishment provision into the Fourteenth Amendment and began to give it substantive content. In his view, the establishment provision was never meant to be incorporated at all. In its essence, it was meant to do no more than to codify the principle of federalism. While free exercise can be validly interpreted to protect a national right of freedom of conscience and religious practice, establishment should not be read as a national license to rewrite or invalidate state laws and customs dealing with religion. So long as the states respect freedom of conscience and the right to worship or not worship as one chooses, what they otherwise do by way of "endorsing" religion ought to be none of the federal government's business. To the extent that states may interfere with religious freedom, the proper remedy lies in free exercise.

Justice Thomas' analysis has a respectable, indeed more than respectable, scholarly and historical lineage. If adopted, it would do wonders by way of cleaning up the current First Amendment mess. As a practical matter, however, his approach has zero chance of being adopted by his colleagues. For all its philosophical appeal, and for all its accuracy as an interpretation of original meaning, Justice Thomas' approach underestimates the extent to which the modern Court is deeply invested in maintaining the status quo. Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to have entertained something very close to Thomas' theory nineteen years ago. His lengthy dissent in *Wallace v. Jaffree* (1985) tore *Everson*'s rationale to shreds. Despite its power, it gained no allies, though it may have had a useful life at the margins by helping to temper the excessive enthusiasms engendered by the theory of strict separationism. *Everson*'s rationale, despite its considerable and demonstrable defects, has exercised a kind of mesmeric charm over the shifting membership of the Court's majority.

The majority is so confident of *Everson*'s hold that they no longer feel compelled to defend its argument. Its premises are so deeply rooted in dozens of modern cases that most Justices seldom stop to question them. Occasionally, a little light breaks in, by virtue of a rigorous dissent. Justice Souter, for example, was moved to offer a lengthy rebuttal to Justice Scalia's powerful dissent in *Weisman*. In that exercise, he was joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor. One suspects that their ultimate target was Justice Rehnquist's dissent in *Jaffree*, and that their goal was to repair the damage to *Everson*'s foundation. Although *Everson* remains secure as a matter of Court policy, its intellectual foundations are always threatening to crumble. Its logic, if taken seriously, would mandate the eradication of every public vestige of religion in America.

Following its logic to the last syllogism, however, would expose the radical underpinnings of *Everson*'s suppositions and might risk rousing a considerable portion of the electorate. That is why the Court's liberals decided to avoid the Ninth Circuit's argument in *Newdow*, which, after all, merely applied the principles

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of the Court's leading cases. The liberals maintain the pretense that *Everson* is an impeccable philosophical statement of the nation's beliefs since time immemorial. This permits the majority in most establishment cases to determine which religious elements in American culture ought to survive and which not. By picking their targets carefully (avoiding *Newdow* for the time being, for example), they can succeed in inflicting death by a thousand cuts.

Those who understand *Everson*'s historical and philosophical errors face an exquisite dilemma. Do you hold your nose and go along with *Everson*'s presumptions, hoping to restrain its excesses, or do you launch a head-on assault? On various occasions, Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas have alternated between the two strategies, the Chief more so than the other two. Having taken his head-on shot in *Jaffree* without notable effect, he seems thereafter to have accommodated himself to the inevitable, and in the course of doing so has used his position (when he's in the majority) to good effect. Justice Scalia for his part has written memorable dissents in a number of cases, the implicit premise of them being that *Everson* was wrongly reasoned. Justice Thomas has from time to time been more forthright about his objections to the Eversonian roots of modern establishment jurisprudence, and his opinion in *Newdow* may betoken a yet bolder approach in future cases. For the moment, however, his position on the establishment provision leaves him pretty much in splendid isolation. His argument, alas, can be safely ignored by the majority. *Everson*'s doctrine is the holy writ of modern secularism, and absent a sufficient number of new appointments who share Justice Thomas' perspective, his *Newdow* opinion will never control the Court or even influence it much. If you think fighting over *Roe v. Wade* is an inevitable and irreducible part of Senatorial confirmations, fighting over *Everson* would be just as bad or even worse.

As important as the detainee and religion cases are, we dare not overlook the significance of the December 2003 decision in *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission*, which upheld (over four withering dissents) the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. In so doing, the majority sustained a grotesque interference with the right of political advocacy once thought to be fully protected by the First Amendment. The point will not be elaborated here, but suffice it to say that campaigning for federal office is now a fully regulated industry, not essentially different in kind from pharmaceutical manufacturing. It is now impossible to contemplate a run for federal office without first hiring a team of lawyers. The same holds true, alas, for groups of private citizens who may wish to support or oppose candidates.

Two striking features dominate the *McConnell* majority opinion (jointly authored by Justices Stevens and O'Connor): (1) the cavalier way in which "strict scrutiny" (the standard normally applied to laws said to abridge First Amendment freedoms) is manipulated to reach the desired result; and (2) the extraordinary deference granted to congressional judgment on the critical issue of what may constitute corruption or the appearance thereof. The Court is traditionally deferential to congressional findings on most economic and social matters, but rarely so when legitimate First Amendment claims are at issue. To underscore the point—and to see just how disingenuous the *McConnell* majority was in applying "strict scrutiny"—consider the same Court's June 2004 decision in *Ashcroft v. ACLU*. The issue here was Congress' repeated efforts to protect minors from the proliferation of pornography on the Internet, all of which have run afoul of the Court's constantly changing strictures.

Following the last go-round with the Court, Congress did precisely what a responsible legislature ought to do. It read the Court's earlier decision and labored mightily to conform its new law to the Justices' dictates—but to no avail. Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Kennedy overturned this statute as well, applying "strict scrutiny" standards and concluding that Congress had not deployed the least restrictive method to achieve its intended result. The bogus strict scrutiny in *McConnell* that allowed governmental interference with political speech becomes in *Ashcroft* a scrupulous strict scrutiny that will not allow government to protect children from pornography. Deference to congressional judgment, which was a critical feature of *McConnell*'s rationale, gives way in *Ashcroft* to judicial second-guessing about other legislative alternatives on pornography that Congress chose not to pursue. You may like or dislike on policy grounds the results in *McConnell* and *Ashcroft*, but if you take seriously the free speech analysis of either case, it's awfully hard to justify the results in both. But who can gainsay the Court even when its opinions are dominated by doctrinal caprice? As the 2004 term drew to an end judicial supremacy, alas, remained alive and well. FT

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Kierkegaard for Grownups

Richard John Neuhaus

That extraordinary writer of stories about the "Christ-haunted" American South, Flannery O'Connor, was frequently asked why her people and plots were so often outlandish, even grotesque. She answered, "To the hard of hearing you shout, and for the almost-blind you have to draw large and startling figures." I expect Søren Kierkegaard, had he lived a century later, would have taken to Flannery O'Connor and would have relished her affirmation of the necessarily outlandish. But then he would immediately be on guard lest anyone think that he does not really mean what he says, that he is anything less than utterly, indeed deadly, serious. He exaggerates for effect and witheringly attacks his opponents who suggest that his exaggeration is anything less than the truth of the matter. He writes, as he repeatedly says, for that one reader—the singular individual who has the courage to understand him—while at the same time describing in detail, and often with hilarious parody, the many readers who refuse to take him at his word. Kierkegaard was keenly (some would say obsessively) attentive to the ways in which he was misunderstood, even as he persistently and defiantly courted misunderstanding. This, as readers beyond numbering have discovered, can be quite maddening. It is also at least part of the reason why Kierkegaard is so widely read.

There are circles of Kierkegaard scholarship, some of it academically solemn and much of it more in the nature of fan clubs. One can only guess what he would make of professors who lecture on his contempt for professors and lecturing, or of admirers who have made him, of all things he unremittingly despised, popular. Apart from the stolid academics and enthusiastic fans, reading Kierkegaard is for many people an "experience," preferably to be indulged early in life before moving on to the ambiguities and compromises of adulthood that we resign ourselves to believing is the real world. A well-read acquaintance of a certain age says that he remembers fondly his "Kierkegaard period." He was about nineteen at the time, and it followed closely upon his "Holden Caulfield period," referring to the young rebel of J. D. Salinger's *Catcher in the Rye*. In his view—shared, I have no doubt, by many others—Kierkegaard provides a spiritual and intellectual rush, a frisson of youthful rebellion, a flirtation with radical refusal of the world as it is. Kierkegaard is, in sum, a spiritually and intellectually complexified way of joining Holden Caulfield in declaring that established ways of thinking and acting are "phony" to the core, which declaration certifies, by way of dramatic contrast, one's most singular "authenticity." Such certification does wonders for what today is called self-esteem. It is a way of thinking and acting that has the further cachet of coming with an impressive philosophical title: existentialism.

As it happened, Kierkegaard's writings were gaining currency in the English-speaking world about the same time as the appearance of *Catcher in the Rye* and other "demythologizings" of all things conventional. For many readers, especially younger readers, the encounter with Kierkegaard was part of a cultural moment marked by the beginnings of disillusionment with the American Way of Life that was so triumphantly celebrated after the Second World War. Those beginnings would build into what was later dubbed the youth culture or the counterculture, which we loosely associate with "the '60s," a curious

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mix of social, sexual, political, and religious liberationisms that made, as it was said, their long march through the institutions and still shape and misshape the way we think and the way we live today. Many Americans now reaching retirement age nostalgically recall, and maybe could still find somewhere around the house, the paperbacks that were the vademecums of that time: Marcuse on one-dimensional man, Charles Reich on the greening of America, C. Wright Mills on the power elite, Malcolm X on revolutionary violence, Jean-Paul Sartre on the nausea of society—and, among those and many others, Kierkegaard on authentic existence. The arguments of these books were dramatically different and often contradictory, but they had in common what was taken to be a relentless hostility to The Establishment.

Walter Lowrie was a prime mover, if not the prime mover, in bringing Kierkegaard to an American readership. As early as the 1940s, he had misgivings about how Kierkegaard would be understood and misunderstood, used and misused. In his preface to Kierkegaard's *Training in Christianity*, he deplores the ways in which Europeans, who were reading Kierkegaard long before he was translated into English, deeply distorted the man and his message. They published first those writings that lent themselves to anticlerical and anti-Christian purposes, and even items of salacious interest, such as "The Diary of the Seducer," torn from its context in *Either/Or*. The result was a grave misrepresentation of—among other things, but the most important thing—Kierkegaard's profound Christian faith and commitment to the renewal of the Church. As he repeatedly says in *Training*, that renewal entails "introducing Christianity to Christendom." What Lowrie feared might happen has to a significant extent, and despite his best efforts, happened among readers of Kierkegaard in English. The result is Kierkegaard experienced as an intellectually upmarket Holden Caulfield, or as an "existentialist" compatriot of atheists such as Sartre.

Lowrie rightly notes that *Training in Christianity* is Kierkegaard's most mature and self-revealing text. It is also his last major work, written after his "conversion experience" during Holy Week of 1848. After this work and until his death in 1855, we have only the typically strident polemical tracts from his last years of open warfare with church authorities who, in his view, were determined to preserve Christendom at the price of denying true Christianity. From beginning to end, Kierkegaard's writings are marked by an intensity of argument and expression that can only be explained—if "explain" is the right word—by his uncompromisable passion for the truth. He was convinced that almost everyone—maybe everyone except Jesus Christ and a few spiritual "virtuosi" who have honestly followed Jesus—had settled for something less than the truth. Kierkegaard's many readers are fascinated, perhaps even spiritually titillated, by his pressing every question to the limits, and then beyond the limits. The pressing, the fearless exploration, never ends.

There are Christians who call themselves Kierkegaardians, much as others call themselves Augustinians or Thomists or Barthians. But Kierkegaard provides no school of thought, and most emphatically no "system," that can be a secure resting place for one's Christian identity. Kierkegaard offers only a mode of being, of thinking, of living that has no end other than the end of being "contemporaneous" with Jesus Christ, true man and true God, who has no end. The certifying mark that one has accepted what he offers—or, more precisely, what Christ offers—is martyrdom, and Kierkegaard yearned to be a martyr. The word martyr, one recalls, means witness. If Kierkegaard was not to be given the privilege of literally shedding his blood, he would bear witness in other ways. He welcomed the derision of those surrounding him, recognizing in them the same crowd that surrounded the cross of his contemporary, Jesus Christ.

To understand Søren Kierkegaard it is helpful to know something of his life. I say that hesitantly, being mindful of today's propensity for "biopathology," for psychologizing thinkers in order to fit them into the patterns that we think we know. Actually, that propensity is not so new. Kierkegaard takes obvious pleasure in skewering those who evade what he is saying by speaking knowingly about "the problem" with poor Søren Kierkegaard. Yet it is necessary to say something about his life and times.

Søren Aabye Kierkegaard was born in Copenhagen, Denmark, on May 5, 1813, and died there on November 11, 1855. As is, I think, typically the case with men, his character was powerfully formed by his father; indeed his life was in crucial respects a conflicted recapitulation of his father's. His father had been an embittered hired hand to a poor tenant farmer in the forsaken moorlands of Jutland. One day, in a rage at his unhappy state, he climbed a hill and cursed God for his mistreatment. He would later relate this incident to his son, when the latter was in his early twenties, and it made a deep and permanent impact that was to haunt Søren for the rest of his life. He never entirely set aside the question of whether he and his family were cursed by God because of his father's blasphemy. The suspicion was reinforced by the early death of his mother and the deaths of five of his six siblings. Kierkegaard described his learning of his father's blasphemy as "the great earthquake" of his life.

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Shortly after that dramatic act of defiance, his father went to live with an uncle in Copenhagen where, over time, he built a very considerable fortune by dealing in woolen goods. At his death in 1838, he left Søren and his brother a handsome legacy that relieved Kierkegaard of the need to make a living, although the money had almost run out toward the end of his life. From early on, Søren's brilliance was obvious to his father, who relished forming the boy in his strictly orthodox Lutheranism, combined—as will not surprise those familiar with the period of Lutheran orthodoxy—with a passion for formal logic. He also passed on a spirit of melancholy, closely associated with a sense of guilt joined to an intimation—or perhaps conviction—of the family curse. When it came time for university, young Kierkegaard was in a conflicted state of mind about what to do with his life, or whether anything worthwhile could be done with it, and sought relief by throwing himself into a life of general dissipation. At the University of Copenhagen, he enrolled in theology but increasingly turned his divided attention toward philosophy. Deeply shaken by the death of his father in 1838, he resumed his theological studies and two years later obtained the master's degree.

His restored sense of purpose was closely connected to another development. He had fallen in love with Regine Olsen and became engaged to marry. Very soon, however, he realized that he would never be able to communicate with such a young and inexperienced person the storm of complex and conflicted ideas raging in his mind. He broke the engagement and went off to seek refuge in Berlin, where he lived for half a year. Thereafter, Regine and the broken engagement would never be far from his thoughts. In his 1845 book *Stages on Life's Way*, the last section is titled "Guilty?/Not Guilty?" and there he examines the relationship with Regine in terms of his distinction between the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. This three-part distinction began to emerge earlier in *Either/Or: A Fragment of Life*, which was the huge manuscript he brought back from his months in Berlin and is probably the book that most commonly serves as an introduction to Kierkegaard today. In *Either/Or* the distinction is between the aesthetic and the ethical-religious, while two years later the ethical and the religious were more sharply distinguished.

The reader will want to keep in mind the three stages of life while reading *Training in Christianity*, since all three "types" appear in various forms. His opponents, as he depicts them, represent both the aesthetic and moral stages while Kierkegaard is, of course, the champion of the authentically religious. Each stage of life has its own dynamic and is totally—one might say existentially—different from the others. Each assumes that man is confronted by a radical decision—radical in the sense of going to the roots—between God and the world. The aesthetic life is one of pleasure, of sophisticated humanism, of a refusal to make life-determining decisions that might set limits on all that seems possible. The word "decide" is derived from the Latin for "cut," and the aesthetic life is averse to cutting off options. In the ethical stage of life, one "grows up" and accepts responsibilities as defined by general principles of moral conduct. It is only in the religious stage, however, that one becomes a "knight of faith" who makes the ultimate leap beyond unending complexifications and beyond the despair induced by unending complexifications to a true actualization of his existence before God.

A rush of writing followed, and 1844 saw the appearance of both *Philosophical Fragments* and *The Concept of Dread*. The latter has been called history's first work of what would come to be known as depth psychology. These and other works were building toward Kierkegaard's frontal assault on Hegel and Hegelianism. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel had died only a few years earlier, in 1831, but the influence of the monumental achievement that was his life's work was everywhere evident among educated people, and not least in the leadership of the Protestant churches. Kierkegaard's direct assault began in 1846 with a book bearing the remarkable title *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments. A Mimic-Pathetic-Dialectic Composition, an Existential Contribution*. The author was named as Johannes Climacus, and S. Kierkegaard was listed as the publisher.

Hegel was the great system-maker. What others viewed as his grand achievement Kierkegaard viewed as his unforgivable crime, the attempt to rationally systematize the whole of existence. The whole of existence cannot be systematized, Kierkegaard insisted, because existence is not yet whole; it is incomplete and in a state of constant development. Hegel attempted to introduce mobility into logic, which, said Kierkegaard, is itself an error in logic. The greatest of Hegel's errors, however, was his claim that he had established the objective theory of knowledge. Kierkegaard countered with the argument that subjectivity is truth. As he put it, "The objective uncertainty maintained in the most passionate spirit of dedication is truth, the highest truth for one existing." Bringing us closer to the central concerns of *Training in Christianity*, Hegel thought it was possible to understand existence intellectually; he equated existence with thought and thus left no room for faith. In this understanding, Kierkegaard protested, Christianity—and Christ!—were reduced to being no

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more than part of The System. The apparently harmonious but demonically seductive synthesis of History, Thought, Morality, Society, Church, and Christ that characterized establishment Protestantism was condemned by Kierkegaard as "Christendom," and against it he intends to make the argument for true Christianity.

He does not expect to persuade everyone. Far from it. What would persuade everyone is almost by definition false. He writes for *Hiin Enkelte*, the emphatically singular individual. *Hiin Enkelte*, those were the words he wanted inscribed on his tombstone. In an 1843 preface he describes watching how his publication fares: "I let my eye follow it a little while. I saw then how it fared forth along lonely paths or alone upon the highway. After one and another little misunderstanding . . . it finally encountered that single individual whom I with joy and gratitude call my reader, that single individual whom it seeks, towards whom it stretches out its arms, that single individual who is willing enough to let himself be found, willing enough to encounter it."

In our day the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur has written powerfully about the "second naïveté" that is the mark of true faith. A century earlier, Kierkegaard wrote about "the second immediacy," the possibility of being a child or youth for the second time. "To become again a child, to become as nothing, without any selfishness, to become again a youth, notwithstanding one has become shrewd, shrewd by experience, shrewd in worldly wisdom, and then to despise the thought of behaving shrewdly, to *will* to be a youth, to *will* to retain youth's enthusiasm with its spontaneity unabated, to *will* to reacquire it by valiant effort, more apprehensive and shamefaced at the thought of equivocating and bargaining to win earthly advantage than a modest maiden is made by an indecent action—yes, that is the task."

The grownups, those who are shrewd in worldly wisdom, have built secure defenses against being encountered by Christ, and they will not let him become their contemporary. With caustic wit Kierkegaard gives voice to the reasoning of the worldly wise. Of Christ the worldly wise say: "His life is simply fantastic. Indeed this is the mildest expression one can use to describe it, for in passing that judgment one is good-humored enough to ignore altogether this sheer madness of conceiving Himself to be God. It is fantastic. At the most one can live like that for a few years in one's youth. But He is already more than thirty years of age. And literally He is nothing." Another worldling says: "That one should push through the crowd in order to get to the spot where money is dealt out, and honor, and glory—that one can understand. But to push oneself forward in order to be flogged—how sublime, how Christian, how stupid!" (A little later, Friedrich Nietzsche will write with withering scorn of Christianity's "slave morality.") The anti-Hegelian barbs are scarcely hidden in the words of yet another worldling: "We all look forward to an Expected One, in this we are all agreed. But the regiment of this world does not move forward tumultuously by leaps, the world development is (as the word itself implies) *evolutionary* not *revolutionary*." The cultural Protestantism that German theologians call *Kulturprotestantismus* and Kierkegaard calls Christendom is as hostile to Christ as was the religious establishment of first-century Judaism. Indeed the hostility is stronger since the Pharisees did expect a radically new thing in the coming of the true Messiah, whereas Christendom thinks it has smoothly subsumed what it formally acknowledges as the true Messiah into the all-inclusive synthesis that is The System.

Christendom is the enemy of Christianity—it is, Kierkegaard says repeatedly, the "blasphemy"—that stands in the way of encountering Christ as our contemporary. Christendom assumes that Christ is far in the past, having laid the foundation for the wonderful thing that has historically resulted, Christendom. Of course we are all good Christians because we are all good Danes. It is a package deal and Christ and Christianity are part of the package. If we are good Danes (or good Americans), if we work hard and abide by the rules, the church, which is an integral part of the social order, will guarantee the delivery to heaven of the package that is our lives. But Christ is not in the distant past, protests Kierkegaard. He confronts us now, and a decision must be made. "In relation to the absolute there is only one tense: the present. For him who is not contemporary with the absolute—for him it has no existence."

This encounter with Christ the contemporary is not to be confused with today's evangelical Protestant language about conversion as a decisive moment in which one "accepts Jesus Christ as one's personal Lord and Savior." Kierkegaard did not, of course, know about the nineteenth-century American revivalism from which today's evangelicalism issues, but he had some acquaintance with the enthusiasms that were in his day associated with "pietism." As he inveighed against Christendom, it seems likely he would also inveigh against Evangelicaldom today. As he would inveigh against Christianity of any sort—whether it calls itself liberal or conservative, orthodox or progressive—that neatly accommodates itself to its cultural context. To decide for Christ our contemporary is always a decision to be a cultural alien, to join Christ on his way of suffering and death as an outsider.

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Once the established order has "deified" itself by claiming to have subsumed the absolute to itself, there is nothing that it cannot presume to do. A person asks, "Do you mean the established order can assure my eternal salvation?" In one of the most scathing passages in *Training*, Kierkegaard lets the established order answer that question. "Why certainly. And if with regard to this matter you encounter in the end some obstacle, can you not be contented like all the others, when your last hour has come, to go well baled and crated in one of the large shipments which the established order sends straight through to heaven under its own seal and plainly addressed to 'The Eternal Blessedness,' with the assurance that you will be exactly as well received and just as blessed as 'all the others'? In short, can you not be content with such reassuring security and guaranty as this, that the established order vouches for your blessedness in the hereafter? Very well then. Only keep this to yourself. The established order has no objection. If you keep as still as a mouse about it, you will nevertheless be just as well off as the others." But, of course, Kierkegaard would not keep it to himself. And that is why, as he understood it, he was defamed, derided, and dismissed as an eccentric and malcontent.

Kierkegaard's relentless polemic is not, in the first place, against what is today called "institutional religion." It is, in the first place, a polemic against the deifying of the social order, which can happen with or without Hegelian philosophy. It is, in the second place, a polemic against the church for letting itself become party to this blasphemous fraud and thus betraying Christianity for the sake of Christendom. Since a person's relationship with Christ, however, is of infinitely greater importance than his relationship with his society, the main fire of Kierkegaard's polemic is directed against the treason of the church. In this connection, Kierkegaard makes a lasting contribution to the endless—or at least unending until Christ returns in glory—debate over the proper relationship between, as the twentieth-century American theologian H. Richard Niebuhr titled his classic book, "Christ and Culture." Niebuhr proposed five main "types" of that relationship as Christians have thought about these things over the centuries. Kierkegaard, one might suggest, is polemicizing against the type of Christ *as* culture and is arguing for the type of Christ *against* culture.

Even more telling, I believe, is the similarity of Kierkegaard's argument with the chilling Legend of the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*. I have sometimes suggested, half tongue in cheek, that if anything might be added to the canon of the New Testament it should be the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor. Although Ivan Karamazov tells the story against the Catholic Church, it is the story of all Christians and the subtle ways in which Christianity can be displaced by Christendom, in which people can be seduced into surrendering their souls to the established order. When Jesus appears in the public square of medieval Spain, the Grand Inquisitor has him put in jail and explains to him, with sophisticated reasons, why he has no right to come back, why people do not need him and cannot bear him as their contemporary. The established order has now taken over the business of salvation, the Inquisitor tells Jesus, and it is simply intolerable that he should return to interfere. After the long night's monologue, in which Jesus says not a word, the Inquisitor opens the prison door and says, "Go, and come never again." Kierkegaard, I am convinced, would relish the tale.

Kierkegaard's influence on contemporary Christian thought is considerable, and aspects of his "existentialism" play a role in that multifaceted phenomenon called postmodernism, although usually stripped of his radical faith in the God-man, Jesus Christ. Apart from the absolute, which was the object of his decision, today's interest in the existentialist mode of his thinking and deciding would, I expect, be of little interest to Kierkegaard. His impact on theology proper has been, in very large part, through the most influential Protestant theologian of the past century, Karl Barth. Kierkegaard's accent on "the infinite qualitative distinction" between God and man, time and eternity, was decisive for Barth's radical break with the liberal theology and *Kulturprotestantismus* of the nineteenth century. At the same time, and despite Kierkegaard's frequent identification with Luther, Barth thought Kierkegaard betrayed authentic Reformation teaching by his "legalistic" notion that *sola fide* (faith alone) is not enough, that salvation is a matter of open-ended "becoming" through authentic encounter with Christ.

Another figure pertinent to Kierkegaard's legacy, and especially to the argument of *Training in Christianity*, is Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Kierkegaard was convinced that an honest following of "Christ the contemporary" necessarily entailed suffering and aspired toward the ultimate sharing in his suffering which is martyrdom. Bonhoeffer, a Lutheran pastor in Germany, actually was a martyr, being executed upon the direct orders of Hitler on April 9, 1945, for his resistance activities and aid to Jews. Bonhoeffer's thought is indebted to Kierkegaard, and he wrote a powerful little book that is in some respects very similar to *Training in Christianity*. In *The Cost of Discipleship*, Bonhoeffer wrote, "When Jesus calls a man, he calls him to come

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and die." At the same time, Bonhoeffer was critical of Kierkegaard's sharp divisions of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious life. An editorial footnote in Bonhoeffer's *Ethics* cites a 1944 letter from prison in which he writes, "Perhaps, then, what Kierkegaard calls the 'aesthetic existence,' far from being excluded from the domain of the Church, should be given a new foundation within the Church. . . . Who, for example, in our time can still with an easy mind cultivate music or friendship, play games and enjoy himself? Certainly not the 'ethical' man, but only the Christian." For Bonhoeffer, the cost of discipleship was attended by a Christian liberty that frees a person to engage the aesthetic, as well as one's responsibilities in Church, marriage and family, culture and government.

The comparison between Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer is instructive. Both were radically opposed to *Kulturprotestantismus*. Kierkegaard sought to expose it for the sham Christianity (i.e., Christendom) that it was. A hundred years later in Germany the corruption and consequent weakness of *Kulturprotestantismus* were exposed under the terror of National Socialism. Both Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer railed against the smooth synthesis of Christ and culture, contending for the courage of personal decision and a costly form of discipleship. In the actual situation of the collapse of cultural-religious securities, however, Bonhoeffer discovered a new freedom for vibrant engagement with questions of Church, culture, politics, marriage, family, and friendship, and also with the celebration of the aesthetic. By circumstance, as well as by personal disposition and decision, such engagement and celebration was largely absent from Kierkegaard's life and thought. These two apostles of radical discipleship were very different personalities, but one cannot help but wonder what Kierkegaard would have thought of Bonhoeffer's existential decision and consequent martyrdom, or how Kierkegaard would have envisioned the imperatives of discipleship if Denmark's Christ-as-culture synthesis had been shattered in his time as thoroughly—although no doubt under very different circumstances—as it was shattered a century later in Germany.

Catholic thinkers, when they have engaged him at all, have been ambivalent about Kierkegaard. This is not surprising, since he seems to be hyper-Protestant in his relentless individualism and antipathy to ecclesiastical authority, even if, in Denmark, it was to Protestant ecclesiastical authority. One Catholic who took Kierkegaard very seriously was Hans Urs von Balthasar, probably one of the two most influential Catholic theologians of the past century. (The other being Karol Wojtyla, later to be John Paul II, who also wrote insightfully about Kierkegaard.) Balthasar, however, was like Bonhoeffer in wanting to rethink the aesthetic, and to place it upon authentically Christian foundations. He wrote several thick volumes on the theology of the aesthetic (not, it is important to note, on aesthetic theology). I have already alluded to Karl Barth's relation to Kierkegaard, and the following passage from Balthasar on Barth's devotion to music, especially to Mozart, brings together a number of pertinent considerations:

> This refutation of Kierkegaard, already evident and fully formed in the early Barth, is attributable to a final contrast: for Kierkegaard Christianity is unworldly, ascetic, polemic; for Barth it is the immense revelation of the eternal light that radiates over all of nature and fulfills every promise; it is God's Yes and Amen to himself and his creation. Nothing is more characteristic of these two men than the way they stand in relation to Mozart. For Kierkegaard, Mozart is the very quintessence of the aesthetic sphere and therefore the very contrast to a religious existence. He had no choice but to interpret him demonically, from the perspective of Don Juan. Quite different is that view of Mozart by one of his greatest devotees, Karl Barth.

Barth wrote that, although Mozart lived a rather frivolous life when he was not working at his music, and was a Roman Catholic to boot, he has an important place in theology, especially in the doctrine of creation, "because he had heard, and causes those who have ears to hear, even today, what we shall not see until the end of time—the whole context of Providence." While the aesthetic can, in its sickly form so powerfully depicted by Kierkegaard, lead to despair, it can also, as in the case of Mozart's music, lead us beyond despair, not so much by a religious leap of faith as by an eschatological prolepsis, an anticipation of the promised wholeness of creation that is to be. As with Bonhoeffer, so also with Balthasar and Barth, we can only speculate about what Kierkegaard would make of their quite different understanding of the "infinite qualitative distinction" between God and man, between time and eternity, as it applies to the aesthetic, ethical, and religious in the life of radical Christian discipleship.

Although it may seem surprising, some have entered the Catholic Church under the influence of Kierkegaard. After Kierkegaard succeeds in demolishing the false securities of every form of Christendom, one's only resort is to a church that is unqualifiedly and without remainder the Church. In his 1963 study *Kierkegaard as Theologian*, the Catholic philosopher Louis Dupré argued that these converts to Catholicism

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misunderstood Kierkegaard. "He is a person who kept protesting, who could never accept a church which had become established, even if on the basis of protest itself. The Protestant principle has been abandoned as soon as it has developed itself to the point of becoming a church. [Kierkegaard] protested against everything, even against the protest itself. Therefore his attitude was not purely negative but [dialectically] made itself positive again." It is very different for the Catholic, says Dupré, "for the Catholic Church cannot accept the dialectical principle except in her own bosom." Kierkegaard could never be content with a dialectic operating within an ambiance of rest, with a dialectic that had found its home, and therefore, says Dupré, Kierkegaard's own relation to Catholicism was always one of "an antipathetic sympathy and a sympathetic antipathy." I am not convinced Dupré is right and therefore have greater sympathy for those who have found Catholicism on the far side of Kierkegaard. From long and hard wrestling with Kierkegaard, one may come to see the ways in which the Church is "Christ the contemporary," but that is a reflection for another time.

Kierkegaard, it remains to be said, is not a systematic theologian. We know what he thought of systems and system makers, of which Hegel was the prime example. There is hardly a page in his writings that does not prompt from the systematically minded reader a protest against disconnections and apparent contradictions. Like Flannery O'Connor, he shouted to the hard of hearing and drew startling pictures for the almost blind. Kierkegaard was eccentric in the precise meaning of that word—off center, even out of the center. He believed that the center of his time and place, and of any time and place, is where the easy lies are told. He was *Hiin Enkelte* writing for the singular individual who might understand him. Many have read him to experience the frisson of youthful dissent from establishment ways of thinking and being, and have then set him aside upon assuming what are taken to be the responsibilities of adulthood. That, I believe, is a grave mistake. Kierkegaard is for the young, but he is also for grownups who have attained the wisdom of knowing how fragile and partial is our knowing in the face of the absolute, who are prepared to begin ever anew the lifelong discipline that is training in Christianity. FT

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The Evangelical Mind Today

Mark Noll

Ten years after the publication of *The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind*, I remain largely unrepentant about the book's historical arguments, its assessment of evangelical strengths and weaknesses, and its indictment of evangelical intellectual efforts, though I have changed my mind on a few matters. Some readers have rightly pointed out that what I described as a singularly evangelical problem is certainly related to the general intellectual difficulties of an advertisement-driven, image-preoccupied, television-saturated, frenetically hustling consumer society, and that the reason evangelicals suffer from intellectual weakness is that American culture as a whole suffers from intellectual weakness. Another helpful criticism is that the book lumps together fundamentalists, Pentecostals, and holiness advocates as culprits in the stagnation of evangelical thinking and that it ignores certain mitigating circumstances and worthy exceptions that one could cite from each of these sub-traditions.

Yet on the whole, *The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind* still seems to me correct in its descriptions and evaluations. What is true throughout the Christian world is true for American Christians: we who are in pietistic, generically evangelical, Baptist, fundamentalist, Restorationist, holiness, "Bible church," megachurch, or Pentecostal traditions face special difficulties when putting the mind to use. Taken together, American evangelicals display many virtues and do many things well, but built-in barriers to careful and constructive thinking remain substantial.

These barriers include an immediatism that insists on action, decision, and even perfection *right now*, a populism that confuses winning supporters with mastering actually existing situations, an anti-traditionalism that privileges one's own current judgments on biblical, theological, and ethical issues (however hastily formed) over insight from the past (however hard won and carefully stated), and a nearly gnostic dualism that rushes to spiritualize all manner of bodily, terrestrial, physical, and material realities (despite the origin and providential maintenance of these realities in God). In addition, we evangelicals as a rule still prefer to put our money into programs offering immediate results, whether evangelistic or humanitarian, instead of into institutions promoting intellectual development over the long term.

These evangelical habits continue to hamper evangelical thinking. We remain inordinately susceptible to enervating apocalyptic speculation, and we produce and consume oceans of bathetic End Times literature while sponsoring only a trickle of serious geopolitical analysis. We are consistently drawn to so-called "American Christianities"—occasionally of the left, more often of the right—that subordinate principled reasoning rooted in the gospel to partisanship in which opponents are demonized and deficiencies in our friends are excused. (Defense of the right to life remains the shining exception to that generalization about politics.) Capitulation to disembodied ideals of spirituality incapacitates our struggling band of novelists and poets. And far too many of us still make the

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intellectually suicidal mistake of thinking that promoting "creation science" is the best way to resist naturalistic philosophies of science. When it comes to the life of the mind, in other words, we evangelicals continue to have our problems.

That being said, it must also be noted that were I to attempt such a book as *The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind* today, it would have a different tone—more hopeful than despairing, more attuned to possibilities than to problems, more concerned with theological resources than theological deficiencies. The major reason for this alteration in perspective is itself theological; a secondary reason is that many developments on the ground now also seem auspicious. The theology, though vastly more important and deserving of extensive exposition, I will treat succinctly below. The signs of life on the ground I will explore at somewhat greater length. Foundational theology and proliferating portents, taken together, make me more hopeful now about Christian thinking by evangelicals than I was a decade ago. And, for reasons that should become apparent, I do mean to say "Christian thinking by evangelicals" rather than "evangelical thinking" as such.

Theological reasons to hope for better things from evangelical intellectual effort spring from the resources of classical trinitarian Christianity. Even if those resources are unused or abused, they continue to exist as a powerful latent force wherever individuals or groups look in faith to God as loving Father, redeeming Savior, and sustaining Spirit. Various forms of evangelical Christianity are, in fact, burgeoning around the world; the evangelical proportion of the practicing Christian population in North America continues to expand; where there is evangelical life there is hope for evangelical learning.

The intrinsic reason for that hope lies in the biblical message that evangelicals identify as the bedrock of our faith. Because evangelicals tend to disregard tradition, we are liable to miss the rich contributions that other strands of faithful believers have made to interpreting and applying the multitudinous biblical words that are so potent for the life of the mind. But this can change. If evangelicals are the ones who insist most aggressively that they believe in *sola scriptura*, and if evangelicals are the ones who assert most vigorously the transforming work of Jesus Christ, then it is reasonable to hope that what the Scriptures teach about the origin of creation in Christ, the sustaining of all things in Christ, and the dignity of all creation in Christ—about, in other words, the subjects of learning—will be a spur for evangelicals to a deeper and richer intellectual life: "He is before all things, and in him all things hold together" (Colossians 1:15-17).

For evangelicals (as for other Christians) the greatest hope for learning in any age lies not primarily in heightened activity, nor in better funding, nor in sounder strategizing—though all of these exertions have an important role to play. Rather, the great hope for Christian learning lies in the Christian faith itself, which in the end means in Jesus Christ. Thus, if evangelicals are the people of the gospel we claim to be, our intellectual rescue is close at hand.

But how will evangelicals pursue goals defined by phrases like "first-rate Christian scholarship" or "the Christian use of the mind," when these phrases sound like a call to backsliding for some in the churches and like a simple oxymoron for many in the broader world? For a Christian in the evangelical tradition, the only enduring answer must come from considering Jesus Christ as sustaining the world and all that is in it. In the light of Christ, we can undertake a wholehearted, unabashed, and unembarrassed effort to understand this world. In a mind fixed on him, there is intrinsic hope for the development of intellectual seriousness, intellectual integrity, and intellectual gravity.

If there is hope for intellectual life in the theology that evangelicals profess to believe, so also can encouragement be found in several concrete developments of recent decades. Without denying that well-entrenched obstacles continue to frustrate an honorable use of the mind, it is still possible to identify substantial signs of progress. How those developments should be ranked in importance differs depending on place and circumstance, but together they make for an impressive list.

The first source of hope I would point to is the increasing engagement between evangelicals and Roman Catholics that has contributed dramatically to improved evangelical use of the mind. As more and more communication takes place between these once-warring camps, mutual enlightenment on many matters, including scholarship, is the result. So rapidly has the situation changed from the cold war that existed into the 1960s, that it is now barely conceivable that either Catholics or evangelicals could once have thought that either could get along without help from the other. The exchange between these traditions is probably more important to Catholics for reasons other than intellectual, but the life of the mind is where evangelicals benefit most. While evangelicals offer Catholics eagerness, commitment, and an ability to negotiate in a culture of intellectual consumerism, Catholics offer evangelicals a sense of tradition and centuries of reflection on the bearing of sacramentality on all existence.

Whenever evangelicals in recent years have been

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moved to admonish themselves and other evangelicals for weaknesses in ecclesiology, tradition, the intellectual life, sacraments, theology of culture, aesthetics, philosophical theology, or historical consciousness, the result has almost always been selective appreciation for elements of the Catholic tradition. Whatever Protestants may think of individual proposals, methods, or conclusions proceeding from any individual Catholic thinker, the growing evangelical willingness to pay respectful attention to the words and deeds of a whole host of Catholic intellectuals, beginning with Pope John Paul II, makes an important contribution to better intellectual effort.

The intellectual harvests that evangelicals now reap from better relations with Catholics are well illustrated by personnel and programs at the University of Notre Dame. Although it is not the only place in the country where first-rate intellectuals from both Protestant and Catholic traditions have been recruited to labor together to Christian learning, it is the place where that recruitment has been most successful. Naturally, the kind of Christian learning on offer—even the definition of what Christian learning means—differs considerably from scholar to scholar at Notre Dame. But for a Catholic university to offer graduate students and the wider reading public (whether Catholic, evangelical, or other) a lineup of Appleby, Cunningham, McGreevy, MacIntyre, McMullen, Marsden, Plantinga, Turner, and many more is really something—something for learning itself, but also something for illustrating how evangelicals have benefited from entering intellectual space founded, funded, and fueled by Roman Catholics.

Notre Dame has also been the home of the Pew Programs in evangelical (or Christian) Scholarship, a series of projects (now winding down) that represent a focused effort to spur evangelicals to better Christian thinking. These ventures have provided research fellowships for college and university professors, scholarships for graduate students, and seminars of various sorts for Christian academics at different stages of their careers. Scores of students from evangelical colleges have been guided toward graduate education, dozens of evangelical graduate students have been funded in leading doctoral programs, and many scholars have been assisted in finishing major writing projects. The Pew initiatives at Notre Dame have made evangelicals better scholars and also have leveraged evangelical connections to improve Christian learning in general.

Consideration of evangelical-Catholic cooperation at Notre Dame leads naturally to consideration of a second source of hope for improved evangelical thinking—the ongoing renascence of Christian philosophy. Beginning with a few intrepid Calvinists and independent evangelicals, and stimulated by a large dose of modern neo-Thomism, for several decades Christian philosophers in the United States have been engaged in full-scale, first-order investigation at the highest level. Evangelicals do not dominate this Christian philosophical resurgence, but they have been key participants at every stage. For evangelical graduate students and young professionals, philosophy has become the one academic discipline where strong networks devoted to both intellectual rigor and Christian integrity exist in all regions of the country and for almost every level of higher education.

Results of this resurgence are visible in the quality of work being produced. Philosophers and theologians attuned to modern philosophy provide an unusually high proportion of the serious orthodox theology on offer in the English-speaking world. *Faith and Philosophy*, the journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers, which is now in its twenty-first year, offers further testimony, with its regular publication of articles and reviews of great intellectual depth, with thirty-eight stellar practitioners on its editorial committee, and with sixteen institutions (including Catholic, evangelical, and mainline Protestant) offering support. For evangelicals, the continuing strength of the Christian philosophy project has provided stimulus, encouragement, models, graduate school mentors, practice in intra-Christian diversity, and much more. Other academic disciplines—including history, the visual arts, economics, political science, sociology, music, and the physical sciences—enjoy active Christian networks, but none has reached as high or mixed as many Christian traditions as has Christian philosophy. No other academic network has contributed so directly to the strengthening of evangelical minds.

Evangelical colleges and universities offer a third venue where hope can be glimpsed. Because of how evangelicalism developed in the United States, evangelical institutions of higher learning have often functioned as sectarian enclaves; they have regularly sought purity in isolation rather than public engagement; and they have often been too tightly bound to the rise and fall of their charismatic leaders. These features have not been harmful for all Christian purposes, but for intellectual life they have been restricting. Over the last half-century, however, more institutions of evangelical higher learning—colleges, universities, seminaries, and even Bible schools—have seasoned their sectarian certitudes with commitment to "mere Christianity"; more have expanded goals beyond the socialization of their own group's rising generation; more have begun to promote the aca-

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demic life as a legitimate Christian vocation; more are coming to understand that there can be no good teaching without good scholarship.

Evangelical higher education has been given a special boost in recent years by remarkable developments at Baylor University and by less comprehensive but still bold initiatives at Calvin College. As is well known, Baylor's characteristically Texan announcement that by the year 2012 it would dramatically improve the academic quality of its university and demonstrably raise the Christian salience of its academic programs has met serious internal resistance. A predictable alliance of theological liberals and nervous naysayers has protested, but Baylor's leaders have forged ahead. Whether Baylor will reach its ambitious goals remains uncertain, but no one should doubt that its efforts constitute the most far-reaching and most important institutional attempt in many decades to do the proper thing for the life of the evangelical mind.

Calvin College's special contribution to that same end has been its stimulating summer seminars, organized for faculty and graduate students in a wide variety of fields. These seminars, in place for more than a decade now, provide instant networking for often-isolated Christian scholars and for colleagues who, though not Christian themselves, want to engage with those who are. They offer opportunities for scholars from different Christian traditions to address important intellectual questions at the level of a research university, for the duration of a summer term and then through follow-up activities. The Calvin seminars are perhaps most intriguing as an experiment testing whether a college committed to solid undergraduate instruction can also foster serious research without taking on the whole of what has usually characterized America's comprehensive universities.

In addition, a host of evangelical colleges—and also quasi-evangelical and evangelical-friendly institutions—have started new programs, added faculty, set up institutes, sponsored conferences, raised money for research professorships, and otherwise taken steps to improve their intellectual quality. Many of these institutions are members of the Council of Christian Colleges and Universities, which from its office in Washington, D.C., has worked hard to strengthen its members' intellectual efforts. Evangelical higher education in North America remains a fragmented enterprise, both nourished and impeded by the sectarian character of American religion. But increasingly these schools are becoming more responsible in sponsoring serious intellectual effort.

A fourth area in which hopeful signs are visible is the domain of science. In the past, warfare over evolutionary theory may have been necessary—especially to protect students from crude philosophical naturalism masquerading as empirical science—but it was regrettable insofar as it transformed questions requiring measured and learned investigation into public arguments favoring simplistic demagoguery by theists and secularists alike. Strife over "creation science" continues to simmer, exacting a high cost in both serious study of nature and serious learning from Scripture, yet several positive influences are evident. Without claiming mastery of the recondite issues involved, I can say I am heartened by the consistent quality of intra-evangelical debate in forums such as the American Scientific Affiliation's *Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith*. I am also encouraged by the boldness and clarity with which evangelicals such as Denis Lamoureux and Keith B. Miller spell out why they are evolutionists and why they hold evolutionary theory to be compatible with traditional Christian orthodoxy. It is also heartening that promoters of the intelligent-design theory, such as William Dembski and Jonathan Wells, are trying to raise questions about the Christian stake in science to the levels of metaphysical and teleological debate, where they should have been all along.

A fifth reason for thinking more hopefully about evangelical intellectual life is the multiplying Christian presence in the nation's pluralistic universities, where far more students of evangelical persuasion receive their higher education than at the evangelical colleges and universities. One sign of that presence is a larger roster of identifiably Christian faculty in the lead ranks of their disciplines. Even though (or, perhaps, because) these visibly believing faculty take up their tasks in many different, not always compatible, ways, their very existence is a sign of hope. To compare the situation just three or four decades ago to the situation today is to see a change for the better. Then there was only a small handful of leading scholars willing to identify themselves as believers; now it is possible to name a long list in many fields. Evangelicals who read and study with such intellectuals are provided with models and mentors.

Other signs of hope at the pluralistic universities are modest but significant. Local churches and individual denominations maintain Christian study centers at many universities, and some of them are effective. Self-standing centers at the University of Virginia, Michigan State University, the University of Illinois, the University of Minnesota, and elsewhere offer encouragement by moving closer to the British and Canadian pattern, where identifiably Christian units are embedded in the

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broader university. The Veritas Forums that annually convene on many campuses bring further connections and encouragement to wide audiences that include many evangelicals.

At pluralistic colleges and universities, campus ministries of many sorts also encourage evangelical spiritual life. Especially with its major commitment to its graduate and faculty ministry, InterVarsity Christian Fellowship offers reason for hope. By providing Christian nurture and networks for evangelical students and teachers who might otherwise feel isolated as believing scholars, the grad-faculty IVCF may be doing as much in its low-key way to improve evangelical intellectual life as any other ongoing national program.

A sixth arena where favorable developments in recent years have helped evangelicals toward greater intellectual responsibility is the world of publishing. Serious periodicals such as First Things, *Books & Culture*, and *Touchstone* provide meaningful Christian engagement with significant issues of contemporary life. Whether such journals do so from explicitly evangelical angles or from the perspective of other believing traditions, their net effect is to demonstrate how essential it is for communities of faith to think their way through the modern world rather than just reacting to it.

The number of serious books that can be identified as Christian, near-Christian, or Christian-friendly also continues to increase. Presses such as Eerdmans, Baker, and InterVarsity Press were midwives at the birth of postwar evangelicalism, and they have continued to make Herculean efforts. They have now been joined by many other religious, commercial, and university presses willing to publish books written by evangelicals or treating seriously the subjects that most concern evangelicals.

Beyond question, evangelical intellectual life is being strengthened by developments in these six areas. Yet when assessing the current situation, realism is also required, as well as precision about what is actually taking place. We are indeed witnessing some advances by evangelicals in Christian intellectual life, but these improvements do not point toward the development of a distinctly evangelical mind. Common, generic evangelicalism and the activistic denominations that make up evangelicalism do not possess theologies full enough, traditions of intellectual practice strong enough, or conceptions of the world deep enough to sustain a full-scale intellectual revival.

Without strong theological traditions, most evangelicals lack a critical element required for making intellectual activity both self-confident and properly humble, both critical and committed. In order to advance responsible Christian learning, the vitality of commitment must be stabilized by the ballast of tradition. Tradition without life might be barely Christian, but life without tradition is barely coherent.

Part of what makes it possible for a particular stream of Christianity to support vigorous intellectual life is simply the passage of time: an older movement obviously has had more opportunities to broaden out into fruitful scholarship. But another part is a self-conscious commitment to learn from the teaching and experience of past believing generations. The current dilemma for Christian learning in North America could be broadly described as follows. On the one side, Pentecostals, Southern Baptists, members of Holiness movements, seeker-sensitive churches, dispensationalists, Adventists, African-American congregations, radical Wesleyans, and lowest-common-denominator evangelicals have great spiritual energy, but they flounder in putting the mind to use for Christ. On the other side, Lutherans, Catholics, Anglo-Catholics, the Reformed, and the Eastern Orthodox enjoy incredibly rich traditions that include sterling examples of Christian thought, but they often display a comatose spirituality.

This picture is, of course, a generalization. Yet think how natural it sounds to talk of Pentecostal Signs and Wonders, intense holiness spirituality, vigorous seeker-sensitive evangelism, a dispensationalist devotion to Scripture, and Baptist missionary zeal. It seems equally self-evident that we can speak of such things as an estimable tradition of Lutheran sacred music, art history pursued from a Kuyperian Reformed perspective, profound social theory from Catholics, and a solid trajectory of Anglo-Catholic *belles lettres*. But try to shift and mix the categories and hear how unexpected some of the combinations sound: Kuyperian Reformed Signs and Wonders? Vigorous Catholic evangelism? An Anglo-Catholic devotion to Scripture? Intense Lutheran spirituality? Or, to run it the other way: Art history pursued from a Baptist perspective? A solid trajectory of seeker-sensitive *belles lettres*? Profound social theory from the holiness movement?

Active Christian life of the sort that defines evangelicalism is a prerequisite for responsible Christian learning. But unless that activity is given shape, it will remain ineffective. The older Christian traditions provide depth, because they are rooted in classical Christian doctrine, and they offer breadth, because they have nurtured outstanding examples of faithful Christian thinking. There is, in other words, no neo-

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Thomist personalism without centuries of God-honoring moral casuistry; no J. S. Bach without Luther's theologies of the Incarnation and the Cross; no Dorothy L. Sayers without Anglo-Catholic sacramentalism; no Flannery O'Connor without a Catholic theology of redemption; and no contemporary revival of Christian philosophy among American evangelicals without the legacy of Kuyperian Calvinism.

Evangelicals of several types are beginning to learn the lessons taught by such exemplars. As they do so, many are becoming more serious Christian thinkers. To embrace the energy of American evangelicalism, but also to move beyond the eccentricities of American evangelicalism into the spacious domains of self-critical, patient, rooted, and productive Christian tradition, remains the great challenge for the evangelical mind. FT

Ordinary Time in the Pews

Ordinary days again.
Advent, Pentecost are past;
who now will accept our sins,
raise the dust in which we're cast?

Cold the God flesh on the tree,
banned the crèche to attic murk,
sheer the silence after prayer,
nothing seems at all to work.

Yet, we try and try again
serving Him we hardly know:
honk if you love Jesus, friend,
beeping blessings as we go.

Here we meet, who somehow must
rescue meaning from the dust,
where betrayal's kiss presents
our best hope of relevance.

Moore Moran

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Our New Deal Nation

James Nuechterlein

Presidential reputations tend to fluctuate according to contemporary preoccupations. Andrew Johnson, to cite a random example, was once upon a time widely pictured as a martyr to the noble cause of Abraham Lincoln's desire to bring reconciliation to the nation following the Civil War, a victim of vindictive Radical Republicans determined to extend, by any means necessary, GOP rule over the defeated Confederacy. Come the civil rights revolution of the 1960s, however, he was recast as a misguided compromiser and racist willing to undo the gains the war had brought to blacks and restore the former slaves to the malign control of their pre-Emancipation masters.

Johnson is by no means unusual as a revisionist target. Even our iconic Presidents—Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson—have at varying times and to varying degrees been the subjects of debunking, or at least skeptical, historians. Which makes the case of Franklin Delano Roosevelt all the more striking. He, more than Ronald Reagan, is our modern Teflon President. Not, of course, that FDR and his New Deal have been immune from all criticism. The Roosevelt presidency has by now been the subject of detailed historical analysis, and students of the era have noted a mass of specific errors in judgment attributable to the President and those who advised him.

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FOR THE SURVIVAL OF DEMOCRACY: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE WORLD CRISIS OF THE 1930S

By Alonzo L. Hamby
Free Press
492 pp. $30.

But, as Alonzo L. Hamby notes in *For the Survival of Democracy: Franklin Roosevelt and the World Crisis of the 1930s*, the perspective of those historians who have attempted comprehensive interpretive studies of FDR and his times has been "largely celebratory," or even, as he says at another point, "near-adulatory." There was a brief period in the 1960s and '70s when left-wing historians attacked the New Deal as insufficiently radical, but that moment passed quickly and the pro-FDR consensus was soon again securely in place. The tradition of what Hamby calls the "founding fathers" of New Deal historiography—James MacGregor Burns (*Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox*, 1956), Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (*The Age of Roosevelt*, three volumes, 1957-1960), and William Leuchtenburg (*Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal*, 1963)—still reigns.

That tradition is notable not only for its consistently favorable judgment of Roosevelt, but also for its agreement on basic terms of analysis of the man and his administration. Most scholars agree with Hamby that David Kennedy's magisterial *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945* (1999) is "the new standard narrative" of its subject, and the remarkable thing about Kennedy's sweeping survey is how little it departs, in its interpretive framework, from the works the founders began publishing almost a half century ago. Historical judgments about FDR and the New Deal differ at the margins, but the patterns of analysis of the man and his administration—where he was wise or not so wise, the strengths

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and flaws of his personality and intellect, the successes and failures of his policies, the enduring legacy of his tenure in office—vary precious little among historians past and present. (Another recent study, Conrad Black's *Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom*, is securely within the prevailing tradition.)

Hamby's book is particularly illustrative of the enduring hold that the Roosevelt consensus has on historians' imaginations. The author indicates in the preface that he began his study with a rather more skeptical take on FDR than is customary, and along the way he offers some sharply critical observations on the President and his policies. But, as we shall see, the criticisms, while more central than is common, are largely the traditional ones, and, in the end, the author's summary judgment does not significantly depart from the prevailing consensus. FDR and his New Deal were intensely controversial in their day, but among scholars—and, it seems, among Americans more generally—that controversy has largely dissipated. Why that is so, and what it tells us about the particular and peculiar nature of the politics of the 1930s, is worth pursuing.

Presidential greatness is in part a function of opportunity. Theodore Roosevelt regretted that in his years in office at the beginning of the twentieth century he never encountered a crisis great enough fully to test his capacity for leadership. His distant cousin Franklin, of course, was President during the two most dramatic crises of the century, the Great Depression and World War II. (This essay addresses itself only to FDR's response to the Depression.) The liberal consensus on the New Deal rests most fundamentally on the assumption that Roosevelt made an unprecedented response to an unprecedented catastrophe; in the words of Carl Degler (*Out of Our Past*, 1959), the New Deal was "a revolutionary response to a revolutionary situation." This "Third American Revolution," in responding to conditions of poverty and unemployment never before encountered, brought into being something that Americans had not previously fully contemplated (though TR had offered glimpses of it), "the Guarantor State."

Indeed, in its wide-ranging program of relief, recovery, and reform, the New Deal wrought a revolution in the role of government. Among other things, it fed the hungry, provided welfare, employed those out of work, set minimum wages and maximum hours for workers, propped up farm prices, refinanced mortgages, bailed out financial institutions, guaranteed bank deposits, supported the arts, produced electricity for rural America, organized and mobilized tenant farmers, established Brigadoon-like utopian communities, built public projects large and small, engaged in massive regional planning, created public housing, and offered old-age security. It put new limits on the operations of the free market and established once and for all the sense of the federal government's responsibility for the health of the economy. It brought a collectivist sense and an emphasis on economic security to what had previously been a predominantly individualistic political culture.

In the process of doing all this, the New Deal also effected a revolution in politics. The Republican Party had, with brief interludes, dominated national politics since the Civil War, but the New Deal created a Democratic hegemony that lasted for decades. The impact of the Depression brought together under the canopy of the New Deal reform forces that had previously been divided on cultural and geographic lines: blacks and whites, farmers and workers, Catholics and Protestants, Southern poor whites and Northern ethnics. That new unity was most visibly represented in the rise of labor in general and the CIO in particular, a development that, however uneasily in some cases, covered over old antipathies with a nascent class consciousness, a sensibility spurred by the New Deal's active support for union organizing and collective bargaining. By the end of the '30s, so the consensus view argues, the previously unchallenged dominance of big business over the nation's political economy had been checked by a new broker-state politics, with an energized big government exercising countervailing power both in its own right and also in conjunction with big labor and big agriculture.

There were lesser revolutions along the way. By the end of the '30s, WASP domination of society was no longer so prevalent as it had been. The New Deal's close involvement with organized labor and with urban political machines brought to prominence leaders from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. Even blacks, still scarcely visible as political actors, edged their way into public attention. (Eleanor Roosevelt, who often acted as a kind of conscience-in-residence to her husband, relentlessly pushed the President in the cause of racial justice.)

There was, finally, also a revolution in the presidency itself (though again, TR, along with Woodrow Wilson, offered some precedent). FDR greatly expanded the powers both of the federal government in general and of the executive branch in particular. He dominated Congress as no President had before him. After him, particular occupants of the Oval Office might be ineffectual, but none of them would be institutionally weak.

Americans of the time granted the President extensive authority because of the depth of the national cri-

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sis. They did so as well, however, because of their response to Roosevelt the man. He was always more popular than his policies. Even many conservatives would concede that, whatever his failings, he was remarkably successful in gaining the trust of millions of ordinary Americans. The contribution he made to the nation, especially in the first days of the New Deal, was essentially psychological: he generated an atmosphere of hope, confidence, and affirmation. Transmitting to the public a measure of his own Hyde Park squire's commanding confidence and essential security of self, he restored to Americans in a time of genuine desperation a sense of faith in their nation and its institutions.

He accomplished this in part through oratorical skill: there was, after all, more to fear in the spring of 1933 than fear itself. But far more than through his press conferences, fireside chats, and other public addresses, he did it through action. What Roosevelt grasped, what his tragic predecessor Herbert Hoover never fully understood, was that the fact of action was more important than its substance. The Depression, not in its origins but in its duration, was a profoundly psychological phenomenon. By 1933, in terms of public opinion (if not necessarily in the opinion of professional economists) too much had gone wrong for too long simply to wait for a turn in the economic cycle to set things right. Roosevelt's activism, in part a natural product of his instinct for power, stemmed as well from his perception that government action was necessary to help restore the public confidence essential for economic recovery.

On all these matters, the liberal consensus established by the historiographical founders remains remarkably intact. It extends as well to the (generally mild) criticisms the founders offered of Roosevelt and his administration. FDR, almost everyone agrees, was a sloppy, impulsive, sometimes absentminded administrator; most concede that whatever benefits accrued to his habit of assigning overlapping jurisdictions and unclear mandates to his subordinates were fortuitous, not consciously intended. He had broad humanitarian sympathies—along with strong ideological and partisan instincts—but he was not a deep or consistent thinker.

In personal relations, he was far more complicated than his habitual jovial and welcoming demeanor indicated. FDR liked people and was genuinely curious about them—he learned by conversing, not by reading—but his relations with others were essentially manipulative. He used his immense charm to cultivate people until he tired of them or they lost their usefulness, but he confided in few and he needed none. In withholding himself, he maintained his personal and psychological independence. His energies were reserved for public uses; they were seldom dissipated in private involvements. As a public man, he was among the most artful of all Presidents, but he was also among the most devious. He regularly misrepresented his true intentions and left false impressions, sometimes intentionally (his dissimulations were legion) and sometimes inadvertently; he had a habit in conversation, for example, of vigorously nodding his head and saying "yes" when he actually only meant "I see what you mean."

Even as liberal scholars have noted FDR's personal flaws—while finding them more than balanced by his virtues—so they have tempered their overall praise of the New Deal with a number of criticisms of specific policies and programs. In more general terms, they have in various ways criticized the New Deal for not going far enough in its programs of economic recovery and political reform, for not creating a more effective reform coalition, for leaving too many social problems untouched or at least inadequately addressed.

It is these policy criticisms that radical historians of the '60s and '70s extended into an overall indictment of the New Deal as a well-intended failure. Thus, for example, Howard Zinn, who edited the volume *New Deal Thought* (1965), faulted Roosevelt for what others saw as his greatest accomplishment: saving capitalism.

Rather than working toward the establishment of democratic socialism that the economic crisis had made possible, Zinn argued, the New Deal "refurbished middle-class America" and gave just enough to the lower classes "to create an aura of good will." Given the inevitable failures of a system geared to profit rather than human need, the Roosevelt administration left a legacy of problems in unemployment, inequality, slums, poverty, and inadequate education and medical care. The New Deal, like so many reform movements before it, was in the end an exercise in cooptation, making enough concessions to preserve the system "while isolated aggrieved groups fought their way up to the point of complacency." Whether precisely intended or not, its effect was to strengthen the capitalist system by buying off radical grievances and dividing the forces of genuine reform.

Zinn's critique, it might be said, represented the views of the Old Left, including those Socialists, Communists, and radicals of infinite variety who opposed the New Deal as it was unfolding. Theirs was an essentially economic and institutional analysis. The New Left, which arose in a time of prosperity rather than depression, did not ignore economic issues, but focused more on matters of morality.

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Paul Conkin (*The New Deal*, 1967), a reasonably typical representative of younger radical scholars, emphasized capitalism's ugliness and spiritual poverty; the New Deal, he suggested, could prime the economic pump, but it could not purify the capitalist well. He called for a renewed moral and religious vision, the establishment of a just community that would offer "meaningful work, personal involvement, democratic participation." Conkin in effect conceded the liberal view that FDR gave the public what it wanted. The problem lay not so much in the inadequacies of the New Deal as in the inadequacies of the American system. Conventional democratic politics, he said, is "a perennial interim accommodation with ignorance." The final blame for the New Deal's failure lay with the "appalling economic ignorance and philosophic immaturity of the American electorate."

The radicalism of the '60s, Old and New, came and went relatively quickly; so also did its critique of the New Deal. History professors keep radical arguments alive in their classrooms, but mainly for pedagogical reasons. Whatever their own ideological preferences, they know that it is Schlesinger and Leuchtenburg, not Zinn and Conkin, who represent the prevailing interpretation of FDR and the New Deal. And to the extent that their sympathies lie with the latter two, they are inclined to accept Conkin's view that the New Deal did about as much as it could in shifting the American political spectrum to the left.

There have, of course, been critiques of Roosevelt and the New Deal from the right from 1933 onward, but even as they found little traction at the time, they have had little historiographical impact since. This is due, in part, to the dominance of the left in academic circles, but that does not explain everything. Other liberal heroes—Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and Woodrow Wilson, for example—have in recent years come under considerable academic scrutiny and criticism, but there has been no real equivalent of that in the case of FDR.

Roosevelt was fortunate in his contemporary critics. Those who led the early criticism—Hoover, the Republican Party, the corporate moguls behind the American Liberty League—had been so discredited by the Depression as to have negligible influence on public opinion; if anything, their criticism was a boon to the administration. It was hardly persuasive, at least in the early years of the New Deal, to argue that if only FDR had left things alone, economic recovery would have developed on its own. The Depression had already lasted too long for the public to be convinced of that.

And given the severity of the economic crisis, the argument that the New Deal was destroying the constitutional order—exalting the President over Congress, the federal government over the states—had a peculiarly abstract air. If, as conservatives argued, Roosevelt was somehow undermining traditional American individualism, it seemed to many people that a measure of undermining of an ideology that had come to such a dead end might well be in order. Similarly, conservative worries about the loss of individual liberties fell flat when such liberties were equated almost solely with property rights and the obligation of government not to interfere with the traditional prerogatives of the business community. All in all, the fledgling New Deal seemed to most not an alien force but a breath of fresh air.

But that leaves unanswered the question as to why academics, given the advantage of distance and historical hindsight, have not been much more critical of the New Deal than were most of its contemporaries. It was not, after all (as even its liberal defenders indirectly suggested), immune from criticism. Enter, in a way, Alonzo Hamby.

Hamby does not lay out his political inclinations, and his book cannot fairly be described as right-wing in its point of view, but his own account of his original skepticism about the received wisdom concerning the New Deal and his occasionally sharp criticisms of FDR and FDR's policies suggest that if he is not necessarily a conservative, neither is he conventionally liberal. (He also brings to our attention two works that are thoroughly critical of the New Deal: Gary Dean Best's 1991 *Pride, Prejudice, and Politics: Roosevelt versus Recovery, 1933-1938* and Gene Smiley's 2002 *Rethinking the Great Depression*.)

The most original aspect of Hamby's approach is his effort to put the New Deal in comparative perspective by interweaving his account of American developments in the '30s with parallel treatments of events in Great Britain and Germany. (He also offers a sketchy account of the diplomatic events of the decade up to the outbreak of war in 1939.)

The results are mixed. The treatment of the rise of Hitler and the Third Reich is too compact and too familiar to be of use to readers, even for purposes of comparison. The Nazi story has been told so often and in so many venues that the most casual consumers of popular history—including viewers of television's History Channel—will find little here to surprise them.

The discussion of Great Britain, however, partly because it is far less familiar and partly because it is far more germane for comparative purposes, is both fresh and suggestive. A central element in the defense of the New Deal is that it represented, in the midst of a

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world increasingly polarized between extremes of left and right, what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. termed "the triumph of the middle way." In this view, the vitality of the New Deal kept hope alive throughout the Western world that the Depression did not necessarily indicate the bankruptcy of democratic capitalism; the liberal and social democratic left in Europe looked to FDR and his policies as proof of democracy's continuing promise amid the totalizing alternatives of fascism and communism.

Hamby does not dismiss this argument—as the title of his book indicates—but he does complexify it. Great Britain had its own middle way, and it was rather different from that of the United States. From late 1931 to the end of the decade Britain was ruled by a National government dominated by the Conservatives with a scattering of Liberals and Laborites. It was a government of collective leadership, with Stanley Baldwin as the major figure in conjunction with his fellow Tory Neville Chamberlain and Labor's Ramsey MacDonald. (Winston Churchill, Hamby says, was rightly thought too erratic to be trusted with leadership.)

In contrast to Roosevelt's New Deal, the National government followed a path, in Hamby's terms, of "stability and anti-charisma." Its recovery policies were somewhere between those of Hoover and FDR, combining "fiscal conservatism . . . with generous social provision for the unemployed and the poor." Its "muddle way," rejecting the more innovative social democratic prescriptions of David Lloyd George and John Maynard Keynes and the radical program of the socialist Labor opposition, was unexciting but broadly popular; the government won a landslide majority in 1931 and was easily returned to power four years later. Hamby is old-fashioned (and, in my view, quite correct) in his emphasis on the importance of political leadership to what happened in the '30s, and he holds in high regard Britain's undramatic but very competent Depression leaders, Baldwin in particular.

Britain's middle way was less adventurous than that of the U.S. and gained less international notice. It was also, at least in economic terms, clearly more successful. Hamby reports that his initial suspicion of FDR stemmed from the fact that while other nations, including both Germany and Great Britain, had largely recovered from the Depression by mid-to-late 1935, the U.S. even at the end of the decade found itself "still deeply mired in economic distress." That is no overstatement. Consider but one devastating statistic: as David Kennedy has noted, in no year of the 1930s did the unemployment rate in America average below 14 percent. Historians have commonly attributed Europe's more rapid economic recovery mainly to its earlier resort to heavy military spending. There is something to that, but the early date of European recovery and the failure of the New Deal to match that recovery even by the end of the decade suggests that there were other factors at work.

Hamby's argument, though he does not make it as directly as one might wish, is that the New Deal's early failure in achieving recovery—it did much better, he thinks, in relief and reform—stemmed from misguided economic analysis. Much of the so-called First New Deal of 1933-35 was based on the assumption that what was needed was large-scale, long-term economic planning. With the end of the frontier, the exhaustion of free land, and the saturation of the domestic market, the United States had become, so the argument went, a "mature economy," in which growth and expansion could no longer be assumed. The American economy, which had grown so rapidly for so long, would for the foreseeable future be restricted to limited growth at best. The equitable distribution of its benefits would require as never before the benign attention of the federal government; the only alternative was control of those benefits by a private economic oligarchy.

The economic heart of the First New Deal was the National Recovery Administration (NRA), a vast program of industrial self-regulation whose intention was, by establishing legally enforceable "codes of fair competition" across the entire American economy, to stabilize prices for industry, improve wages and conditions for workers, and protect the interests of consumers. It was an unprecedented (for America) effort at what Hamby calls "managed capitalism"—in the Depression context "managed scarcity"—and, to drastically simplify a large and complicated story, it did not work. (The Agricultural Adjustment Administration, which dealt with the farm economy, was more successful.) Whereas European economies had revived by mid-1935, in America real wages had slightly declined. The idea that the American economy could be at once democratic, prosperous, and planned was dubious to begin with (a point made at the time by Walter Lippmann in *The Good Society,* 1937), and in any case, as Hamby emphasizes, America's political and economic culture was still too individualistic to be hospitable to such a centralized, collectivist project. When the Supreme Court unanimously declared the NRA unconstitutional in May 1935, most Americans, whether of left or right, were glad to see it go.

The President was not among them. He never gave up his commitment to planning, and he always hoped

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that, in one form or another, the NRA might be resuscitated. As Otis L. Graham, Jr. noted (*An Encore for Reform: Old Progressives and the New Deal*, 1967), Roosevelt was an "instinctive collectivist," easily the farthest left of all American Presidents. His belief in planning—a commonplace on the left in his day—dovetailed with his understanding of the nature of the Depression. In contrast to Hoover, who viewed the Depression as a foreign disaster that had spread to America and could not entirely be overcome by domestic policies, Roosevelt saw it as essentially homemade, a product of Republican errors based, at bottom, on the GOP's narrow concern for the interests of businessmen and bankers. Recovery in America would, in FDR's view, depend on national economic planning as well as on political reforms that would make the structural and institutional changes necessary to secure permanent economic renewal.

Roosevelt therefore followed a policy of what Hamby disapprovingly terms "recovery in one country," a policy that, despite the President's rhetorical bow to the need for international cooperation, was essentially nationalistic. Hamby thus, in speaking of the policies of the First New Deal in 1933, refers not, as is the historiographical custom, to "the first 100 days," but to "the first 125 days." The longer time frame takes in Roosevelt's totally unexpected July 3 "bombshell message" to the World Economic Conference in London, a message so harsh and dismissive that it effectively scuttled a major cooperative effort to fight the Depression on a global scale. The incident, Hamby thinks, "revealed [Roosevelt] at his worst."

In addition to criticizing the early New Deal's recovery policies, Hamby raises, more tentatively, the related issue of Roosevelt's antagonism throughout his presidency toward the business community. From his first inaugural address onward, FDR used the business and banking elite as scapegoats for the Depression and as targets of political attack. Hamby is sure that Roosevelt held simplistic neo-populist views of businessmen, and he appears sympathetic to the idea that the President's unrelenting antipathy to business leaders impeded economic recovery. Since history cannot be rerun, that argument can neither be proved nor disproved, but there is a certain common sense in supposing that reasonably satisfied capitalists are necessary to a healthy capitalist economy. And under Roosevelt, the capitalists were not at all satisfied.

Roosevelt was a patrician, and like most patricians, he held in disdain those who merely made money. Moreover, as a man of the progressive left of his time, he was, while not anti-capitalist, deeply anti-business. When he attacked businessmen he was not simply being opportunistic; he meant what he said. He truly, however erroneously, believed that it was the monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic powers of big business and the shady dealings of financiers that had been central to the coming of the Depression and that blocked economic recovery. Whenever the New Deal encountered economic difficulties, he resorted to conspiracy theories to explain them. The business community was refusing to invest because it wanted to discredit the administration; when the crippling recession of 1937-38 occurred, Roosevelt blamed it on a "strike of capital." Like other New Dealers, he was given to making facile comparisons between the concentration of economic power and the rise of fascism.

FDR's prejudices fit with those of his time. People needed explanations for the Depression, which meant, not incidentally, finding those to whom to assign responsibility for it. Republicans and business leaders had taken credit for the prosperity of the 1920s, and it was a form of recompense for their perhaps naïve arrogance that they were given oversimplified blame for the Depression.

It was during the so-called Second New Deal (1935-38) that relations between the administration and the business community became most embittered. By 1935, with the economy still sputtering, Roosevelt came under severe criticism, not just from the right but increasingly from the left. His response to the latter was at once shrewdly tactical and fully sincere: he moved sharply left in his policies and, in Hamby's words, "open[ed] an offensive against the wealthy, the bankers, and the big corporations." That offensive reached its rhetorical climax in Roosevelt's famous Madison Square Garden address at the end of the 1936 presidential campaign:

> Government by organized money is just as dangerous as government by organized mob. Never before in all our history have these forces been so united against one candidate as they stand today. They are unanimous in their hatred for me—and I welcome their hatred. I should like to have it said of my first administration that in it the forces of selfishness and of lust for power met their match. I should like to have it said of my second administration that in it these forces met their master.

Conservatives and moderates were not alone in decrying FDR's "class warfare" and the effect it might have on economic recovery. John Maynard Keynes, for example, whose own political views were to the

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left of the New Deal, cautioned Roosevelt in 1938 about the dangers of business bashing.

It was not just the rhetoric but the policies of the Second New Deal that opened a chasm between Roosevelt and his conservative critics in the business community and elsewhere. The NRA, whatever its failures, had been based on an appeal to national unity. Once it was gone, that appeal gave way to naked political conflict. It is impossible here to specify the myriad details, but the administration's policies from 1935 to 1938 were unabashedly on the left: they attempted to reconstitute the Supreme Court so as to bend it to Roosevelt's desires, uncritically supported organized labor and poor farmers, instituted high corporate and individual wealth taxes, imposed a series of regulations on business activity, increased antitrust prosecutions, created a commission to investigate the concentration of economic power, and engaged in public spending in a variety of programs that significantly increased the deficit.

These policies generated a complicated series of political counterreactions that, combined with the severe economic downturn in 1937-38 and significant Republican gains in the congressional elections of 1938 (preceded by failed interventions by Roosevelt in several Democratic primaries), brought an effective end to the New Deal as a reform movement. After 1938, in any case, the President was increasingly preoccupied with international affairs, and once the U.S. became involved in World War II, he announced that "Dr. New Deal" had been supplanted by "Dr. Win the War." (It is worth noting, however, that Roosevelt did not forsake his reform dreams: in 1944 he proposed an Economic Bill of Rights, a program of cradle-to-grave security that went nowhere politically but that stands as a testimony to the New Deal's aspirations.)

Hamby is by no means uniformly critical of Roosevelt's reform policies. He does note, however, that when reform came into conflict with recovery, the latter gave way to the former. Thus, for example, Roosevelt knew that his social security program was, at least in the short term, anti-recovery. The payroll taxes that supported it were regressive, and, because it delayed payments for several years until an adequate fund to finance it was in place, it acted in the meantime as a fiscal drag on the economy. But here as elsewhere, he opted for the long-term benefits, as he saw them, of reform. He often, in fact, expressed concern that a too-rapid recovery might dull the reform impulse. Roosevelt, of course, wanted recovery, but he was persuaded that recovery over the long haul, not just for the moment, required fundamental political reform.

Several things need to be noted about Hamby's criticisms of FDR's economic policies. To begin with, they are not new (this is not meant as criticism). All of them have been noted by historians of the New Deal from Schlesinger onward, even if liberal scholars tend to give them lesser weight and prominence than does Hamby. And even liberals these days pretty much concede the failure of planning in general and the NRA in particular. The historical guild has caught up with Economics 101.

It is also the case that Hamby, as a fair-minded historian, concedes mitigating factors in what he sees as Roosevelt's mistakes. While he offers hints that he finds Great Britain's sober middle way preferable to FDR's more radical and chaotic alternative, he admits that what was workable there could not simply have been transplanted here. The British right, for example, had a paternalistic tradition of "socially aware conservatism"—some called it "Tory socialism"—that had no significant counterpart in America. In shorthand terms, American conservatism had never seen the need of a Bismarck (though once again, TR had made gestures in that direction), and so the struggle to establish a major role for government in guiding the economy was bound to be more explosive in the U.S. than it was elsewhere. Hamby argues in general that responses to the Depression legitimately differed from nation to nation depending on particulars of history and tradition.

Even in his most intense criticism of Roosevelt—on the policy of "recovery in one country"—Hamby concedes that FDR was hardly alone in his error. His predecessor Hoover had signed into law the highly protectionist Hawley-Smoot tariff. Beyond that, most countries turned inward in fighting the Depression, adopting varying patterns of "self-concern, tariff protectionism, competitive currency devaluation, and beggar-thy-neighbor policies." Roosevelt, on this matter, simply followed the crowd.

One final point on Hamby's criticisms: If FDR's First New Deal recovery policies were so mistaken, how do we account for his remarkable political successes in both the congressional elections of 1934 and the presidential campaign against Alf Landon in 1936? Hamby suggests several possible factors: the fecklessness of the GOP opposition, FDR's unsurpassed political skills and personal popularity, and signs of economic revival in the summer and fall of 1936. He also emphasizes the very immediate rewards that millions of people obtained from the New Deal's various relief and quasi-relief policies. As many as one-quarter of Americans, Hamby estimates, benefited directly from one or another New Deal program, and millions more had friends or family members

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who received such benefits. The government's humanitarian policies, he concludes, had created "a hard core of electoral support willing to forgive almost any other shortcoming."

At the end of the day, it is difficult to make out precisely what Hamby's final judgment on Roosevelt comes down to. He is not, as we have seen, hesitant to offer criticisms, but he avoids definitive judgment. Instead, he goes uncertainly back and forth. There are, we learn unhelpfully, large failures and large achievements to bring into balance. On more than one occasion he says that FDR the man was more impressive than his policies, a comment that opens more questions than it closes. He shakily concludes that, in Roosevelt, "one senses a presence larger than can be conveyed by any balance sheet tally of pluses and minuses." All this is not so much fair and balanced as terminally ambivalent, and it unfortunately weakens the effect of a book whose analysis is in so many ways penetrating and perceptive.

As for the New Deal itself, Hamby's wavering summary judgment comes not in his introduction or conclusion but in a throwaway line at the end of a discussion of the Tennessee Valley Authority. "[W]hatever it had become and whatever its shortcomings, it was hard to avoid the conclusion that TVA did more good than harm. In this, its history paralleled that of the New Deal." In the end, it seems, however halfheartedly, Hamby has signed on to the New Deal consensus.

We are left with the question of why that consensus has held up so broadly and for so long a time. Part of the answer, I suspect, lies with the sheer scholarly competence of the historiographical founders. Whatever their pro-FDR inclinations, they were thorough historians and biographers determined to see Roosevelt and his policies in as comprehensive a framework as possible. In viewing the man and his times in the large, they provided patterns of analysis, both critical and favorable, that have endured for decades. That is why, as noted earlier, Kennedy's recent overview falls so neatly into step with what, for example, Leuchtenburg wrote thirty-five years previously.

There is also the matter of ideology. Liberals—as opposed to radicals—naturally look back with nostalgia and affection to a decade that was, in its politics, liberalism's finest hour. It is hardly surprising that liberal scholars and activists find it difficult to be more than mildly critical of an epoch that they would give anything to be able to restore.

The case of conservatives—whether scholars or ordinary citizens—is a bit more complicated. During the many years when I taught the New Deal, I was regularly struck by the overwhelming pro-Roosevelt consensus among my students, even the more conservative of them. Young men and women who would have fervently opposed any revival of New Deal policies were relatively uncritical—or were at least understanding—of the original program. There was, simply, the unprecedented crisis of the Depression, a crisis so deep and baffling that it broke the normal rules of political economy. Those desperate times, even many conservatives retrospectively concede, called for desperate measures. And some of those measures, Social Security for example, brought an element of economic stability into American life unwelcome only to doctrinaire libertarians. Beyond that, the New Deal set in place government policies that, it is widely hoped, make a Second Great Depression unlikely if not impossible. In any case, the New Deal is thought to be safely in the past, born in conditions that few Americans can imagine being replicated. It is thus suitably domesticated for recollection in tranquility.

The legacy of the New Deal is clear up to a point, though not perhaps so obvious as the liberal consensus thinks. Prior to the 1930s, most Americans assumed that the nation's economy required relatively little attending to. Given a reasonably nonintrusive government, it was thought, the dynamics of American capitalism were such that the economic pie would keep getting bigger; and if that was so, little attention needed to be paid to the problem, to the extent it was a problem, of the slices being so unequal in size. Americans characteristically cared about growth, not distribution. As John F. Kennedy famously put it years later, "A rising tide lifts all boats."

It was only after the Depression hit that the Progressive belief in economic planning—largely a result of the experience of economic mobilization during the First World War—gained wide attention and a degree of acceptance. If America's economy was now truly "mature" in the negative sense, then growth could not be assumed, and the problem of inequality of distribution took on a significance it had never held before. The most dedicated New Dealers wanted a conscious commitment to a more equal division, under government aegis, of the nation's economic rewards. They knew that such a policy would bring a measure of class conflict, but they did not shrink from that. While they never sold the country on their program, they did succeed in instilling in the public a greater concern for economic security as a legitimate and necessary public policy issue.

The widespread prosperity of the 1940s and '50s—which came as a surprise to most New Dealers—restored assumptions of perpetual growth and ended any hope that liberals had retained of mandating eco-

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nomic equality. The economic aftermath of the New Deal was interest-group competition, not planning toward equality. But if Americans rejected a policy of equal division of the pie, the Depression experience had opened them to the idea of government's responsibility for guaranteeing something approximating a minimum slice. That change in thought, the New Deal consensus assumes, is still secure.

Hamby is not so sure, and he wonders if the New Deal changed Americans' ideas about government as much as is commonly thought. It is true, he admits, that most people are nowadays concerned with economic security and that in some ways they hold government responsible for securing it. Yet, he says, those beliefs coexist, however paradoxically or even contradictorily, with a stubborn, pre-New Deal suspicion of big government. That's not a tidy conclusion, but even a cursory examination of post-New Deal political history suggests that it contains a good deal of complicated truth.

In the end, however, whatever Hamby's marginal disagreements with the New Deal consensus, he has not strayed far from it. Nor have most of the rest of us. It is ironic that a highly politicized nation, narrowly and bitterly divided over partisan values of red states versus blue, should agree so broadly about the most ideologically divisive era in all of American history. The Whig interpretation of American history, which portrayed an extended struggle from 1776 onwards between implacably opposed armies of conservatives and progressives—and the inevitable triumph of the latter—saw the New Deal as that history's culmination. It turned out instead to be, in its quite unrepresentative experience of economic disaster and response to disaster, less the paradigm of the nation's history than a special and exceptional case. The New Deal made, in ideological terms, a big, but mostly fleeting, difference. That's why we don't fight about it much any more. FT

If God Is My Bell-Metal

If God is my bell-metal,
massive, cold,
impatient in its long waiting
to be struck
and in that striking
ring me in;
Then
first I seek a casting fire,
my leathery heart a bellows
breathing the blue flame
of angels bearing the great
rocking-in-its-ropes
mallet of God,
knowing his tolling
may well overwhelm
my frail tower
and bring me down.

Warren L. Molton

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Books in Review

Truth—or Consequences

Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity. By Paul J. Griffiths. *Brazos. 254 pp. $18.99.*

Reviewed by J. Budziszewski

Everyone has lied. Most people are uneasy about lying, but most also justify at least some of their lies. How uneasy should we be? Is there such a thing as an innocent lie? What is a lie, anyway? And what is at stake in these questions—what, exactly, is endangered if we get the answers wrong?

No one takes a harder line than St. Augustine, for whom all lies are wrong by their nature. This is also the view of the Catholic Church, although it has not been the view of all Christians through the centuries, or for that matter of all Catholics. So when Paul Griffiths, Schmitt Chair of Catholic Studies at the University of Illinois at Chicago, advertises an Augustinian theology of the matter, one knows he will be defending embattled ground.

In fact, his project in *Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity* is more difficult still, for the view of lying that Griffiths proposes is *even stricter* than that of the Church—though not, in his view, stricter than that of Augustine. The Catechism of the Catholic Church (§ 2482) takes its definition of what it is to lie from Augustine's *De mendacio* (On Lying): "A lie consists in speaking a falsehood with the intention of deceiving." What the text probably means by falsehood is what St. Thomas Aquinas called "formal" falsehood and Griffiths calls "duplicity"—deliberately speaking what one believes to be untrue, whether or not it is, in fact, untrue. So understood, the definition includes two conditions regarding intentions. To tell a lie, (1) I must intend a mismatch between my thought and my word, and (2) I must also intend to deceive by it. This is where Griffiths becomes stern. In his view, the deliberate mismatch of word to thought is always a lie, whether or not I intend to deceive anyone.

Why does Griffiths call his view "Augustinian"? In the definition quoted in the Catechism, Augustine plainly affirms both conditions. Griffiths' answer is that Augustine is inconsistent: sometimes he writes as though all duplicity is lying; sometimes he writes as though I haven't lied unless I also intend to deceive. His most mature and consistent view, says Griffiths, is that duplicity is all that matters. I am not sure how much rides on this claim, because Griffiths makes duplicity do some of the work that in other accounts is done by deceptive intention. Suppose I tell a joke about a duck who goes into a bar and asks the bartender for a drink. There is no such duck; have I then lied? I would say no, because I am not trying to make anyone think that there is. Griffiths would say no, because given the conventions of joking, I do not understand myself as saying what I think to be false. Nevertheless, considering how much weight Griffiths places on this definition, it is surprising that the opening definitional chapter is perhaps the weakest in the book. Griffiths offers nothing like the kind of textual analysis that would be necessary to show that Augustine really means what Griffiths says he means.

This ought to be fatal to the book. Curiously, it isn't. What really drives Griffiths' argument is not what Augustine says about the definition of lying, but what Augustine says about the relationship of man to God. Griffiths tries to show not that only one definition of lying fits Augustine's statements about its definition but that only one definition of lying fits his theology.

For Augustine, words are signs—not natural signs, as smoke is a sign of fire, but conventional signs, as the word "cat" brings a cat to mind for speakers of English but not to speakers of French. Now a cat is something outside me, but words can also signify what is in the mind—for example, what I believe about the cat, or what I regret about him. To make the private, internal contents of the mind external and public is the defining characteristic of speech. Part of the reason why duplicity is perverse is that it perverts this relationship. But there is more, says Griffiths.

Although speech signifies thought, it is not the same as thought. The thought, or inner "word," is nonphysical because it is not a vocalization, preverbal because it cannot be identified with any particular set of conventional words, and nontemporal in the limited sense that whatever is true or false in my thought is eternally so. But when I speak, I choose words and vocalize them in time. These differences make every phase of speech unreliable. Perhaps we would not need language for communication had it not been for the Fall. As Griffiths concludes, "anything that could deepen this unreliability (as the lie would) should be shunned." But there is still more.

Speech occurs in three phases: "From what you think to what you

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say to what your hearer understands you to think." This triadic progression in speech engages the triadic unity among memory, intelligence, and will. Memory is where the internal "word" is stored as a disposition to have certain ideas or concepts; intelligence is the activation of those ideas or concepts as thought; and vocalization is the utterance of this thought by an act of the will. But the relation among memory, intelligence, and will is not merely triadic—it images the divine Trinity:

> We might say (though Augustine does not) that the memory-intelligence-will triad, when gazed at with the appropriate intensity and lack of distraction, serves (or may serve) as an icon of the being of God. An icon participates in what it represents, and because it does so it can displace the gaze from itself to that in which it participates.

The most fitting way to understand speech, then, is that "it makes thought audible by invocation as the divine word was made visible by incarnation." By improperly and sinfully dividing speech from thought, the lie "ruptures God's image in us." By so doing, it also displaces our gaze from God, in whose being all speech ought to participate, and turns it back to ourselves in a futile attempt at control and possession; for truthful speech, in Griffiths' view, is most truly regarded as incipient adoration.

The first part of Griffiths' book develops this line of thought, with the heavy lifting done mostly in chapters four and five. At its highest points, the argument is absorbing, suggestive, and intensely lyrical—far more so than my summary can convey. In the second part of the book he offers "Augustinian readings" of what nine other thinkers, both Christian and non-Christian, have written about the lie: Plato, Aristotle, Chrysostom, Jerome, Cassian, Aquinas, Kant, Newman, and Nietzsche. The author's explanation of the reason for these readings is rather odd, but very postmodern. As he explains in the introduction, the rightness of what Augustine thinks about the lie "depends on the rightness of what he thinks about a good many other things." But "disagreements about such matters are, I should think it obvious, not typically capable of resolution by argument." For this reason, he barely troubles with argument in defense of the position he has pledged himself to defend. "Commentary is likely to do a better job," he says, because "it is possible to use commentary to

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clarify and illuminate the contours of a particular position by bringing it into close contact with a competing position," and one way to do this is "to read a text presenting a competing view through the spectacles of the Augustinian view."

There is so much to half-agree with in all of this. Granted that fundamental disagreements are rarely capable of resolution solely by argument, does it follow that argument has no role at all to play in their resolution?

There are other problems with the book. In the first place, although Griffiths works hard to connect the Augustinian view of the Trinity with the Augustinian view of speech, he puts much less effort into showing that Augustine makes this connection. I am not sure that he sees the necessity of doing so. In the second place, although Griffiths' commentary succeeds in showing how important it is not to lie, it does not quite justify his view of what lying involves. Remember that according to Griffiths, the only thing necessary for a statement to be a lie is deliberately false signification. Whether you also intend to deceive is completely beside the point; it is irrelevant not only to the definitional question of whether you have lied, but also to the further moral question of how bad a lie you have told. "If the lie-as-such is sinful," Griffiths explains, "the sense in which and the extent to which it is sinful will remain the same for all lies." This does not seem to follow from his premises. As he points out, what the will "typically" intends in the third phase of progression from thought into speech is to "replicate in others the thought present in the speaker's mind." It would seem, then, that the intention to do so completes or perfects the act of speaking truthfully. If this is so, then even if the intention to deceive is not part of what makes a lie a lie, surely it makes a lie even more contrary to the truth.

This is, in fact, the opinion of Thomas Aquinas—and in Aquinas' own view, at least, he and Augustine are wholly in agreement. In the *secunda secundae* of the *Summa Theologica* (question 110, article 1), Aquinas explains that there are three ways in which a statement may be opposed to truth. First, it may be materially false; second, it may reflect an intention to say what is false; third, it may reflect an intention to make the other party believe what is false. As to the first, whether a statement is materially false is merely incidental to its being a lie; after all, a liar may say what is true, thinking it false. As to the second, the fact that a state-

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

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ment reflects an intention to say what is false is what *makes* it a lie; here Griffiths and Aquinas agree. As to the third, the fact that a statement reflects an additional intention to deceive has nothing to do with its being a lie, but plenty to do with what kind of lie it is. It is an even falser lie—false in one additional way—or, as he paradoxically puts it, it is a "perfect" lie. This is not to say that it is the *worst* kind of lie. All sins are to be avoided, and all lies are sins because they violate that due order for which the mind was made and through which it participates in the mind of God. Not every lie takes on the additional evil of opposing charity, which would make it a mortal sin.

To my way of thinking, the Thomist and Augustinian views of lying are complementary. The case for the defense: although Aquinas does not emphasize the triune character of God's image in us as Augustine does, Aquinas' thought is open to that emphasis, and it brings sorely needed order to the relation between deliberately false signification and the intention to deceive. It also brings the virtue of truthfulness into relation with the virtue of justice—with what we owe others as fellow bearers of God's image—and so rounds out Augustine's discussion of what we owe God directly. For Griffiths, though, this sort of thing is traitor talk, and his splenetic treatment of Aquinas (who is, by Griffiths' own admission, the closest to Augustine of all of his nine historical interlocutors) unfortunately typifies his approach to those who disagree with him.

In Griffiths' ledger, Aquinas does not just fail to think of speech in terms of the triune image, he *refuses* to do so, and through this refusal he "shows himself insufficiently serious as a Christian thinker." Aquinas' attempt to relate truthfulness to justice corrupts his whole analysis because it is the wrong "starting point," says Griffiths, and his distinctions among lies according to the ways in which they oppose truth and love show that he cannot remember his own definition. These flaws mark those who follow him, so that Thomists are "much more likely" than Augustinians to rationalize lies. This happens because and to the extent that "a fully Christian mode of thought about speech has been abandoned." There is a lot more such venting, and by the end of the book, the author has convinced himself that Aquinas thinks some lies ought to be told. Of course one should appreciate polemical writing when it is

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appropriate and well done. But well-done polemic requires better aim.

In his conclusion, Griffiths explores another favorite theme of Augustine's (though in doing so he sounds a bit like Stanley Hauerwas): no one has the power by himself to abandon the lie; but we can "apprentice ourselves" to the Church, to the community of truth, whose principal speech-act is adoration, and through which God pours out sanctifying grace. The theme, then, is the relation between the City of God, founded on this aspiration, and the City of Man, founded on its denial. Griffiths' terse comments about the former are interesting. About his comments on the latter, the less said, the better. Let us grant his contention, for example, that lying is pervasive in every political regime, including democracy, where lying typically takes the form of pandering to voters in order to attain elective office. Does it really follow with so little argument that the Christian may never seek elective office, or that a Christian may never prefer democracy to forms of government in which lying is even more pervasive? But the book should not be taxed too heavily for the tendentiousness of its nominal conclusion; its real conclusion, which is far more interesting, is to be found in part one.

Lying is a work of large flaws but also real merits; it deepens our pre-existing understanding of how gravely disordered the act of lying truly is. The worth of its accomplishment is not impaired by the fact that it claims to do much more than it does.

True Mercy and Charity

Saving America: Faith-Based Services and the Future of Civil Society. By Robert Wuthnow. *Princeton University Press. 352 pp. $29.95.*

Reviewed by Amy L. Sherman

My heroine, Octavia Hill, chose to live in the slums of east London in the 1800s. Active in what would now be called "Christian community development," with an emphasis on affordable housing, Hill was a frequent speaker to churches and charitable societies, and she sometimes

Amy L. Sherman *is a Senior Fellow at the Sagamore Institute, where she directs the Faith in Communities initiative.*

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rebuked her fellow Christians for being "too willing to help the poor, but not willing to know them." Hill's sense that compassion involves building genuine relationships with the needy echoes the concept of true mercy offered by the fourth-century Church Father Gregory of Nyssa, who said that mercy is "a voluntary suffering that joins itself to another."

In his new book, *Saving America: Faith-Based Services and the Future of Civil Society*, Robert Wuthnow seems to agree with Hill and Gregory. Though the book provides an enormous volume of information regarding the formal social service programs of congregations and faith-based nonprofits, Wuthnow concludes that the most important work that religious believers can do to serve the poor is to build caring communities that enfold people in lasting, supportive relationships. When congregations function as caring communities, Wuthnow argues, "they may contribute to the 'saving of America' in ways poorly captured by the service-organization model."

Saving America addresses the three main questions of today's debate over faith-based social services—namely: what faith-based organizations (FBOs) are doing, how well they are doing it, and whether their efforts should be supported with government aid. But Wuthnow also goes beyond those questions to examine the ways in which congregations and FBOs may contribute to the strengthening of civil society. This issue, he rightly asserts, is really the most important one. He concludes that faith communities build not only what Robert Putnam called "bonding social capital" but also (though indirectly and less often) what he termed "bridging social capital." Specifically, by mobilizing volunteers to work in faith-based service organizations, congregations help middle-class Americans to interact with low-income citizens—and this may contribute to overcoming class differences.

He draws this conclusion after reviewing findings from several national and community surveys (including four of Wuthnow's own from 1995 to today), as well as from numerous studies that have emerged in the last few years as scholarship on the faith community and social service has burgeoned. (The book would make a good textbook for any college course treating religion's involvement with social or economic development or urban issues.)

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

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Wuthnow estimates that about two-thirds of religious congregations are active in providing social services and that they invest roughly five percent of their annual budgets in such services. This amounts to an estimated 3.7 billion dollars annually. If the in-kind contributions of these congregations are also counted (the volunteers they mobilize, the free space they provide, the time their clergy devote to community work), the portion of their budgets spent on social services goes up to 20 percent or more. Wuthnow also estimates that 18 percent of U.S. nonprofits are faith-based service organizations, and that these groups invest some 8.4 billion dollars annually (after administrative expenses) in programs for those in need.

In absolute terms, then, the faith community's contribution to America's social safety net (about twelve billion dollars annually, excluding in-kind contributions) is impressive. In addition, we learn in *Saving America* that religious volunteers appear to give more hours per week than secular counterparts and are more likely to have volunteered in a poor inner-city neighborhood. "In short," Wuthnow writes, "the volunteers connected with religiously funded programs appear to have been more actively involved in service endeavors than the volunteers associated with other programs."

But what about the faith community's contributions in relative terms? The twelve billion dollar figure represents about 13 percent of the total expenditures of all nonprofit human service organizations—an important, but obviously limited, share. Wuthnow's data provide a further insight on the relative contribution of religious groups to social services versus that of public welfare agencies and secular nonprofits. His study of 2,077 low-income families in Pennsylvania reveals that 50 percent of those who had sought assistance did so from either congregations or FBOs. Among individuals transitioning from welfare to work, roughly four in ten sought help at some point from churches and community organizations (including FBOs). Clearly, faith communities compose a vital, necessary part of the safety net. Yet the scope and scale of their involvement is insufficient to replace the role of government or secular nonprofits.

Wuthnow's book looks not only at how much faith communities are doing to serve the poor but also at

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how well they are doing it. *Saving America* makes a great contribution to the field's literature with its three chapters of data from Wuthnow's path-breaking client study. In this section, Wuthnow reports on how recipients of aid rated the effectiveness and trustworthiness of their helpers. Congregations earned the highest marks, government agencies the lowest. On a four-point scale, clients gave congregations an average grade of 3.59 for effectiveness. And an impressive 84 percent said that they felt they could trust the helpers at congregations "a lot." FBOs and secular nonprofits received ratings in between those of government and congregations, and they served the same kinds of clients (neither enjoyed more "cream of the crop," easy-to-serve families); their grades on effectiveness and trustworthiness were also virtually identical. But Wuthnow's data provide some evidence that clients may nonetheless prefer to receive help from faith-affiliated groups. When asked whether they would prefer to deal with an organization sponsored by a coalition of churches or an organization not sponsored by such a coalition, "nearly five to one opted for the church-sponsored organization."

While congregations do a lot (and apparently do it well, at least in the eyes of recipients), they also have limits. They tend not to provide more specialized forms of aid (such as job training or substance-abuse counseling) and they are marked by "a kind of equilibrium . . . that encourages [them] to be involved in service provision, but not too heavily involved." As Wuthnow explains, congregations have a lot of other work to do—clergy salaries to pay, buildings to maintain, Sunday school and youth programs to operate—in order to remain competitive for members. As a result, numerous faith-based nonprofit organizations have developed to offer more professionalized services and to focus exclusively on outreach.

Wuthnow complains that too many policymakers have failed to distinguish between these social service organizations and congregations in the debate over "faith-based initiatives." Congregations are different from FBOs, he emphasizes, and this must be taken into account in any discussion of government funding. FBOs are task-oriented and tend to offer shorter-term, transactional programs. Unlike congregations, they do not often use the language of love or faith to describe their work. More-

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

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over, "the sharp line that some observers have tried to draw between faith-based and nonsectarian service organizations is probably exaggerated." On the one hand, Wuthnow explains, many FBOs downplay their religious identity, and their programs are not particularly shaped by their faith commitments. On the other hand, secular nonprofits are sometimes staffed by people of faith, may receive funding from religious groups, and may include clergy on their governing boards.

Wuthnow's discussion here is valuable, but sometimes he goes too far. His assertion that most FBOs downplay religion, for example, is based in large part on a survey that John Green and I completed with nearly four hundred FBOs as respondents. But our sample included only FBOs that had received government funding, as opposed to FBOs in general. We did find that only about a quarter of the FBOs were "fully expressive" in terms of how much religion was involved in their programs. But that number may be higher in the general population of FBOs, since some of the groups most "faith-saturated" are wary of financial collaboration with government.

Other observations of congregational outreach can turn some of Wuthnow's arguments on their head: many congregations offer commodified benevolence consisting of short-term, emergency cash or food assistance while some faith-based nonprofits work intensively for years with the same clients, developing strong friendships. In short, transactional social service models that fail to enfold clients into supportive communities mark both congregations and FBOs, as do the more effective, holistic, relational models. Some FBOs serve clients in a business-like manner to respond only to an immediate need, while others form deep bonds with clients that produce remarkable life transformation. Some congregations achieve the ideal of fostering caring communities, and others do not.

Wuthnow is careful to acknowledge that some FBOs show an ability to forge "encompassing, whole-person, personally transforming relationships with clients" (Teen Challenge and Prison Fellowship are mentioned as examples), but he claims that this kind of FBO is rare. According to the footnote, however, this claim is based on a study of just eight FBOs in California. Surely we need more research on more FBOs before we conclude that "relatively

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

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

few faith-based organizations actually fit this model."

Wuthnow also acknowledges that these relationship-cultivating FBOs are often remarkably effective. He worries, though, that these groups "appear thus far to have been concentrated on a particular kind of client, whereas the wider variety of needs being met by service organizations may not be so easily met in this way." He points out that working with inmates in prison is clearly different from helping the person coming off welfare who needs job training. But Wuthnow may be too pessimistic here. After all, church-based nonprofits around the country are heavily involved in relational ministries—creating "Big Sister" programs for at-risk teens, tutoring children, and befriending low-income adults. Moreover, many FBO transactional services, such as GED or job training classes, are coupled with mentoring that seeks to incorporate the students into the life of the congregations affiliated with the FBO. I have visited Hispanic day-care facilities in Philadelphia and Phoenix that not only provide child-care but also involve mothers in support groups, mentoring relationships, and life-skills classes. The National Jobs Partnership, an FBO with affiliates offering job-training programs in twenty-seven cities, credits its success (the job retention rate after one year among their 1,500 graduates is over 80 percent) to the work of its mentors, who often link students with supportive local congregations. In short, innovative FBOs and congregations can design ways of providing specific social service programs that also build caring communities; the two don't have to be opposed.

BASED ON THE MANY studies he has carefully reviewed and explained in *Saving America*, Wuthnow addresses the question of government funding of congregations and FBOs. He states that nothing in the research accumulated to date suggests that "faith-based initiatives emanating from Washington should be scrapped." He argues that there is considerable evidence to suggest that FBOs function "just as well as non-sectarian agencies, and, for this reason, should not be discriminated against in receiving government support." He cautions policymakers to recognize, however, that some of the best work that congregations and FBOs do—informal support, the building of caring communities, and cultivation of intensive, faith-saturated social relationships—cannot be reinforced by government support. He also wonders whether accepting government funding could threaten some FBOs and congregations, and he challenges faith leaders to guard their missions diligently. Finally, he asserts that successful FBOs "are effective for reasons that probably disqualify them from receiving government funding."

These are mostly fair conclusions; the last one, though, is problematic. "Faith-saturated" programs could theoretically receive public funding indirectly by means of vouchers, without raising constitutional objections. And highly relational, faith-infused organizations could be funded for only those programs that provide specific public services and involve no mandatory religious components, while their other, inherently religious programs (e.g., biblically based life-skills classes) are maintained exclusively with private dollars. Politicians could also pass charity tax credit laws that would have the effect of allowing tax dollars to flow to a wide variety of FBOs, whether robustly faith-filled or essentially secular. If we find that congregations and FBOs that emphasize bonding, friendship, and community offer the poor the greatest help and hope, it seems counter-intuitive to argue that these groups should not receive any public aid.

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The Things That Remain

Dylan's Visions of Sin. By Christopher Ricks. *Ecco. 517 pp. $26.95.*

Reviewed by Sean Curnyn

In October 1985, Bob Dylan was interviewed on television, and among the questions posed was this: "There have been times when born-again Christianity, orthodox Judaism, both of those were important to you? Or is it a broader thing for you?" (Broader, you see; not narrow Judaism or cramped Christianity.) Dylan replied courteously, "No. I want to figure out what's happening, you know, so I did look into it all." The journalist probed for a reason for this narrowness of belief. "Did it make life easier?" he asked with some sympathy. Dylan responded, "Not necessarily."

Dylan's Visions Of Sin is not, despite its title, an investigation of Dylan's religious beliefs, though in the course of its pages it sheds some light on the religious elements of his art. It is a study of the poetry of his songs, written by a renowned literary critic who is the author of highly regarded books on Milton, Tennyson, Keats, and T. S. Eliot. (W. H. Auden called Christopher Ricks "the kind of critic every poet dreams of finding.")

In considering an artist who in the past forty years has published about five hundred songs, as well as miscellaneous poetry, it is wise to have an organizing principle. In Ricks' words (paraphrasing William Empson), "handling sin may be the right way to take hold of the bundle." But not sin alone. Ricks will employ "the seven deadly sins, the four cardinal virtues (harder to remember?), and the three heavenly graces: these make up everybody's world, but Dylan's in particular." Ricks finds this approach apt because "Dylan's is an art in which sins are laid bare (and resisted), virtues are valued (and manifested), and the graces are brought home." This happens not by deliberate plan, but in the course of Dylan's creation of what many listeners find to be his remarkably true, abiding, and insightful songs.

For Ricks' purposes, then, it is not necessary that a sin be specifically attacked or (scandalously) practiced in the course of a song—it may be the notable absence of that sin, or some surprising resistance to it, that constitutes its presence. It may be "the only person on the scene missing," so to speak, as in Dylan's "Jack Of Hearts." And while envy is not what Dylan conveys when he sings "and I know no one can sing the blues like Blind Willie McTell," it provides Ricks with his jumping-off point to explore that haunting lyric of slave ships, chain gangs, and corruptible seed.

An obvious and legitimate question posed by the appearance of a book judging Dylan's songs by the standards of poetry is: What's the point? Is not Dylan's art a musical one, and so isn't this effort doomed to fall short, or to overreach? Ricks acknowledges that Dylan's art is threefold, involving music, words, and his voicing of those words. He acknowledges that he is not the critic who can integrate a study of all three into one overarching whole, but he is convinced that it ought to be possible "to attend to Dylan's words without forgetting that they are one element only, one medium, of his art." The test of this book is whether—with so little reference to musical elements—it is able to expand the reader's appreciation of how Dylan's words work their particular magic. In this limited but challenging task, Ricks largely succeeds.

Ricks allows from the outset that he sees his job as "prizing songs, not as prizing-open minds." (Such wordplay is one of Ricks' charms.) Ricks is not trying to argue with convinced non-aficionados and dedicated deniers of Dylan's poetic worth. He takes it as given that those reading his book already derive enjoyment from Dylan's songs, but "may not always know quite why they feel it." The

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

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casual fan of Dylan's music might be advised to approach this book, CDs in hand, as an opportunity to become familiar with many neglected Bob Dylan albums. The book is well indexed, but a deep familiarity with Dylan's lyrics comparable to Ricks' own would serve a reader well. Phrases in the book that may appear to be non sequiturs are often the author's unannotated references to the works of the prolific troubadour. Ricks starts his piece on "The Times They Are A-Changin'" with this: "When I paint my masterpiece, I had better acknowledge that one day it may need to be restored." Readers unfamiliar with Dylan's 1971 song "When I Paint My Masterpiece" might mistake this for an annoyingly quirky beginning, but even for them Ricks brings it all back home by making one of Dylan's oldest classics sound fresh and new to the attentive ear. Ricks maintains that the title-refrain itself is anything but a casual construction:

> Times change
> The times change
> The times are changin'
> The times are a-changin'
> For the times they are a-changin'

Something dynamic has developed from a commonplace phrase; as Ricks puts it, "the acorn has grown into a royal oak."

In the course of a fairly technical exploration that includes reference to the "durative or continuous aspect" of the present tense as employed by Dylan, Ricks notes that "Children of the sixties still thrill to 'The Times They Are A-Changin',' kidding themselves that what the song proclaimed was that at last the times were about to cease to change, for the first and last time in history." Dylan likely knew his song's durability then, and the sixty-three-year-old Dylan knows it now, as he sings it in concerts to audiences that may include the grandchildren of those children of the '60s: "The line it is drawn / The curse it is cast / The slow one now will later be fast / As the present now will later be past / The order is / Rapidly fadin' / And the first one now / Will later be last / For the times they are a-changin'." The echo of Matthew 19:30 cannot be missed ("But many that are first will be last, and the last first"), and Ricks points out that this is the last verse of that chapter and likewise "the last admonition of the song." This is just one of the always interesting, if sometimes audacious, direct comparisons Ricks makes between a Dylan lyric and Scripture.

Of course, when Dylan wrote

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

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

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these lines, most of his listeners had no knowledge of the former Robert A. Zimmerman's Jewish background—and who in the '60s would have prophesied his later public acceptance of Jesus? Ricks finds Scripture both under and on the surface of much of Dylan's work, both before and after his overtly Christian songs were written. In "I Believe in You," as in many other songs, Ricks finds echoes of the Psalms. In "Sad-Eyed Lady of the Lowlands," from 1966, the "sad-eyed prophet" is identified by Ricks as Ezekiel, a claim he supports with detailed comparison of the song lyrics to that book of the Bible, from the explicit borrowing of "kings of Tyrus" to the stylistic echo of the "wealth and wares" of the city of Tyre in Dylan's list of the belongings of his sad-eyed lady. (Covetousness is the sin of moment here.)

Most daring perhaps is Ricks' comparison of Ecclesiastes, chapter 12, to Dylan's jaunty song "I Want You." Ricks' litanies of coinciding words and images seem to prove his case, even as they may lead the reader to question, "Well, and what of it? Are we supposed to applaud Dylan for his holy larceny?" And then there are his line-by-line comparisons of specific Dylan lyrics to poems of the past (e.g., Dylan's "Not Dark Yet" and Keats' "Ode To A Nightingale"). Should Dylan be admired for modeling his song on this poem, as Ricks believes he does? Not necessarily.


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The point is that by understanding the artist's internalization of the Bible (Dylan has called it "the founding book") and his absorption of the lyrical work of predecessors, we may appreciate better the power of his songs. His deepest sources are not to be found in the transient but in the "things that remain" ("When You Gonna Wake Up?").

Interviewed in London in 1981, Dylan mused on his chosen profession and said that he thought a doctor was someone who would be truly worthy of admiration, someone who "can save somebody's life on the highway." He went on: "Not to say, though, that art is valueless. I think art can lead you to God." The interviewer asked if he thought that this was art's purpose. "I think so. I think that's everything's purpose. I mean, if it's not doing that, it's leading you the other way. It's certainly not leading you nowhere."

"FAITH" IS THE FIRST of the heavenly graces and so has its own chapter in Ricks' book, which he begins with this statement of full disclosure: "I am not myself a Christian believer, being an atheist." This does arguably give him a more impartial perspective from which to defend the worthiness of Dylan's gospel-based material against those he calls "illiberal liberal" critics who, when these songs first began to appear, dismissed their former idol as a crazed fundamentalist. By the time of his third album containing explicitly Christian themes (*Shot Of Love*, 1981), Dylan had been so marginalized that nothing he did got much consideration in the popular media. (He lamented a few years later that *Shot of Love*'s remarkably live sound, of which he was so proud, had been ignored by critics: "It was just 'Jesus this, Jesus that,' as if it was some kind of Methodist record.") In this chapter, Ricks shows how Dylan restores the sacred meaning of the phrase "saving grace" in his song of the same name. It is here not just "a" saving grace but "the" saving grace, which, as Ricks points out, was in older linguistic times, "a term of deep redemption, alive to damnation and to salvation."

For those (not just a few) believers who find nourishment in Dylan's songs, this treatment by a nonbeliever may actually reinforce the value and centrality of faith in Dylan's work. Ricks' broader achievement is to illustrate and explicate how Dylan's chosen words fall upon the ear and wend their way into the heart in their peculiar and beguiling fash-


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ion. *Dylan's Visions of Sin* is not the last word on Dylan's art, nor is it meant to be. But the book does uncover levels of Dylan's artistry that Ricks is especially qualified to explore.

Back to that 1985 television interview: in it Dylan was asked if he considered himself to be a poet. It's a question that Dylan had memorably evaded (1965: "Oh, I think of myself more as a song and dance man, you know"). On this day he replied straightforwardly. "I don't know if I'd call myself a poet or not. I would like to—but I'm not really qualified I think to make that decision, 'cause I come in on such a back door, that I don't know what a Robert Frost or a Keats or T. S. Eliot would really think of my stuff." Ricks has, in a way, addressed Dylan's doubts with this book.

Hope and Resistance

A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow. By David L. Chappell. *University of North Carolina Press. 344 pp. $34.95.*

Reviewed by Glenn Tinder

In his "I Have A Dream" speech, Martin Luther King, Jr. called on his followers to hew "a stone of hope" from "a mountain of despair." David Chappell's *A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow* is about the faith that enabled this to happen, and his main thesis is simply that the civil rights movement could not have succeeded without the solidarity and self-sacrificial spirit that came from Christian faith. Religion turned out to be not the opiate of the people but the spark of revolution. The author goes so far as to argue that the civil rights movement was not primarily a social and political event with religious overtones. It was, rather, a religious event with significant social and political consequences. Thus civil rights gatherings often had the atmosphere of religious revivals. Moreover, King was widely regarded among his followers as something more than a political and religious leader. He was a messiah. The author sums up the hope that moved King and his followers with the adjective "prophetic."

Glenn Tinder *is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts at Boston and author of* The Political Meaning of Christianity.

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The mountain of despair, Chappell argues, was not mere hyperbole. King was strongly influenced by Reinhold Niebuhr, and he and his followers were far from being historical optimists. They rejected the liberal faith in progress. Indeed, they saw the general trend of history as downward (which of course is not quite the way Niebuhr saw it). And despite their commitment to political action, they believed that all such action involved the use of power and was in that sense evil. Their fight against Jim Crow, then, was a conscious effort to hew justice out of refractory historical materials and to do this with crude and imperfect tools.

The theme of prophetic hope is not monolithic. The author grants that stock ideals of secular liberalism, such as individual rights, played a part in King's movement. In an appendix, Chappell presses his qualifications so far as to make one fear he is weakening his main argument. He indicates, for example, that his own method of interpretation is that of historical materialism. He notes accordingly that the civil rights movement was conditioned by the consolidation and mechanization of farms in the South, a development which loosened the party allegiances and controls that had undergirded the regime of Jim Crow. He also analyzes at length the weaknesses of white segregationists in the face of the black challenge. He points out, for example, the reluctance of established and respectable segregationist leaders to associate with the "white trash" who constituted their natural allies. The main theme of the book, however, is the motivating power of religious faith among the black protagonists of racial integration. It was their "prophetic" spirit that enabled King and his associates to defeat Jim Crow.

A Stone of Hope is, on its negative side, a polemic against traditional liberalism, which was disabled by most of its basic attitudes and ideas: an unrealistic understanding of human nature; an optimistic view of history; trust that spontaneous trends like economic growth and scientific discovery would erode segregation gradually; and, overall, excessive reliance on reason. Such views and assumptions were enervating. They drained away the purposeful and self-sacrificial spirit that the civil rights movement drew from its prophetic faith. Liberals were aware of these deficiencies, and in such works as William James' essay "The Will To Believe" and John Dewey's short book *A Common Faith* liberals had sought to inspire, without breaching

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the boundaries of their worldly and irreligious worldview, a fervor for reform similar to the biblically inspired movement for civil rights.

Most Christians will view with some gratification the part their faith played in moving Americans to try to rectify one of the great injustices of our history. They will feel less gratification, however, when they turn their attention to the part played by Christianity among whites. Most white Christians in the South did not support the civil rights movement, and the white churches were uncertain and divided during the desegregation struggle. Even the Southern white clergy failed on the whole to join the assault on segregation. It must be granted that the picture can be shaded in a way that makes the white churches look less culpable. For one thing, their very confusion and division helped the civil rights struggle. Black leaders did not have to fight the resistance of the white churches, even though they had to get along without their support, and white Christians did display one sort of integrity: rarely if ever did they claim that the Bible supported segregation. (Chappell contrasts this with the Civil War period when the Bible was brought forward in defense of slavery.) And one of the most prominent Southern white Christians of the time did play an honorable, if minor, role in the desegregation movement: Billy Graham refused, after 1954, to allow segregated seating at his crusades. Still, the contrast between black and white Christians is stark. The latter were for the most part confused and silent onlookers as the struggle unfolded.

THERE IS MUCH in Chappell's account that needs to be sorted out. I say this partly in criticism, but also partly in praise. It is a way of saying that his book provokes thought. Also, it ought to be noted that the issues in need of clarification were apparently unclear in the minds of participants in the civil rights struggle. This is understandable. They were not, after all, philosophers or theologians, and they were absorbed in difficult and dangerous actions. Thus, some obscurities and confusions in Chappell's account mirror the reality of the civil rights struggle itself. Nonetheless, the issues are important and call for reflection.

A surprisingly prominent issue is that of nonviolence. Black leaders were strongly committed to this tactic. Why? Was there any reason beyond the fact that the other side controlled most of the instruments of violence? Civil rights leaders were fully aware that nonviolence, as Niebuhr had shown, is a form of coercion. It is a way of compelling people to do things they do not wish to do. It is not, then, a way of evading the evils inherent in the use of power—evils of which the civil rights leaders were highly cognizant. Moreover, there seems no good reason for considering nonviolence in any way "prophetic." It is true that Niebuhr, who so often seemed to represent the meaning of prophetic hope for King and other civil rights leaders, had discussed nonviolence very sympathetically. But it was not a major theme in Niebuhr's thought, in contrast with the role it played in the thought, for example, of Thomas Merton (who apparently had no influence on any of the leaders of the civil rights movement). Further, the notion of nonviolent resistance never, to my knowledge, occurred to any of the ancient Hebrew prophets.



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It was not within the horizon of their usual concerns. As for the New Testament, the tactic affirmed by Jesus was *nonresistance*, a way of refusing all power, and completely different from *nonviolent resistance*, which is always stained by the moral impurities inherent in the use of power. When Jesus enjoined his followers to "resist not evil," he commanded a form of political abstinence to which the civil rights leaders could not, in their situations, even aspire.

Another issue raised by *A Stone of Hope* is that of historical progress. Is there a natural tendency toward the betterment of human life? Chappell seems to presuppose a rather simple dichotomy between the outlook of secular liberalism, with its Enlightenment confidence in the expansive tendencies of human reason, and the prevailing view in the civil rights movement, namely, that history tends naturally downward. In short, liberal optimism is set over against prophetic pessimism. But is there such a thing as prophetic pessimism? Is there pessimism in prophetic hope? Surely it would be questionable to characterize the historical attitude of the ancient prophets of Israel as pessimistic. They were typically angry about existing conditions. But believing in God as the Lord of history, they could not be basically pessimistic. And the thinker who provided the civil rights leadership with its philosophy of history, Niebuhr, was not altogether pessimistic either. History did not tend simply upward or simply downward, in Niebuhr's view, but in both directions at once. This corresponded with the ambiguity of human nature, at once sinful and marked for redemption.

It is noteworthy that a century earlier than Niebuhr another great Christian thinker who contemplated long stretches of time, Alexis de Tocqueville, interpreted history in roughly the same way: history was ambiguous. Tocqueville saw the coming of democracy as an irresistible historical trend. It was a source, however, both of good and of evil. In its egalitarianism, democracy was just, and it encouraged widespread decency in social relations. But it also brought such phenomena as unthinking conformity and a coarsening of manners. That a sense of historical ambiguity like Niebuhr's and Tocqueville's is authentically prophetic is indicated by the fact that it seems implicit in the writings of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and other Hebrew prophets. Their anguished awareness of the sins of the Israelites reflects a degree of historical pessimism, but their confidence in the sovereignty and justice of God manifestly meant that they did not, in their own minds, face anything like a "mountain of despair."

A closely related issue concerns the

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relationship of historical progress and political action. Chappell believes that one factor contributing to the feebleness of secular liberalism is its assumption that, since progress is spontaneous, vigorous action is unnecessary. In contrast, Chappell claims that the civil rights movement was challenged and enlivened by the mountain of despair it faced. At first glance, this may seem plausible. Still, wouldn't deep historical pessimism be as disabling as one-sided optimism? It is a commonplace in studies of revolution (discovered, perhaps, by Tocqueville in his great work on the French Revolution) that destitution and despair are paralyzing. Activist impulses begin to stir only when conditions are improving. This is not as paradoxical as it may seem to be. If circumstances were not bad, there would be no incentive to act, just as there would be no such incentives if conditions were hopeless. In short, the precondition of political action is a sense of historical ambiguity.

Another issue concerning historical change is that of gradualism as opposed to revolution. Chappell apparently associates gradualism with liberal optimism and revolution with prophetic pessimism. But the linkage is questionable. As Chappell the historical materialist is no doubt well aware, the most famous and influential revolutionary of the modern era, Karl Marx, was anything but an historical pessimist. Revolution can be undertaken only by people who assume that history accords with their designs, or can be made to do so. On the other hand, gradualism seems to presuppose a degree of pessimism. It is a counsel of prudence and is associated with a realization that historical currents can be treacherous. Surely King, in spite of some revolutionary rhetoric, did not aspire to a swift and complete transformation of Southern society. He was not truly a revolutionary. He was a gradualist, and that was because he was historically pessimistic, but not despairing.

A final issue deserves brief consideration. Chappell ignores the fact that there are two profoundly different kinds of prophetic hope. The difference turns on whether the end hoped for is envisioned as worldly or transcendental. The ancient prophets apparently looked toward an historical climax they expected to occur visibly, on this earth (although to my inexpert ear there are also hints of less worldly expectations). On the other hand, the prophetic hope of Christians, aside from aberrations such as Joachim of Fiore, has always been emphatically transcendental, or eschatological. Niebuhr was perfectly clear about the distinction

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between a progressivist and eschatological outlook, and it was important to him. It allowed for historical ambiguity. There were favorable trends in history, and hence there was room for hope. But hope had to look to an eternal as well as an historical future. The exclusively worldly hope harbored by Marx and other modern revolutionaries was bound to end in disappointment, if not in tragedy. As to what kind of hope King and other civil rights leaders harbored, Chappell does not clearly say. It is probably hard to know. However, as a Christian pursuing a course of action that he knew might lead to his own violent death, King must have thought often about the relationship between his political and his eternal hopes. Readers of *A Stone of Hope* may wish that the author had devoted some attention to this issue.

If Chappell's book has a serious deficiency, it lies in its failure to clarify adequately the concept of prophetic hope. It is not clear that the attitudes that contributed to this prophetic hope were either coherent or, in any meaningful sense of the word, prophetic. Did the commitment to nonviolence, for example, have any intrinsic kinship with the egalitarian aims of the civil rights movement, or was it merely a prudent adaptation to the circumstances facing insurgents lacking armed and organized power? And why call such attitudes as historical pessimism and nonviolent resistance "prophetic"? True, the members of the movement were often infused with religious passion, but not always. Not all of the civil rights leaders were religious: one of them, Bob Moses, was devoted to Albert Camus, who was neither religious nor prophetic. And while the civil rights leaders were often moved with religious fervor, their views were not, as I have suggested, always traceable either to the Hebrew prophets or to Jesus.

It may be, however, that my comments should not have the critical edge I have given them. The leaders of the civil rights movement were a diverse and spontaneous assemblage, working and living under great pressure. Things must often have been somewhat unclear and incoherent in their own minds. And Chappell, after all, is an historian, not a philosopher or a theologian. Judging from this book, moreover, he is quite an able historian. He has original insights and an eye for things that matter. I have no hesitation in saying that Christians, by and large, will find *A Stone of Hope* to be of very great interest.


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Briefly Noted

Creative Tension: Essays on Science and Religion. By Michael Heller. *Templeton. 183 pp. $22.95 paper.*

Michael Heller brings to his reflections on science and religion a depth of knowledge, thought, and experience that is highly unusual. He spent his early childhood in Siberia, where his family had been exiled from Poland by the Soviets. The power of faith to sustain people through extreme hardships turned his mind to God and eventually led him to the priesthood. He went on to earn a master's degree in philosophy and a Ph.D. in physics, and he was one of the intellectuals who would meet at the Krakow residence of Archbishop Karol Wojtyla to discuss science and faith. After Wojtyla became pope, Heller continued to organize these meetings, bringing eminent scholars from around the world to participate. He is currently professor of philosophy at the Pontifical Academy of Theology in Krakow and an active researcher in relativistic cosmology. These essays show him to be a thinker of fine judgment about science, theology, and philosophy, and about their interrelationships. He warns against the conceptual confusion that has led some to expect religion to answer scientific questions or science to answer religious ones; but he stresses that theology cannot insulate itself from science. Every age, he says, forms a "world image" that is an informal synthesis of scientific and other ideas. To ignore developments in science is to risk accepting, unconsciously and uncritically, outdated concepts and even pseudoscience into one's theology. An ironic example is provided by Whiteheadian and Teilhardian theologies based on conceptions of time that are naïve from the viewpoint of modern physics and cosmology. Heller wisely suggests returning to the profounder insights of St. Augustine and St. Thomas on the atemporality of God and the act of Creation. Heller's historical analyses are astute. Two noteworthy examples are his discussion of the causes of the estrangement of theology and science and his brief but telling comments on the influence that reigning positivistic ideas about science exerted on Jacques Maritain and, through him, on neo-Thomism. The book has some minor faults. The three essays that deal with Heller's work on "non-commutative geometry" and the Big Bang, while stimulating, are somewhat repetitive, and they contain some material too technical for the intended audience. No translator is listed, and it should be said that while the English, presumably Heller's own, is generally quite good, it suffers in places from misuse of the definite article.

—*Stephen M. Barr*

Revelation: The Apocalypse of Jesus Christ. By Judith Kovacs and Christopher Rowland. *Blackwell. 315 pp. $24.95 paper.*

This is the first volume in a new commentary series by Blackwell that promises to provide a brief history of how the biblical text has been interpreted in Western culture. The genres under review are numerous (literature, art, and music), as is the chronological span (everything from the early patristic period to current events). The commentary is arranged according to the chapters of the biblical text. This assures that the discussion is always driven by the structure of the biblical original rather than by the thought-world of the various interpreters who are brought to bear on the text. This volume on the Book of Revelation is a stunning achievement. Since the authors are also the editors of the overall project, it is certainly a good sign for the series as a whole. The range of sources employed is remarkable. One finds an intelligent discussion of everything from Origen to Joachim of Fiore, the Protestant Reformers, late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century fundamentalists and their considerable impact on such modern phenomena as David Koresh's Branch Davidians and the "Left Behind" series of novels by Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins. Almost no stone is left unturned as the authors consider the significance of this inspiring book. The volume is also very well annotated so that the reader wishing to pursue a particular point in greater depth will have no problem in finding out where to turn. Given that it is an anthology, the book need not be read cover to

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

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cover, but many readers will be tempted to do just that.

—Gary A. Anderson

CONGREGATIONS IN AMERICA. By MARK CHAVES. *Harvard University Press. 292 pp. $29.95.*

A numbers-crunching, tables-littered sociological study of religious congregations, of which there are over 300,000 in America, although the largest ten percent include more than half of all churchgoers. The main point that interests the author is that social services always have been, are now, and likely always will be peripheral to congregational life. This point he presses against the more enthusiastic proponents of "faith-based initiatives." At the center of congregational life is worship, religious education, and the arts, the last mainly related to music. The author's very limited point, however, will likely not impress proponents of faith-based initiatives who never suggested that congregations would or should be turned into social service agencies. For a different and more positive view of the role of churches in meeting social needs, see Robert Wuthnow's *Saving America: Faith-Based Services and the Future of Civil Society* (reviewed in this issue).

THE UNMASKING OF OSCAR WILDE. By JOSEPH PEARCE. *Ignatius. 412 pp. $19.95 paper.*

Over three years ago, these pages alerted readers to a new book on Oscar Wilde by the marvelous literary historian Joseph Pearce which had just appeared in Great Britain under the HarperCollins imprint, and the hope was expressed that it would soon appear in the United States (While We're At It, February 2001). Now, thanks to Ignatius Press, American readers can benefit from

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Pearce's effort to portray the real Wilde, freed from the legends woven about him and the many masks he wore. As Pearce shows in persuasive detail, Wilde's homosexuality was part of a pose and an attitude, less fundamental to him than other, deeper aspects of the complete man, who was not only a husband and father but also a religious seeker who finally was baptized a Catholic and received absolution and extreme unction a few hours before his death. In Wilde's art, much of the true Wilde comes through, and Pearce points out that his novel *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (attacked in its day for its "immorality") is a thoroughly moral work. This is a sympathetic portrait of a humane and intelligent artist who was divided against himself in fundamental ways but of whom it is fair to say, in sad approbation, that his face never did grow to fit the masks with which he tried to shield it.

Lutherans Today. Edited by Richard Cimino. *Eerdmans. 246 pp. $20 paper.*

The several Lutheran churches in the U.S. count 8.5 million members, and twice that number of Americans identify themselves as Lutheran, but, as historian Mark Noll observes in the opening essay of this instructive book, Lutherans keep a very low public profile. For instance, among U.S. Presidents, many have been Episcopalian, several Presbyterian and Congregationalist, as well as Quaker, and Disciple of Christ, but there has been no Lutheran, despite the fact that there are more Lutherans in America than all of the above. Part of the reason for this may be found in Matthew Rose's winsome article, "Unremarkably Lutheran" (FT February 2001). Cimino, the book's editor, writes about Lutherans who are "evangelical catholics," and it seems they are a tolerated minority in the liberal Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) and have a stronghold, but no ecumenical engagement, in the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod (LCMS) at that body's Fort Wayne seminary. Other chapters in the book address, inter alia, historical disputes, youth attitudes, higher education, and political engagement. The subtitle is "American Lutheran Identity in the Twenty-First Century," and one's general impression is that Lutheran identity—traditionally shaped by confessional theology, sacramental realism, liturgical rich-

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
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ness, and a powerfully anti-utopian view of worldly possibilities—is on the ropes. Of the two large bodies, the ELCA is increasingly indistinguishable from oldline Protestantism, and the LCMS, while maintaining important dimensions of that identity, continues to exhaust its energies in polemics against other Lutherans and in famously fractious internal rivalries. Lutherans have often been called "Protestants with a difference." *Lutherans Today* suggests that the ELCA is less and less different, while the LCMS is different in ways that few others would want to be. Between its being, in Matthew Rose's terms, unremarkable and unattractively remarkable, it seems Lutheranism will continue to be, when they notice it, something of an enigma to most Americans. Which, in view of the promise inherent in its traditional identity, is a great pity.

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
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ARGUING ABOUT WAR. By MICHAEL WALZER. *Yale University Press. 208 pp. $25.*

Walzer, who has been influential in current thought about just and unjust wars, is a committed man of the left with a talent for challenging leftist illusions. The present book is a collection of previously published pieces. Although they were all written before September 11, 2001, he addresses regime change in Iraq (a policy goal also in the Clinton administration) and has sharp words about the responsibility of France and Russia, among other dubious friends, in contributing to terrorism.

THE LOGIC OF RENEWAL. By WILLIAM J. ABRAHAM. *Eerdmans. 172 pp. $17 paper.*

A Methodist scholar at Perkins School of Theology in Dallas, Abraham surveys a wide range of proposals for Christian renewal over the past half century. Joseph Ratzinger, Rosemary Ruether, R. R. Reno, Don Cupitt, Leslie Newbigin, Martin Luther King, and John Spong all come in for critical attention. Obviously, many of these proposals are in conflict, and Abraham tries to be fair to all, while evaluating their worth in the light of their potential contribution to a tradition of orthodoxy he calls our "canonical heritage." *The Logic of Renewal* is, at the very least, a helpful introduction to some of the best, and worst, of what influential thinkers have been saying about the prospects for the revitalization of Christian faith and life.

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

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

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GOD AND VIOLENCE: BIBLICAL RESOURCES FOR LIVING IN A SMALL WORLD. By PATRICIA M. MCDONALD. *Herald Press. 370 pp. $16.99 paper.*

The degree of violence in the Bible, and especially in the Old Testament, is commonly overstated, also in the service of justifying violence. In a careful canonical reading of the texts, the author attempts to counter that misreading and misuse. Admirers of René Girard will be interested in her criticisms of his theory of violence as the foundation of human society. Whatever the other merits of the theory, she says, it does not square with the biblical texts.

MR. MOODY AND THE EVANGELICAL TRADITION. Edited by TIMOTHY GEORGE. *T&T Clark. 185 pp. $24.95.*

It has been said that Dwight L. Moody was the Billy Graham of the nineteenth century, but editor Timothy George of Beeson Divinity School suggests it is more accurate to say that Billy Graham is the Dwight L. Moody of the twentieth century. These ten essays explore dimensions of Moody's doctrine, preaching methods, and extraordinary role in advancing the urban revivalism that swept the U.S. and Britain in the last part of the century. Incidentally, long before Billy Graham was justly hailed for doing so, Moody invited Roman Catholics to join in the leadership of his revivals, and they accepted. The book gives a vivid impression of an extraordinary man who, with no more than a fifth-grade education, shook the English-speaking world with the saving gospel of Jesus Christ.

THE TWO REFORMATIONS. By HEIKO A. OBERMAN. *Yale University Press. 320 pp. $35.*

A collection of essays by the late Heiko Oberman (best known for his *Luther: Man Between God and the Devil*) in which he reevaluates some of his earlier views. He now accents the degree to which the sixteenth century was an outcome and extension of dynamics at work in the fifteenth, and, provoked by the recklessness of the likes of Daniel Goldhagen, attacks the claim of a direct line between Luther and the Holocaust. In an aside, he writes, "Well before the Germans were characterized as 'Hitler's willing executioners,' the books on Luther were already closed (quite literally in the library of the Hebrew University, where I had to slice open the page of the only critical edition of Luther's writings on and against the Jews.)"

WHAT'S RIGHT WITH ISLAM. By IMAM FEISAL ABDUL RAUF. *HarperCollins. 314 pp. $23.95.*

Current unpleasantnesses in world affairs incidentally involving Muslims have nothing to do with Islam. Islam is a religion of peace and its ideal of the rightly ordered society is very much like tolerant and pluralistic America. Tragically, Westerners have over the years done many bad things to Muslims, making some of them confuse their murderous resentment with Islam itself. Christians and Jews, who share the "Abrahamic faith," should join in attempting to remedy these unhappy misunderstandings. That's the gist of the book and the author gives every appearance of being sincere. Father Hans Küng, president of Global Ethic Foundation, hails the book as "an excellent work of bridge building." Abdul Rauf is imam of a New York City mosque.

IS THE MARKET MORAL? A DIALOGUE ON RELIGION, ECONOMICS, AND JUSTICE. By REBECCA M. BLANK and WILLIAM MCGURN. *Brookings. 151 pp. $16.95 paper.*

Blank is an economist at the University of Michigan and McGurn is chief editorial writer for the *Wall Street Journal.* The title question is, of course, a perennial, and both

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authors answer it with the appropriate qualifications, McGurn more in the affirmative than Blank. While the demise of "real existing socialism" has blunted the edge of ideological confrontation, one is again impressed by the ways in which debate over plausible policy proposals still falls along the lines of divide between dispositional socialism or capitalism.

J. Gresham Machen: Selected Shorter Writings. Edited by D. G. Hart. *P&R Publishing. 584 pp. $39.99.*

Machen, who died in 1937, was once one of the most influential figures in American Protestantism and is still a major intellectual presence among conservatives of a Calvinist and specifically Presbyterian persuasion. This anthology of his shorter writings on a wide range of subjects—theological, cultural, social, and aesthetic—bears witness to his intellectual and spiritual stature.

A Man of Faith: The Spiritual Journey of George W. Bush. By David Aikman. *Thomas Nelson. 237 pp. $21.95.*

Aikman, formerly senior correspondent with *Time* magazine, had remarkable access to those closest to President Bush and presents a strongly positive view of the integrity of his religious and moral commitment. Also those who are skeptical or hostile toward the man will benefit by coming to understand better his understanding of himself, American purpose, and what God may intend for world history.

A Time for Reflection: An Autobiography. By William E. Simon. *Regnery. 352 pp. $27.95.*

The late William E. Simon was an extraordinarily successful entrepreneur, treasury secretary under two Presidents, a philanthropist of both discernment and generosity, a paterfamilias on a grand scale, and a man who found high adventure in living fully the Catholic faith. From building a financial empire to his personal care for the sick and dying at Lourdes, Simon lived with all stops pulled. The autobiography addresses family relations and, chiefly, his experiences with people in power—political, financial, and ecclesiastical.

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Richard John Neuhaus

BISHOPS AT A TURNING POINT

In the nineteen years he has been attending these meetings, says one archbishop, this was unquestionably the best. The sentiment seems to be widespread among the bishops who participated in the semi-annual meeting, held this past June in Englewood, a few miles from Denver, Colorado. The sentiment is hardly universal, however. For some who are more closely bound to an older way of doing things, the meeting had its rough patches. But, for those who loved it, several reasons are offered. There was no press. The bishops were meeting among themselves and had a chance to work through problems without the glare of publicity. They were able to engage in fraternal argument and disagreement without worrying about the next day's headline, "Major Rift in Bishops Conference." Equally important, it is said, there was minimum participation by the staff of the national conference, the U.S. Council of Catholic Bishops (USCCB). There are 281 active bishops (active, in this case, means they are not retired) and more than 350 staff members of the USCCB. While the USCCB is the creation of the bishops, and the staff is there to serve the bishops, a common complaint has been that meetings of the bishops are consumed by processing the predetermined agenda of an endless array of committees, subcommittees, departments, and related offices. As the title of a book on the episcopacy has put it, the bishops have become "a flock of shepherds." In sum, substance was subsumed by process and the bishops have found themselves, willy-nilly, subordinated to those who are supposed to be serving them. That, it is said, did not happen at the Denver meeting.

At Denver there was real discussion and deliberation, and a readiness to engage rather than deny disagreements. Not that the meeting was confrontational, although there were tense moments; but the bishops spoke out as bishops, as shepherds and teachers of the Church, and not as managers of local franchises of Catholicism U.S.A. The most important difference, several bishops say, is that the meeting was intensely prayerful. The homilies at Masses were spiritually and intellectually substantive, there were periods devoted to prayer and reflection before the Blessed Sacrament, and confessors were kept busy. The sense was that, after years of scandal and unremitting attack, they had, by the grace of God, come through a dark night together; wounded and chastened, to be sure, but newly resolved to be more fully the bishops they were ordained to be. Of course, minds were powerfully concentrated by a question that most of the bishops knew could not be evaded or postponed: how to deal with Catholic public figures, meaning mainly politicians, who act in public and persistent defiance of the Church's teaching, notably on the protection of innocent human beings at the beginning and end of life.

Before turning to that great question and what the bishops did about it, however, a word is in order on what Denver may portend for the future of the American bishops as a body. It is said that Denver may be, just possibly, a turning point in how the bishops deliberate and decide, and how they define their fraternal responsibilities to one another and to the body. As discussed previously in this space, there has been much thought over the last two years about how the bishops might more effectively exercise their leadership. Apparently nobody is suggesting that the USCCB be dismantled,

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but there is a general sense that something else is needed. The idea of a plenary council for the Church in the U.S. has been widely bruited, but a plenary council has not been held since the nineteenth century and nobody quite knows what it would entail. Some experts say that the pertinent canons prescribe the participation of well over a thousand people, both clerical and lay, thus making it unwieldy, in addition to being ineffective as a forum for deliberation among the bishops. It would also be, some note, forbiddingly expensive.

Alternatively, there could be a special U.S. synod of bishops, but synods of bishops are ordinarily held in Rome and are composed of representatives from the region involved. That would not achieve the goal of enhancing effective collegiality among all the American bishops. So it seems the plenary council and synod proposals have been put on a back burner. They may be moved to the front again, but right now bishops who are looking for a better way are saying, "Let's do the June meeting again for another two or three years and then see where we are." In other words, if at least once a year they meet as bishops with no press, minimal staff, a limited and sharply focused agenda, and a generous openness to what the Spirit might do as they engage one another on questions of consequence, perhaps a plenary council or synod will not be necessary after all.

A New Generation

Another reason for talking about a possible turning point is that there seems to be something like a generational change underway. It is not necessarily age specific, being more a matter of when one was admitted to the episcopal club. There is, I am told, a different spirit among many of those who were made bishop from, say, 1995 on. They were not present at the creation of the USCCB system. The last of the founding fathers who knew how to make the machinery work and enjoyed making it work was Joseph Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago, who died in 1996. No other cardinal archbishop has taken over the organizational controls. The late Cardinal O'Connor of New York believed he had more important things to do than to get distracted by national episcopal politics, and his successor, Edward Cardinal Egan, has concentrated on putting New York on a sound financial basis. Cardinal Bevilacqua of Philadelphia, now retired, is an assertively orthodox and independent soul who is impatient with bureaucratic restrictions. His successor, Justin Cardinal Rigali, evidences no ambition to be king of the conference. William Cardinal Keeler of Baltimore steadily attends to organizational duties and has served as president of the conference but has apparently never aspired to run the machine in the tradition of Cardinal Bernardin. The energies of Cardinal Law, formerly of Boston, were applied to curial business in Rome and international troubleshooting. As for Roger Cardinal Mahony of Los Angeles, he is viewed as being off in a world of his own. There was for years the monumental preoccupation with building that cathedral, and now he and his batteries of lawyers have their hands full with abuse charges that will likely see him through retirement. Also monumentally preoccupied has been Adam Cardinal Maida of Detroit, who raised some seventy million dollars for the John Paul II Cultural Center in Washington, D.C., which has turned out to be a cropper in terms of both popular interest and scholarly contribution. So nobody has taken on, or seems likely to take on, the role of conference ringmaster played by Cardinal Bernardin. Some think that Theodore Cardinal McCarrick, moved from Newark to Washington in 2001, may aspire to that role, but after the June meeting that seems unlikely, for reasons we will come to.

If one asks around among knowledgeable bishops, there seems to be near unanimity that the intellectual leader of the conference is Francis Cardinal George of Chicago. Nobody is listened to more carefully and respectfully by the other bishops. It is not simply that he is very bright. He seems to embody a sense of urgency and expectation about the possibilities of Catholic renewal in the U.S. That is joined to a dour—I think excessively dour—assessment of the problems intrinsic to America's Protestant (he says Calvinist) culture, and he has no illusions about the culturally accomodationist "reforms" of Catholicism over the past four decades. He is strongly, albeit critically, sympathetic to what some describe as a need for a "reform of the reforms." But he, too, has no ambition to succeed Bernardin in presiding at the master control panel of the USCCB.

A while back, we invited Cardinal George to give a lecture at the celebration of Cardinal (then Father) Avery Dulles' eightieth birthday, and he took the occasion to present a dramatically different vision of the bishops conference. In contrast to the present apparatus of departments, committees, and subcommittees issuing endless memoranda and position papers on every issue that pops up on the public radar screen, he suggested that bishops should see themselves as part of a deliberative body that participates in the magisterium or teaching ministry of the Church. Close conversation and coordination with Rome, he believes, is not an unwelcome restriction but is crucial to the credibility of the bishops' leadership. Unlike some critics of the bishops conference, he does not want to downgrade the conference but to upgrade it into a more ecclesial and less institutional-bureaucratic instrument of leadership. Maybe into

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something more along the lines of what began to happen this June in Denver.

Not surprisingly, Cardinal George's star is high also in Rome. John Allen, the best of American reporters in Rome, says that when he mentions Francis George in Vatican circles he frequently gets the response, *Peccato che lui è un americano. Perchè sarebbe un bel papa.* (Too bad he's an American. Otherwise he would make a great pope.) Because of this country's dominance in almost everything else, it is assumed that no American should be elected pope. One also has reason to believe that Cardinal George, very sensibly and very definitively, does not want or expect to be pope. He has no ambition other than to be the very best archbishop of Chicago that he can be, and it is the singularity of his devotion to the episcopal task that makes his leadership crucial to what some sense as a turning point in the episcopal conference. In short, he is greatly respected by those who are sometimes called the "new generation" of bishops, the men who are likely to shape the conference of the future.

"JP II Bishops"

These are men who palpably understand their office in ecclesial and spiritual, rather than managerial and career, terms. They evince a serious practice of prayer and are not inhibited in talking about the devotional life. They give top priority to evangelization, and to the re-evangelization of Catholics who seem not to know what it means to be Catholic. They are active in encouraging vocations to the priesthood, proposing it to young men as a course of high adventure and costly discipleship. Very often, they are simply called "JP II bishops." The term is not meant to suggest that not all bishops respect the Pope. Of course they do. Admittedly, there are still some who are inclined to the view that this Pope has slowed down or stopped the liberal progress that they thought was mandated by the Second Vatican Council. Others are well past that ideological hump, respect the authority of his office, and admire him personally. The JP II bishops, however, have internalized the dramatic teaching initiatives of this pontificate and have demonstrated a zeal in communicating them. They share the Pope's discernment of the third millennium as a potential "springtime" of evangelization and authentic Catholic reform.

Very importantly, they are men who do not hesitate to speak up and speak well in the company of their fellow bishops. Until recently, the protocol was that those recently made bishop deferred to their seniors and remained silent in conference meetings for several years. That is changing. Another change is noted. Rome is no longer limiting itself to the conventional sequence of episcopal "promotion." Younger auxiliary bishops are being appointed directly to archiepiscopal sees. The Catholic Church, as one is regularly reminded, is like a very big ship that turns slowly, and, in the gradualness of the turning, "turning points" are hard to specify, but there is a sense that change is underway. The future of the bishops conference, in particular, will be significantly affected by a number of bishops whose names repeatedly crop up in these discussions. Mind you, this is not to be taken as my list of favorite bishops. Some of them I do not even know. No bishop should have his influence crippled by appearing on a FIRST THINGS roll of honor, so that is not what this is. But in a very unscientific survey of people who pay attention to such matters, there are bishops who are mentioned again and again.

Not in any particular order, the list includes: Bishop William Lori of Bridgeport, Connecticut; Archbishop Charles Chaput of Denver, Colorado; Bishop Allen Vigneron of Oakland, California; Bishop Thomas Olmstead of Phoenix, Arizona; Bishop Samuel Aquila of Fargo, North Dakota; Bishop Peter Sartain of Little Rock, Arkansas; Auxiliary Bishop José Gomez of Denver; Archbishop Sean O'Malley of Boston, Massachusetts; Bishop Leonard Blair of Toledo, Ohio; Archbishop John Myers of Newark, New Jersey; Bishop Robert J. McManus of Worcester, Massachusetts; Archbishop Timothy Dolan of Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and Archbishop Joseph Naumann of Kansas City, Kansas. They are, along with Cardinal George, the emerging leadership of the American bishops, or so I am told by people whose judgment I respect. No doubt, to the extent their leadership is effective, there are many others who will come to the fore in the years ahead. But, if there is to be a vibrantly collegial reception of the deep reforms—spiritual, catechetical, evangelistic, pastoral—proposed by this pontificate, these are the bishops who are notably eager to let the Spirit make it happen.

Catholics in Political Life

Aspects of the new leadership were evident in the way the bishops addressed the question of Catholic politicians who defiantly reject the Church's teaching, notably on abortion. Cardinal McCarrick had earlier been appointed to head up a task force on the question, and it was scheduled to issue its report to the bishops after the November elections. At the June meeting, he arranged for Cardinal Keeler and Archbishop William Levada of San Francisco to make presentations, after which he would speak. Keeler reported on consultations that had been held months earlier with bishops, theologians, canonists, and sundry lay leaders, all suggesting that it would be a big mistake to publicly sanc-

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tion offending politicians. By the time of the June meeting, however, Cardinal Keeler's report seemed very dated. Levada offered an extended pastoral-theological reflection, asking the question, "Who is to judge the state of a Catholic communicant's soul?" He warned that penalties imposed on politicians or voters might be viewed as "an interference in the constitutional rights to political freedom." Moreover, he said, bishops should act together, since "the application of restrictive practices regarding the reception of Holy Communion in one diocese necessarily has implications for all."

The last observation was understood to refer to a few bishops, most notably Archbishop Raymond Burke of St. Louis, who had taken the pastoral initiative in cautioning offending politicians that they should refrain from communing or run the risk of being refused at the altar. At the meeting, there were some who wanted Burke put on notice that he had violated the protocols of episcopal fraternity by acting as he did. First in his diocese in La Crosse, Wisconsin, and then shortly after his move to St. Louis, Burke stood firm on the necessary connection between communing and being in *communio* with the Church, which includes not publicly rejecting her solemn teaching on the dignity of human life. Some canon lawyers argued that Burke had exceeded his canonical authority, but they apparently did not know their man. For five years Burke was on the Apostolic Signatura in Rome, the Church's highest court, and he has mastered canon law in all of its sometimes befuddling intricacies. It soon became evident at Denver that the overwhelming majority of bishops, while they may not follow Burke's precise course of action, were in no mood to reproach him or distance themselves from him. To the contrary, the final Denver statement, "Catholics in Political Life," was approved 183 to 6 and provided ample room for the approach taken by Burke and others.

A Beleaguered Cardinal

After the speeches by Cardinal Keeler and Archbishop Levada, Cardinal McCarrick spoke to the assembly. It had become obvious that the bishops were not prepared to wait until after the elections for his task-force report. The question, which had in prior weeks and months become publicly entangled with the John Kerry campaign, had to be addressed now and addressed clearly. McCarrick told the bishops that "the battles for human life and dignity and for the weak and vulnerable should be fought not at the communion rail but in the public square." (One conservative wag indicated his surprise and pleasure that there are still communion rails in Washington.) McCarrick declared that, while "life comes first," there are other issues that "demand our attention and action as well," such as "faith and family, education and work, housing and health care." He continued, "We must not allow ourselves to become used in partisan politics either by those who dispute our teaching on life and dignity or those who reduce our teaching to a particular issue or partisan cause." The reference to "our" teaching—as distinct from the teaching of moral reason, natural law, and the Church's magisterium—struck an odd note. As did the suggestion that those who concentrate on protecting the unborn are somehow "reducing" the Church's teaching to a partisan cause, while pro-abortion Catholics are innocent of partisan politics.

The unhappy and beleaguered Cardinal went on in this vein, bringing to mind familiar liberal abuses of the metaphor of a "seamless garment" of moral urgencies. "The fundamental issue is human life and dignity," he asserted, "which is threatened in so many ways—preeminently by abortion, but also by euthanasia, cloning, widespread hunger and lack of health care, by war and violence, and by crime and the death penalty." The list can be readily extended in emptying "preeminently" of preeminence. "Our task is not winning elections," he said, but, with an eye to elections, he noted that attempts to impose penalties on Catholic politicians "have often been counterproductive." Things took an interesting twist when he told the bishops that he had been in contact with Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, by letter and telephone. "He has offered some observations for our work," Cardinal McCarrick said, "which he specifically asked not to be published, but which I wish to share with you." According to McCarrick, the burden of Ratzinger's message was that he has complete confidence that the American bishops know best how to deal with these questions, that the proper approach is one of dialogue and persuasion, not discipline, and that, not to put too fine a point on it, Cardinal Ratzinger agrees with Cardinal McCarrick. He did allow that Ratzinger recognizes that, "as in the case of a person in an invalid marriage, there are circumstances in which Holy Communion may be denied."

The Ratzinger letter and how McCarrick used it is the subject of lively discussion. No bishop wanted to say that McCarrick "misrepresented" Ratzinger's message but, as one put it, "The charitable thing to say is that he did not tell us the whole truth." It appears, although it is not certain, that the letter was sent only to McCarrick and the papal nuncio, Archbishop Gabriel Montalvo, who was, of course, present at the meeting. At least a few bishops, however, were apprised of the full text and were less than pleased with McCarrick's presentation of what Ratzinger had to say. When the full text was later made public, first in an Italian news-

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paper, McCarrick suggested to the press that there were other communications with Ratzinger that put the letter in context, justifying the interpretation he had offered the bishops. Back at the June meeting, the bishops had, despite McCarrick's resistance, made up their minds. There needed to be a clear and firm statement that unmistakably underscored the utterly distinctive status of abortion and euthanasia in Catholic teaching, and that approved, but did not mandate, specific pastoral approaches, including the denial of Communion to the obdurate.

The drafting of the statement was assigned to Cardinal McCarrick's task force, but not before the bishops took the precaution of adding Cardinal George and Archbishop Chaput to the drafting team. McCarrick was manifestly unhappy with the turn of events, but the others stitched together a statement that, while hardly seamless, managed to take into account appropriate cautions while affirming an assertive course in dealing with offending public figures, including the denial of Communion when other measures have failed. One can only speculate on how the statement would have been different had Cardinal McCarrick more accurately communicated Cardinal Ratzinger's message.

Striking Differences

The Ratzinger letter speaks decisively to those who misleadingly weave a "seamless garment" of Catholic concerns:

> Not all moral issues have the same moral weight as abortion and euthanasia. For example, if a Catholic were to be at odds with the Holy Father on the application of capital punishment or on the decision to wage war, he would not for that reason be considered unworthy to present himself to receive Holy Communion. While the Church exhorts civil authorities to seek peace, not war, and to exercise discretion and mercy in imposing punishment on criminals, it may still be permissible to take up arms to repel an aggressor or to have recourse to capital punishment. There may be a legitimate diversity of opinion even among Catholics about waging war and applying the death penalty, but not with regard to abortion and euthanasia. . . .
>
> Regarding the grave sin of abortion or euthanasia, when a person's formal cooperation [i.e. knowing, free, and deliberate cooperation] becomes manifest (understood in the case of a Catholic politician, as his consistently campaigning and voting for permissive abortion and euthanasia laws), his pastor should meet with him, instructing him about the Church's teaching, informing him that he is not to present himself for Holy Communion until he brings to an end the objective situation of sin, and warning him he *will* otherwise be denied the Eucharist [emphasis added].

Citing an earlier statement of the Holy See, Cardinal Ratzinger continues:

> When "these precautionary measures have not had their effect or in which they were not possible," and the person in question, with obstinate persistence, still presents himself to receive the Holy Eucharist, "the minister of Holy Communion *must* refuse to distribute it." This decision, properly speaking, is not a sanction or a penalty. Nor is the minister of Holy Communion passing judgment on the person's subjective guilt, but rather is reacting to the person's public unworthiness to receive Holy Communion due to an objective situation of sin [emphasis added].

In view of the striking differences between Ratzinger's letter and what he had told the bishops on June 15, Cardinal McCarrick was in an awkward position. He did later elicit and make public a letter from Ratzinger, dated July 9, referring not to McCarrick's position but to the statement actually adopted by the bishops. "That statement is very much in harmony with the general principles" set forth in his earlier letter which, writes Ratzinger, was "sent as a fraternal service—to clarify the doctrine of the Church on this specific issue—in order to assist the American bishops in their related discussion and determinations." This is a classic instance of observing what in the Vatican is called *bella figura*—in this case, reproaching by subtle indirection. How could Ratzinger's earlier letter have assisted the bishops in their discussion and deliberations if it was not shared with them? Which is precisely what McCarrick did not do and claimed he was instructed not to do. There is also a nicety in the phrase "very much in harmony." If I ask whether you agree with something I have said, you might answer, "Yes, very much." Or you might answer, "Well, very much"—meaning to a large extent—and then you might go on to qualify that by referring to agreement in "general principles."

In fact, there are obvious differences between the bishops' statement, "Catholics in Political Life," and Cardinal Ratzinger's articulation of "the doctrine of the Church on this specific issue." Most notably, what is optional in the former is mandated in the latter. Nonetheless, the June statement is to be welcomed. It acknowledged the worries of the timid while affirming the course decided upon by the likes of Archbishop Burke and Archbishop Myers and emboldening oth-

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ers to follow their example. There is every reason to believe that the statement would have been more firm and coherent if, as Cardinal Ratzinger intended, the bishops had had the benefit of his letter. As several have pointed out, the connection between Communion and *communio*, which is addressed by the statement, involves much more than the current and necessary concern about errant Catholic politicians. In recent decades the practice has become widespread that everyone attending Mass receives Communion. The consistent Catholic teaching, however, is that only those who are in a state of grace and are rightly disposed spiritually should receive. Practice to the contrary has resulted in, among other things, a dramatic decline in recourse to the Sacrament of Reconciliation, a decline approaching desuetude in some parts of the Church. It is hoped that the clarification precipitated by the controversy about Catholic politicians might turn into a "teaching moment" with respect to the sacramental order of Catholic Christianity.

And so one may see the June meeting as a possible turning point in the leadership of the American bishops. As Cardinal George has underscored, it is not a turn against the bishops conference but a turn toward reconceptualizing the purpose of the conference and its supporting institution, the USCCB. The key to the turning is the readiness of bishops to be the teachers and shepherds they are ordained to be. After a few more meetings like that of Denver, there may be substantial reason to believe that a new generation of bishops is prepared to lead.

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THE NEW YORK INTELLECTUALS, AGAIN

A lot of people don't read *Comment*, a magazine published by the Work Research Foundation in Mississauga, Ontario. For that matter, it has frequently been brought to my attention that a lot of people don't read this magazine. Maybe more will be reading *Comment* now that it is turning itself into a website. In any event, the last print issue of *Comment* includes a provocative article by Daniel Silliman of Hillsdale College, Michigan, "The Failure of the New York Intellectuals." The New York Intellectuals included figures such as Lionel Trilling, Irving Howe, Daniel Bell, Irving Kristol, and, toward the end, Nathan Glazer and Norman Podhoretz. The "community" generated and gravitated around publications such as *Partisan Review*, *Commentary*, *The Public Interest*, and *Dissent*. Today's talk about "public intellectuals" is a faint echo of what the New York Intellectuals were, writes Silliman.

"The New York Intellectuals were a movement that ought to have continued, one whose lack of an heir is frustrating and discouraging. They were different from the other political movements in two respects: the occupation of a position between pundit and academic, and their attention to culture, especially the literary." With them, politics and art were "cyclically informed" by each other, and that is very different from today's "political magazine including three or four short book reviews in the back." Silliman writes:

> It is here that we find the hope and potential of the New York Intellectuals. Here they were poised to change everything. Here they had a chance at genius and the mark of individuality. It is here that we find the most heart-rending failure: they were unable to be more than products of their time and never embraced their literary focus as the essence of their potential. It was never seen as the definition, either by the New York Intellectuals or by the observers of the New York Intellectuals. The New York Intellectuals themselves embraced the literary but never saw it as what they were, failing to get past the historical accidents of context from which they rose. It is here, too, that we find their final failure, their lack of heirs. It is on this point of a political movement informed by and informing the aesthetic that the end of the New York Intellectuals is felt most dearly, perhaps in the subtlety of echoes half heard, but felt as an absence. This breadth has not been replaced and, looking, one finds political movements designed for political men with political souls. And, for some of us observers, the landscape feels bereft of something that was great, or, at least, something that could have been great. The New York Intellectuals never saw themselves predicated on this point, and those movements hoping to be heirs to the New York Intellectuals didn't see it either.

That's very beautiful, in its way, but is not, I think, the whole story. The New York Intellectuals were a phenomenon of very particular time and place and sensibility: the sons and daughters of immigrant Jews assertively making their debut in the intellectual public square; City College, the Old Left, intra-Marxist ideological battles; proving their mastery of the high—meaning mainly literary—culture, and fading out into definitional contests over evolving meanings of left and right. How could they have left heirs? The concatenation of circumstances is not repeatable. And Mr. Silliman fails to appreciate how much they were writing and arguing for themselves and among themselves, as

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the many and sometimes romantic accounts of the New York Intellectuals make clear.

Numerous writers, editors, and think tank scholars understand themselves to be heirs, to a greater or lesser degree, of central figures in the legend of the New York Intellectuals. Unlike them, however, they do not have the advantage of being one or more steps removed from direct public influence. They are in the thick of it, and, being in the thick of it, cultural tone is compromised for the sake of effectiveness, alliances are made with those of different sensibilities, and the "cyclically informed" relationship between politics and art tends toward giving way to the triumph of politics. So I suppose I do not have a substantive disagreement with Mr. Silliman, except to suggest that he might have titled his article, "The Success of the New York Intellectuals," recognizing that, in a fallen world, success is the forerunner of failure, usually for reasons quite unexpected.

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DRAWING THE LINE AGAINST TORTURE

The outrages committed by Americans at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq justly sparked worldwide protest. Never mind that much of the protest was motivated by opposition to American policy or generalized America-bashing. We handed them a bat with which to bash us. The pictures of what happened and the failure of policy that permitted what happened will long be cited as evidence against the claim that America is the champion of human rights and dignity. The damage is grave.

It is not a question of terrible things done by "a few bad apples." Ruth Wedgwood of Johns Hopkins University and R. James Woolsey, former director of the CIA, write, "In a democratic country bounded by religious faith, there is no room for unbounded power over any human being." Unbounded power and the repugnantly abusive use of unbounded power was on display at Abu Ghraib. Pinning responsibility may be difficult, but we know that the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department was in 2002 producing memos on how, in the treatment of terrorists, the U.S. might get around solemn international agreements prohibiting torture. Wedgwood and Woolsey write:

> The Office of Legal Counsel has traditionally claimed the last word, at least on constitutional law, within the Executive Branch. But even the most capable lawyers cannot countermand the President's solemn promise of humane treatment for all persons captured in war. Nor can they override the President's proclamation of June 26, 2003. President Bush declared that "the United States is committed to the world-wide elimination of torture" and called for all governments to join with America to prohibit "all acts of torture" and "prevent other cruel and unusual punishment." The words of a President should not be lightly dismissed.

There is a temptation to place terrorists beyond the pale of humanity. But every human being, no matter how radically he has debased himself, is a child of God, created in His image and likeness. Liberals such as Alan Dershowitz have argued that, in extraordinary circumstances, we should get over our abhorrence of torture and establish rational rules for its use. Dershowitz's argument is seconded by Andrew C. McCarthy in the July-August issue of *Commentary* in a jumbled article that compares torture to capital punishment, allowing abortions under restricted circumstances, the death of innocents in war, and government plea bargaining to obtain information. The gist of McCarthy's case is that we should "create controlled, highly regulated, and responsibly accountable conditions" in which torture would be permitted. Torture happens anyway, he writes, and his proposal is "far superior to the current hypocrisy that turns a blind eye to that which it purports to forbid." An even better proposal is not to turn a blind eye to the illegal and unconscionable.

The usual instance cited by proponents of legalized torture is that of the "ticking time bomb." The scenario is that we have in custody a fourteen-year-old girl who, we have reason to believe, knows where a nuclear bomb is planted in the heart of a city, a bomb timed to explode within hours. Surely, it is argued, in such a circumstance torture is justified in order to get information that will save many thousands of lives. No, it isn't. Leave aside the counter-arguments that maybe she does not know, or that information exacted by torture is unreliable. When it comes to defining circumstances justifying torture or to the regulating of torture, the course is slippery and steeply sloped. We dare not trust ourselves to torture.

Torture as defined in international agreements to which the U.S. is party—outrages against human dignity, humiliation, degradation, mutilation, the threat of death—is never morally permissible. Admittedly, a measure of coercion, both physical and mental, is inevitably involved in most interrogation. The very fact of being in custody and under threat of punishment is a form of coercion. The task is to draw as bright a line as possible between such coercion and torture, and to forbid the latter absolutely. The uncompromisable principle is that it

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is always wrong to do evil in order that good may result. This principle is taught in numerous foundational texts of our civilization and is magisterially elaborated in the 1993 encyclical of John Paul II, *Veritatis Splendor*. We cannot ask God's blessing upon a course of action that entails the deliberate doing of evil. When something like Abu Ghraib happens, the appropriate response of patriotic Americans is one of deep sorrow, clear condemnation, and a firm resolution that it not happen again.

WHILE WE'RE AT IT

■ In Hilaire Belloc's *Cautionary Tales*, there is a poem about the unfortunate "Jim" who gets eaten by a lion. Belloc counsels the children, "And always keep a-hold of Nurse / For fear of finding something worse." George F. Kennan, commonly called the father of the containment policy against the Soviet Union, brought the line to the attention of John Lewis Gaddis, the distinguished Yale historian, who uses it to good effect in his little book, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Harvard University Press, 150 pp., $18.95). Gaddis provides a marvelously intelligent and lucid evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the foreign policy of the Bush administration. The key elements of that policy, as set forth in the National Security Strategy published in the fall of 2002—preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony—go back to John Quincy Adams, the sixth President, who, Gaddis convincingly argues, was the architect of a strategy that continues to this day, as is evident in America's response to September 11. A significant change was introduced by FDR, who, in extending America's hegemony to the entire non-Communist world, realized that we would need the help of others and established organizations such as the United Nations and NATO. Others went along with American preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony "for fear of finding something worse." The problem today is that much of the world sees U.S. hegemony as the "something worse," while the U.S., Britain, and a few others try to make the case that the "something worse" is the terrorism against which they are defending the world. Although he is very hard on the naïveté and inaction of the Clinton administration, Gaddis is not making a partisan argument. He is sharply critical of Bush on several scores, but he helps us to understand that the U.S. strategy since September 11, including the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, fits into a strategic framework established by Adams almost two hundred years ago. In the current highly politicized and frequently toxic disputes about U.S. foreign policy, a reader looking for an informed perspective on the continuities and discontinuities in America's response to September 11 could hardly do better than to spend a couple of hours with John Lewis Gaddis in *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*. My own expectation is that the world will gradually, or under the pressure of catastrophic surprise, come to realize that there is something much worse to fear than American preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony.

■ The Church of England, we noted a while back, has dropped references to the Three Wise Men. The text, it is claimed, doesn't say they were three, or wise, or men. So now it's "persons from the East." But that's nothing compared to *Good as New*, a Bible version produced by John Henson of One, an organization dedicated to "establishing peace, justice, dignity, and rights for all," along with the "sustainable use of earth's resources," and to challenging "oppression, injustice, exclusion, and discrimination" while accepting "one another, valuing their diversity and experience." So you can see that One is a Very Good Thing. Endorsing *Good as New*, which also includes the noncanonical gnostic Gospel of Thomas, Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, says he hopes it will spread "in epidemic profusion through religious and irreligious alike." The epidemic he wishes upon the masses changes original Hebrew and Greek names into modern nicknames. Peter becomes "Rocky," Mary Magdalene is "Maggie," and Aaron is "Ron." Henson deftly refers to demonic possession as "mental illness," and references to the "Son of Man" become "the Complete Person." Mark 1 in the Revised Standard Version (RSV): "And when he came up out of the water, immediately he saw the heavens opened and the Spirit descending upon him like a dove; and a voice came from heaven, 'You are my beloved Son, with you I am well pleased.'" *Good as New*: "As he was climbing up the bank again, the sun shone through a gap in the clouds. At the same time a pigeon flew down and perched on him. Jesus took this as a sign that God's spirit was with him. A voice from overhead was heard saying, 'That's my boy! You're doing fine!'" In 1 Corinthians 7, St. Paul says, "Now concerning the matters about which you wrote. It is well for a man not to touch a woman. But because of the temptation to immorality, each man should have his own wife and each woman her own husband." That was then, this is now. The same text, so to speak, in *Good as New*: "Some of you think the best way to cope with sex is for men and women to keep right away from each other. That is more likely to lead to sexual offenses. My advice is for everyone to have a

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regular partner." Later in the chapter, the RSV has this: "To the unmarried and the widows, I say that it is well for them to remain single as I do. But if they cannot exercise self-control, they should marry. For it is better to marry than to be aflame with passion." *Good as New*: "If you know you have strong needs, get yourself a partner. Better than being frustrated." The Archbishop of Canterbury writes: "Instead of being taken into a specialized religious frame of reference—as happens even with the most conscientious of formal modern translations—and being given a gospel addressed to specialized concerns, we have here a vehicle for thinking and worshipping that is fully earthed, recognizably about our humanity." There is no doubt that *Good as New* is fully grounded in fashionable sensibilities. There are few things more poignant than the liberal nostrum that if it is difficult to communicate the gospel, the answer is to change the gospel. From the general public *Good as New* is likely to elicit hoots of derision. From the two percent of the members of the Church of England who go to church, it is likely to prompt deeper wonderings about whether they're wasting their time. Among the theologically serious, in which company Rowan Williams is included, it will little enhance hopes for his leadership. One holds out the possibility that he did not read the book before endorsing it, which may be construed as only a venial sin. The epidemic of which *Good as New* is a carrier has already reached plague proportions. It does not need a boost from the Archbishop of Canterbury.

■ "What can we do to show that the Eucharist is a communal activity? Greeting people at the door is a start. It alerts us to the fact that we are going to do something with others. . . . I have found some Catholics who think this whole 'welcoming' business is destroying our traditional sense of reverence and replacing it with some folksy, feel-good experience. This is a false conclusion. If you wish to invite a guest into your home, you must have space. To invite others into our hearts and our worship, we must make room for them. The enemy of reverence is not hospitality but arrogance." Despite my being intimidated by the flat assertion, "This is a false conclusion," I dare to wonder if the author, a professor of theology writing in *America*, might tolerate a modest dissent. Note the language: *we* are going to do something; *our* traditional sense of reverence; *your* home; *our* worship. Is there not something to be said for reverence for what *God* is doing in *His* house through the liturgy of the *Church*, the saints in heaven and pilgrims on earth? There are many conversion stories in which the narrator describes quietly entering a Catholic church, maybe even sneaking in, and being struck by the statues and candles, and, most of all, by the people kneeling in rapt devotion as the priest at the altar lifts the consecrated host and declares, "Behold, the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world." There may be one, but I have never read a conversion story in which a person was drawn to the Catholic Church by the kind of chumminess that one might encounter at a birthday party or around the water cooler at the office. "This is a false conclusion," rumbles our liturgist. I'm sorry, sir, but since I've had the temerity to go so far, I'll go a step further and, at the risk of your wrath, suggest that it is really not so important "to show that the Eucharist is a communal activity." That's not the point. The point is what God has done, and is doing in the Mass, reconciling the world to Himself through the sacrifice of Christ. The eucharistic community is created precisely by our turning away from ourselves and toward Christ. The wonderful friendliness of our wonderful selves is really quite beside the point. And to think otherwise is, well, arrogance.

■ Among the trickiest elements when tyrannies are moving toward something better is how to deal with guilt and responsibility for the bad things done in the past. South Africa and Chile have provided recent examples of balancing strict justice and reconciliation in the transition to a more democratic regime. An alternative approach is represented by the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the U.S. thinks that alternative deeply flawed. These questions are carefully probed in a Notre Dame Law Review article by law professors John Czarnetzky and Ronald Rychlak, "An Empire of Law? Legalism and the International Criminal Court." They write: "An effective international tribunal, one that will do most of the good that its proponents posit for the ICC, cannot rest upon an unbridled faith in legalism. With the ICC, however, the yearning for an end to human rights abuses has led a significant portion of the international community to look only toward mechanistic legalism, enforced by an unaccountable Court. In doing this, the ICC is essentially imposing the 'unconditional surrender' model of Nuremberg on all future transitional societies. No room is left for political compromise. This, of course, means that the ICC is taking some potential tools for peace off the table. That is a dangerous thing to do. Law itself is an instrument of politics, and therefore does not transcend human beings and our foibles. Though it is unfashionable to assert, humans have no choice but politics when we discuss just resolutions of difficult situations. Put differently, the fallible human beings who will run the ICC, though garbed in the mantle of positive law derived from noble human-rights norms,

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will still just be human beings. If history teaches anything, it is that human beings with unchecked, absolute power will eventually abuse that power. In the case of an international tribunal with the power decisively to affect the future of entire peoples, the stakes are far too high to deny such a truth learned through so much hardship over the centuries."

■ On October 17, 2003, there was a dinner held over at the Union League Club and sponsored by the invaluable *Human Life Review* in order to honor its founder, the late J. P. McFadden. William F. Buckley, a close friend of McFadden's, was asked to make remarks, and jolted those present by suggesting that Catholics should relax their strictures against removing feeding tubes from the likes of Terri Schiavo, whose life was then hanging in the balance in Florida. Mr. Buckley cited favorably an article in *National Review* by the late Ernest van den Haag advocating doctor-assisted suicide. Buckley's remarks were, to say the least, controversial and have occasioned a lively symposium in *Human Life Review*. George McKenna of City College (New York), who is familiar to readers of this journal, criticized Buckley on a number of scores, including good taste and logic, but homed in on the assumption that the law against taking innocent human life is a peculiarly Catholic hang-up. Quoting Romans 2 on "the law written in their hearts," McKenna mentions Nat Hentoff's protest against Buckley's suggestion, noting that Hentoff is "an atheist who heeds no theological system but only the law written in his heart." McKenna writes: "Let me cite another person, now dead for many years, who did the same. Mr. Buckley and J. P. McFadden knew him very well, because he served for a time as columnist and editor at the *National Review*. His name was Whittaker Chambers. He was a figure of great controversy in the late 1940s because he exposed Alger Hiss, a former State Department official, as a long-time Communist spy. Chambers knew about Hiss' secret Communist activities, because he had participated in the same activities during the 1930s; he had received stolen State Department documents from Hiss and passed photocopies of them along to Moscow. Chambers came from a nominally Protestant home, but he lost whatever scraps of religion he had during college, and of course was a staunch atheist during his thirteen years as a Communist. (He became a Quaker some time after he left the party in 1938.) In 1952 he published *Witness*, a memoir of his Communist years. In it he recalls that in the mid-1930s his wife (who also held no religious belief) told him that she thought she was pregnant. Since this was one of the most intense periods in his career as a Soviet agent, they planned an abortion. His wife went to a doctor to verify her pregnancy, and when she returned, he asked what the doctor said. 'She said that I was in good physical shape to have a baby,' his wife replied. Then there was silence. Finally, it dawned on him: he asked if she wanted to have the child.

> My wife ran over to me, took my hands, and burst into tears. 'Dear heart,' she said in a pleading voice, 'we couldn't do that awful thing to a little baby, not to a little baby, dear heart.' A wild joy swept me. Reason, the agony of my family, the Communist Party and its theories, the wars and revolutions of the twentieth century, crumbled at the touch of the child.

So it happened that Whittaker and Esther Chambers, having no religious law at the time, joyously went ahead to bring their first child into the world. Their consciences bore them witness. Mr. Buckley, I fear, has misjudged his audience and readers because he does not speak to what unites them. It is not religious doctrine, precious as that doctrine is to most of them. It is a law written in their hearts telling them that we may not kill people just because their birth will be inconvenient or their death will be greeted with relief. It is that law which brought them all out to honor the memory of J. P. McFadden, and it is what motivated Mr. McFadden to sacrifice so much for the journal he founded. It is a very compelling law and, however complicated its implementation may be in particular cases, a very clear law; it can be obscured only by lies and sophistries."

■ "The threat by Catholic bishops to withhold communion from politicians who uphold abortion rights is an affront not just to democracy but also the best moral teachings of Catholicism." So begins an editorial in *Forward*, the Jewish weekly. "It's unfair to believers and unfair to the system," the editors conclude. What a system, in which a Jewish paper instructs Catholic bishops on the moral teachings of the Church. Only in America, as it was said when the people of Dublin elected a Jewish mayor.

■ Sorry. Circulation figures for some of the publications mentioned in the last issue were in error. The errors resulted from failing to include institutional and overseas subscriptions, as well as newsstand sales. The correct figures as of November 2003: *Commentary*, 34,000; *National Review*, 156,000; *Weekly Standard*, 60,000; *New Republic*, 61,000; and *New York Review of Books*, 130,000.

■ "If they want to do it, let them. How does it affect you?" That's the line that opponents of same-sex mar-

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riage have the greatest difficulty in responding to. An interesting response comes from Adam Haslett, writing in, of all places, the *New Yorker*. "Love Supreme" offers a serviceable, if somewhat misleading, sketch of marriage in Western history, noting the ways in which the institution has been largely disengaged from childbearing and child-rearing, while at the same time it is connected to a growing number of legal entitlements. Moreover, the proponents of same-sex marriage know that something bigger is involved, says Haslett, namely, "the official recognition of love." "This," he writes, "is the difference between civil unions and marriage: one is a legal certificate and the other is a public endorsement." That is why they insist on the word "marriage." "To discount this as mere semantics misses what the definition points up: that marriage, through all its incarnations, has been a procedure that assigns people a new identity based on their gender. For centuries, it has been the ceremony that makes males into husbands and females into wives. Until very recently, this meant a lifetime commitment to both the security and the constriction of a well-defended social role. The symbolic danger that gay marriage poses to such an arrangement is obvious. It alters the public meaning of the word by further draining it of its power to reinforce traditional expectations of behavior. What does it mean to be a husband in a world where a man could have one of his own? This is up to each individual couple, one is tempted to say. Fair enough; but the words we use to describe our relationships are shared cultural property. There is no private language. In this sense, granting the word 'marriage' to gay couples will eventually affect everyone." Haslett concludes on the note that same-sex marriage should be seen as a fulfillment of a goal of the women's movement, which, historically speaking, is radical: "the decline of the patriarchal legal structure and rise of the goal of self-fulfillment." Obligations—patriarchal, matriarchal, or simply faithful—are out. Self-fulfillment is in. Get used to it. Or not.

■ "Jews, Muslims, Christians—we are all children of Abraham and people of the Book." Not so, says the French historian Alain Besançon, writing in *Commentary*. "What Kind of Religion is Islam?" is a hard-hitting critique of what Besançon views as a false ecumenism eager to find commonalities with Islam that do not exist. Not incidentally, this misguided effort disadvantages Judaism since it is claimed, for instance, that Islam honors Jesus and Mary while Judaism does not. But the Jesus/Issa honored in the Koran as a messenger of Allah is not the Jesus whom Christians worship, writes Besançon. He is supposedly born of Mariam, the sister of Aaron, and is neither a redeemer nor a mediator between God and man. And, of course, he does not die on the cross, since a double is substituted for him. Moreover, Allah is not the God of Abraham who reveals himself through historical events, but a distant and impersonal power that makes everything happen immediately; not through the nature and history of his own creation but according to his omnipotent whim. Thus the determinism and fatalism at the heart of Islamic religion. "These then," writes Besançon, "are some of the elements that conduce to misunderstanding when Christians and Jews approach Islam. Such outsiders may well be struck by the religious zeal of the Muslim toward a God whom they recognize as being also their God. But this God is in fact separate and distinct, and so is the relation between Him and the believing Muslim. Christians are accustomed to distinguish the worship of false gods—that is, idolatry—from the worship of the true God. To treat Islam suitably, it becomes necessary to forge a new concept altogether, and one that is difficult to grasp—namely, an idolatry of the God of Israel. To put it another way, Islam may be thought of as the natural religion of the revealed God." The concept is indeed difficult to grasp and not, I think, entirely convincing. Yet Besançon's critique is a necessary caution against the kind of interreligious dialogue that slides too easily into wishful thinking. "The Qur'an," he writes, "is neither a preparation for biblical religion nor a retroactive endorsement of it. In approaching Muslims, self-respecting Christians and others would do better to rely on what remains within Islam of natural religion—and of religious virtue—and to take into account the common humanity that Muslims share with all people everywhere." Christians seeking dialogue with Muslims have to begin somewhere, and Besançon's bare minimum is one starting point. Despite the fundamental differences that he underscores, however, other Christians and Muslims may, with eyes wide open to the difficulties, try to tease out greater religious commonalities. This is one of the great tasks of this century, and the alternative to pursuing it may be open-ended and unlimited warfare between Islam and the infidels, meaning chiefly Christians and Jews.

■ The ceremony was at St. Stanislaus Kostka Church in Pittsburgh. According to the *New York Times*, the bride "is the director of advocacy programs and a spokeswoman for the New York affiliate of NARAL Pro-Choice America, the reproductive rights organization." The pastoral policy in Pittsburgh is "don't ask, don't tell"? Although the *Times* found out, and reports it with what one detects is a measure of glee.

■ It's a muckraking book, admits Yale's Daniel Kevles in his review of *War Against the Weak: Eugenics and*

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the American Campaign to Create a Master Race by Edwin Black, but he nonetheless thinks it important reading. Black details American scientific and financial support for German eugenics programs in the early part of the last century that did not cause but were certainly on a continuum with the Holocaust. The Rockefeller Foundation was in the lead in backing projects in Germany and the U.S. aimed at culling out the unfit ("life unworthy of life") to make way for superior human beings. Progressives such as Margaret Sanger, Theodore Roosevelt, and Rabbi Stephen Wise cheered on the improvement of the race. And there was, of course, Oliver Wendell Holmes' pithy observation in the 1927 *Buck v. Bell* decision upholding the sterilization of inferior people: "Three generations of imbeciles are enough." Kevles is a bit sniffy about Black's alleged overstatements, but he concludes his review with this: "Despite its imperfections, Black's book does prompt us to wonder what in medical genetics and biotechnology we are taking socially and morally for granted today that our descendants might indict us for tomorrow." We do not have to wait until tomorrow. The indictments are coming in fast and furious today. Our descendants may well wonder why so many ignored them.

■ There's an outfit called the Rainbow Sash Movement whose purpose is to encourage lesbians and gays to don a rainbow sash and present themselves for Communion at Catholic cathedrals on Pentecost Sunday. The idea, of course, is to protest the allegedly oppressive homophobia of the Catholic Church. In some places, Chicago for instance, priests are instructed to politely deny the sacrament, and they wave the protesters by, sometimes adding a blessing and a prayer for the reordering of sadly disordered lives. The point is, according to the Archbishop of Chicago, that those who would exploit the Eucharist by turning it into a political protest are manifestly not rightly disposed to receive the Body of Christ. In Chicago, Rainbow Sash succeeded in getting a few news stories about their being turned away at the altar. Other places, Los Angeles for instance, took a different tack. The cardinal archbishop there is on record as being opposed to politicizing the Eucharist by imposing sanctions on notoriously pro-abortion politicians. Los Angeles is also known to be, as it is delicately said, a gay-friendly place. The archdiocese not only announced that it would not turn away protesters but sent a message to the Rainbow Sash Movement saying that they would be warmly welcomed at the altar of the new Cathedral of Our Lady of the Angels. Nobody with sashes showed up. What's the point of going to Mass if you're going to be denied a confrontation? I would not be surprised if some gay activists in L.A. are upset about the archdiocese depriving them of their right to be rejected. And just imagine the hurt feelings of an ever-so-welcoming archdiocese scorned. In the theater of gay agitprop, players should stick to their designated roles. In Chicago, the archdiocese had the satisfaction of being Catholic, and gay activists the satisfaction of being oppressed. It was a win-win proposition. In Los Angeles, it seems that everybody lost.

■ In "unenlightened" times, it seemed more or less natural for people to do really nasty things to those who did not belong to the tribe. It was taken to be instinctual, normal, and lawful to slaughter and enslave enemies, and to take their women as concubines. It was in the Europe of the Enlightenment, of the discovery of human rights, that human nastiness required rationalizations. That, says Bernard Lewis in *From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East*, helps explain why racism and anti-Semitism arose and flourished in Europe. "Modern racism, in its origins, is an attempt to justify the enslavement and exploitation of Black Africans by enlightened Europeans and Americans; anti-Semitism is the response of the secularized Christian, no longer able to use theological arguments, against the emancipated Jew. . . . Religious hostility against Jews had of course existed since early times, but restating this in racist rather than religious terms was a nineteenth-century invention—an attempt to rationalize and to justify primitive bigotry. In enlightened, science-minded nineteenth-century Germany, it was no longer acceptable to hate Jews because they had rejected Christ. One had to find a modern and scientific reason. Anti-Semitism was the answer." Lewis is widely acknowledged as the almost indispensable guide to the history of what is happening in the Middle East. ("Almost" because, as de Gaulle said, the cemeteries are filled with indispensable men.) His recent book, *What Went Wrong?*, is perhaps the best answer we have to the inevitable question of why so many Muslims hate us as they do. The new book, *From Babel to Dragomans*, is a collection of Lewis' scholarly and occasional writings from the last fifty years and touches on a wide array of questions currently disputed. There is, for instance, the question of why so many Christian clergy are hostile to the state of Israel. Lewis notes that Israel is a relatively open society in which the media are free to air complaints and grievances. "After all, where else in the entire Middle East and North Africa is it possible to get an opponent of the government on television to denounce the government as conducting a police state? You might infer from this that Israel is the only police state in the region, or you may find another explanation." It is both blessing and curse for Israel that Jews

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and Christians share so much of a common religious tradition. The Hebrew Bible is the Christian Old Testament. "There was no parallel development among Muslims, who simply declared both the Old and New Testaments to be obsolete and brought a new Scripture not to supplement but to supplant the existing ones." Christians are deeply implicated in Jewish religion and Jewish history, and the latter generates an understandable element of guilt. "This was extremely important in the early days of the history of the state of Israel and the conflicts in which it was involved, but is becoming less so. The feeling of guilt, particularly guilt for the Holocaust, can operate in more than one way. One can expiate it, by supporting Israel even when it's wrong; or one can escape from it, by denouncing Israel even when it's right. For the [Christian] clergy in particular, the problem of guilt for the Holocaust has been an extraordinarily difficult one, and to deal with Jews as accused and not accusers brought welcome relief. It enables them to abandon the uncomfortable and unfamiliar posture of contrition and penitence, and to return to the more familiar and comfortable posture of moral superiority and stern reproof." That is not the whole of the story, as Lewis well knows, but it is an important part of the reason why liberal Christian leaders tend to be so strongly anti-Israel (or, as they prefer, pro-Palestinian), in sharpest contrast to millions of American Christians who, inspired not so much by guilt as by Bible prophecy, constitute a base of support for Israel that is, in the judgment of many observers, now more important than the organized "Jewish lobby." The items cited here are chosen at random and are not necessarily representative of the writings collected in *From Babel to Dragomans*. For entrance to the wisdom of Bernard Lewis, begin with *What Went Wrong*? Then, if you are as taken with what he has to say as innumerable others have been, you might want to pick up the new collection of exhibits in evidence of the near indispensability of Bernard Lewis.

■ It's a good thing the courts are pressing same-sex marriage, says Presiding Bishop Mark Hanson of the ELCA Lutherans. "It's an issue for the whole culture; it helps us to see that this isn't something that we are doing in isolation." Apparently some people thought the ELCA had come up with the idea of same-sex marriage. Their presiding bishop assures them they have good company; it's a cultural thing. Those familiar with H. Richard Niebuhr's "Christ of Culture" model will relish his further statement: "Now, the question for us as people of faith is when, out of conscience, do we challenge civil society as being wrong and when do we embrace the decisions of civil society as it orders its life hopefully for the sake of order and justice." Apart from the fact that the courts and not civil society are making these decisions, one wonders if it has eluded the bishop's notice that "people of faith," unlike the courts, are to decide in obedience to the gospel of Jesus Christ. He does mention the gospel, noting that it "encompasses more than sexuality," and is often "troubling." For instance, "It better trouble us that the ELCA is still 94 percent descendants of European immigrants in this wonderfully rich and pluralistic country." Bearing the cross of Scandinavian or German ancestry is not easy. The ELCA leadership suffers from a deep sense of guilt about being noninclusive in a wondrously inclusive culture. Guilt about being noninclusive is joined to the galling realization that there are not a lot of people interested in being included in the ELCA. To paraphrase a Pauline passage so important to Luther, "Who will deliver the ELCA from this body of demographic sin?" Since it is improbable that millions of blacks, Latinos, or Filipinos are going to join up any time soon, it seems that, for the members of the ELCA, salvation must be by faith alone, combined with profound contrition for being who they are. As it happens, there are many very nice people and devout Christians in the ELCA. I used to be one myself. (Not unusually nice or devout, but I was in the ELCA.) They and their church would, I expect, be more generally appreciated were they not so touchingly eager to catch up with the cutting edge of a culture to which the community of faith is to be not a mirror but a contrast. As for "troubling" aspects of the gospel, being descended from European immigrants doesn't even make the list, except by conveniently eliminating the real sins for which Lutherans, along with the rest of us, must plead forgiveness.

■ There are long shelves of books, nay, entire libraries devoted to answering the question, What is anti-Semitism? I have read more than my quota of learned disquisitions on the matter. Imagine, then, the sense of relief when I spied on the corner of Third Ave. and 20th St. a big poster blazoned with the slogan "Anti-Semitism Is Anti-Me." Pictured on the poster was a collared clergyperson of the female persuasion. Walking toward Fifth Ave. I spotted another one, this time with a pretty black lady, and on Broadway yet another with a little boy with Asian features. I went for answers to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the sponsor of the posters. I learned that the first picture is of the Rev. Kathleen Rusnak, described as "one of the nation's leading Lutheran Christian ministers." (In New York it cannot be assumed that people know Lutheran is Christian.) The second poster featured "Supermodel Naomi Campbell." All I learned about the boy in the third is that his name is Jacob. Abraham Foxman of ADL explained that the poster campaign,

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which is soon to go national, intends to "change the perception that anti-Semitism is strictly a problem for Jews." Employing the language of critical theory, he explained, "Anti-Semitism is an expression of a hatred of the other." Aha. So hatred of George W. Bush is anti-Semitism. Hatred of the religious right is anti-Semitism. Hatred of France for, among other things, its anti-Semitism is anti-Semitism. The possibilities multiply. Real anti-Semitism being in such short supply in America, the ADL, whose sole purpose is to combat anti-Semitism, has immeasurably expanded the definition of the threat that is its reason for being. A smart move for the institutional perpetuation of the ADL. A really dumb move if the aim is to increase alertness to the evil that is anti-Semitism. Such an expansion of the meaning of anti-Semitism ends up reducing it to a generalized term of abuse for people who dislike people they find disagreeably different. Declaring war on human antipathies is breathtakingly ambitious. But then, nobody has ever accused Mr. Foxman of being modest.

■ The pathetic competes with the presumptuous in a recent exchange between an Episcopal priest and Randy Cohen who writes a column for the *New York Times Magazine* called "The Ethicist." The priest asks what he should do since his bishop will not let him bless same-sex unions. Cohen answers, "You need not endorse every doctrine of the church to participate in it honorably." "While there are organizations so impervious to reform that one would be ethically obliged to leave them, that is not your situation," Cohen adds. Is it unfair to think he might have the Catholic Church in mind? Cohen then urges the priest to be welcoming to gays, to preach against his bishop's policy, and to find a way to get around the policy so he can get on with the "happy task" of blessing same-sex unions. The pathetic is in a priest seeking doctrinal and moral guidance from the *Times*. The presumptuous is in Mr. Cohen's giving it. Unless, of course, he is a theologically trained Episcopal layman, which I am told he is not.

■ In his 1995 encyclical *Ut Unum Sint* (That They May Be One), John Paul II asked Christian leaders outside the Catholic fold to join in exploring ways in which the papacy, so often an obstacle to unity, might become more effectively an instrument of the unity that Christ manifestly desires for his disciples. Reinhard Hütter, a Lutheran theologian at Duke University, takes up the invitation in *Bound to be Free: Evangelical Catholic Engagements in Ecclesiology, Ethics, and Ecumenism* (Eerdmans). His reading of the encyclical is, for the most part, sympathetic, but he bridles at the claim that the Church in its fullness uniquely "subsists" in the Catholic Church. While Christ and, therefore, in some very important sense, his body the Church are to be found outside the boundaries of the Roman Catholic Church, the Catholic claim is that she is the Church most fully and rightly ordered according to the intention of Christ. There is another sense, however, in which Hütter and others who call themselves evangelical catholics bridle at the very existence of the Catholic Church. "What question is raised by the encyclical," he asks, "for the churches of the Reformation, and how do these churches fend off the very fact of the ongoing existence of the Roman Catholic Church, which calls them into question?" But why should Lutherans, for instance, want to "fend off" being called into question? The great Lutheran confessional theologian, Peter Brunner, said that a Lutheran does not understand what it means to be a Lutheran if he does not ask himself every day why he is not a Roman Catholic. Hütter himself cites Philip Melanchthon, Luther's closest collaborator, who wrote: "However, concerning the pope I maintain that if he would allow the gospel, we, too, may (for the sake of peace and general unity among those Christians who are now under him and might be in the future) grant to him his superiority over the bishops which he has 'by human right.'" (The distinction between "human right" and "divine right," one notes, is susceptible of considerable nuance in view of God's working through human agency.) Hütter also cites Luther: "According to Luther's ecclesiology, the test case of the papal office can hinge *solely* on whether the ordained ministry to the gospel *also* includes—and indeed, where possible, requires—a ministry of unity to all of Christendom. If the papal office permitted itself to be understood as a ministry under the gospel, serving as a transforming—even re-forming—catalyst for the unity of the church, it would open the door to an ecumenically promising and, from the perspective of the Lutheran Reformation, permissible approach to the thorniest of all ecumenical dilemmas. After all, Luther himself asserted in 1531 that he 'could kiss the pope's feet if he would permit the gospel.'" But only a page earlier Hütter himself writes: "In the area of the doctrine of justification, the heart of Reformation theology, while there is not complete agreement, there is convergence, which suffices to certify that the truth of the gospel—that is, the biblical message of the sinner's justification by faith alone—has in the meantime been both permitted and recognized by the Roman Catholic Church." If that is true, one cannot help but ask why Hütter and evangelical catholics of like mind are not prepared to kiss the pope's feet. (Figuratively speaking, of course, since the gesture is not required and almost certainly would not be welcomed today.) Hütter cautions those in the

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Reformation tradition against finding or inventing additional "basic differences" that justify separation from Rome. But if the basic difference is not, as Melanchthon said, that the pope does not "allow the gospel," what does justify the continued separation?

■ There are the survivors of the Holocaust, and now there are the children of survivors who are carrying on the business. Ruth Franklin, writing in the *New Republic*, finds it more than a little obscene. She reviews, among other books of the genre, Melvin Jules Bukiet's recent collection of writings by second-generation "survivors." Bukiet writes: "Whatever wisdom others bring to it comes from the heart and head, but for us it's genetic. To be shabbily proprietary, we own it. Our parents owned it, and they gave it to us. Just as John Quincy Adams and Ken Griffey Jr. followed in their parents' footsteps, we go into Shoah business. I'd like to tell everyone from the Bellows and the Ozicks to the Styrons and the Wilkomirskis, 'Bug off. Find your own bad news,' but no one can legislate artistic imperative, and perhaps no one should. . . . We have been given an obscene gift, a subject of predetermined value that no one can deny." On which Franklin comments: "It's difficult to say what is most grotesque about this passage—that a mean scribbler such as Bukiet is asserting moral authority over Saul Bellow; that the survivors somehow bequeath their stake in the Holocaust to their children (I can't speak for Bukiet's family, but my own grandparents weren't in 'Shoah business,' they ran a grocery store); that anybody 'owns' anything about the Holocaust. Bukiet's twisted proprietariness does not stop here: he later announces with pride that he uses the number on his father's tattoo, 108016, as his ATM code. Identity thieves, take note!" For the second generation writers, says Franklin, "the Holocaust lies at the very foundation of their consciousness." The Holocaust is allowed the last word about reality. Franklin writes, "In survivors, this degree of possession by the Holocaust is tragic—but in their descendants it is shockingly defeatist." It is to "make of the world our own personal Holocaust museum." As Emil Fackenheim, whom Franklin does not mention, might have said, to give the Holocaust the final word is another way of giving Hitler a posthumous victory.

■ Barbara Ehrenreich is hard as nails and demands that other women be so too. "Time to take your thumbs out of your mouths, ladies, and speak up for your rights. The freedoms that we exercise but do not acknowledge are easily taken away." What has her upset in her column in the *New York Times* is that polls show that "only 30 percent of women are unambivalently pro-choice." Actually, the figure is much lower than that. Considerably less than 20 percent are unambivalently pro-choice if unambivalently means they believe that abortion should be legally available for any reason at any time during the entire course of pregnancy and up through delivery (partial birth abortion). That, of course, is the present license of the lawless law of *Roe v. Wade*. But let's not quibble about the polling data; it is Ehrenreich's argument that is of interest. There are, she writes, "an appalling number of women who are willing to deny others the right that they once freely exercised themselves." It is the women who regret having an abortion and feel guilty about it who outrage Ms. Ehrenreich. She would deny them their remorse and their resentment of an unlimited abortion license that made it too easy for them to do wrong. They do not want other women to be similarly tempted. Ehrenreich will have none of it: "Honesty begins at home, so I should acknowledge that I had two abortions during my all-too-fertile years. You can call me a bad woman, but not a bad mother. I was a dollar-a-word freelancer and my husband a warehouse worker, so it was all we could do to support the existing children at a grubby lower-middle-class level. And when it comes to my children—the actual extrauterine ones, that is—I was, and remain, a lioness." Do not call her a bad mother. She acknowledges all her children and is very protective of the ones she did not have killed. She perhaps feels a bit uneasy about the abortions, since she offers the excuse that the alternative would have been intolerable: sub-middle-class existence with a husband working in a warehouse. Ugh. She writes, "Choice can be easy, as it was in my case, or truly agonizing." Today Ehrenreich is a best-selling author and liberal activist, is divorced from her lower-middle-class husband and remarried to Yale literary critic Peter Brooks, has houses in Charlottesville and the Florida Keys and a column in the *Times*. No wonder the choice was easy. What are the lives of two children compared to all that? It isn't as though the children died for nothing. As for those for whom abortion was "truly agonizing," Ehrenreich tells them to get over it. "Assuming the fetal position," she writes, "is not an appropriate response." If that does not persuade those millions of women with whose unhappiness she is unhappy, Ehrenreich invokes the moral authority of Jean-Paul Sartre who, she says, would accuse them of "bad faith" for wanting to discourage other women from doing what they did. Sartre, it may be remembered, was throughout his life an unrepentant apologist for Communism's mass murderers. He taught generations of leftists the moral wisdom that you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs. Ehrenreich's column, "Owning Up to Abortion," carries the pull-quote, "It's time to get past the guilt." It's time to move on. Money, fame, media stardom, Ivy

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League connections. Those thumb-sucking women are implying that it is not really terrific to be Barbara Ehrenreich, which is ludicrous. Not that they will be able to match her success, but they can at least support the abortion license that made it possible. Too bad about those two kids, but, as Sartre understood, nothing comes without paying a price. Sure it's unfair, but, then, life is unfair. The children died in the cause of giving the public Barbara Ehrenreich and giving Barbara Ehrenreich some really neat advantages. Do these women know what it's like to live in a grubby lower-middle-class world with a husband who works in a warehouse? Barbara Ehrenreich should feel guilty about what she did? Get real, ladies.

■ I don't know what kind of revolution Robert Reich, labor secretary in the Clinton administration, has in mind, but he does Robespierre proud. Writing in the July issue of the *American Prospect*, he contends that Christian fundamentalists pose a greater danger to America than people flying jetliners into skyscrapers. He writes, "Terrorism is a tactic, not a belief. The true battle will be between modern civilization and anti-modernist; between those who believe in the primacy of the individual and those who believe that human beings owe their allegiance and identity to a higher authority . . . between those who believe in science, reason, and logic, and those who believe that truth is revealed through Scripture and religious dogma. Terrorism will disrupt and destroy lives. But terrorism itself is not the greatest danger we face." By Reich's definition of "fundamentalist" and "religious zealot," one would have to include, to name but a few Presidents, Washington, John Adams, Lincoln, Wilson, Carter, Reagan, and, of course, George W. Bush. More impressively, the great majority of the American people are, by his measure, enemies of the democracy he envisions. Reich's are not offhand remarks after the third scotch but were written for publication in a magazine of liberal respectability and influence. The thing worth remarking is that most of those who inhabit his ideological fanum (from which "fanatic") likely consider his sentiments unexceptionable. Mr. Reich has written a book called *Reason: Why Liberals Will Win the Battle for America*. Recall the recipe for unicorn stew: first, get a unicorn. Robert Reich's recipe for liberal victory in America is similar: first, get rid of the Americans.

■ "Jesus Matters in the U.S.A." is the title of his article in a new journal, *Modern Intellectual History*, and historian David Hollinger of the University of California, Berkeley, thinks Jesus matters altogether too much. In a review essay discussing four recent books on American religious history, he notes that America's intellectual elite in the twentieth century consciously identified itself with "a larger arena," meaning a more secularized Europe. Wanting to play in the game of world-class intellectuals, American thinkers more or less consistently ignored the fact that America remains an overwhelmingly Christian society, and this has contributed to the huge gap between intellectual elites and "the people." After World War II, "Jews interacting with liberal Protestants and lapsed Protestants greatly advanced the integration of American intellectual life with that of the secularized elites of Europe, and in the process they helped distinguish 'the intellectuals' from everyone else." Thinkers were reluctant to acknowledge the Jewish factor "for fear of giving indirect support to the anti-Jewish attitudes long sustained by Christian cultures." The American intelligentsia imitating like-minded Europeans tended to "treat the Christianity of the public and of the public's learned fellow travelers as an irrelevant anachronism." Mr. Hollinger shares that aloofness from his embarrassingly religious society. Discussing D. G. Hart's argument for confessional rather than revivalistic Protestantism (*The Lost Soul of American Protestantism*), he writes, "This aspect of the book will be of interest chiefly to Christians involved in disputes specific to that community of faith." Ah yes, that community of faith. I suppose he means the two-thirds of the population that is Protestant, or maybe he means all who think they are Christians, which is 90 percent of the people. In any event, Mr. Hollinger suggests, we need not bother our heads about matters of interest chiefly to *those* people. With specific reference to Catholics, Hollinger thinks Paul Blanshard, author of the 1949 anti-Catholic tract *American Freedom and Catholic Power*, is wrongly accused of bigotry. Catholics, he says, were pretty much guilty as Blanshard charged. But Catholic intellectuals, through "changing the Church's stance on birth control" and other achievements, somewhat alleviated the problem by turning Catholics, or at least thoughtful Catholics, into Protestants. (It will come as a surprise to Catholics, intellectual or not, that the Church has changed its stance on birth control.) Hollinger allows that there are Christian intellectuals—"the public's learned fellow travelers"—but they are afflicted by a "survivalist" mentality. That is, they seem to want Christianity to survive and flourish. That is why they are so often unsympathetic to the liberal Protestants who "decided either that Jesus mattered differently than they had thought before, or that he did not matter so much after all." "The Idea of liberal Protestantism as a halfway house, as a stepping stone to modernity, even as a slippery slope out of Christianity, is problematic only if one looks at twentieth century history as a Christian survivalist." That is clearly not Mr. Hollinger's prob-

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lem. He is very happy with aspects of Christianity "that flow to the outside of the perimeter of faith, making Jesus matter less." Thus does David Hollinger's essay exemplify what he so acutely describes: the Europeanized American intellectual who is embarrassed by his stubbornly religious country. Thus do those intellectuals who style themselves "the intellectuals" persist in trying to protect their superior selves from the embarrassment of America.

■ Although numerous accounts of the civil rights movement fudge or skirt the truth, honest scholars recognize that it could not have succeeded without the driving force of Christian conviction in the black churches. This is convincingly demonstrated in David Chappell's recent book, *A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow* (reviewed in this issue). Liberal secularists who are inclined to exaggerate their role in the movement, and to downplay the part played by religion, sometimes contend that religion equally supported the cause of segregationist resistance. That, says Chappell, was not the case. Southern segregationists displayed a "veneer of defiance and solidarity [but] the segregationists' foundations in Southern white culture were mushy. The segregationists had popular opinion behind them, but not popular conviction." Conviction trumps opinion, and Southern white culture was as deeply rooted in Christian conviction as was Southern black culture. Already in the early 1950s, the Southern Baptists and Southern Presbyterians were passing resolutions in favor of integration, and Billy Graham was conducting racially integrated revivals in the South. In short, segregationists had a bad conscience about their opinions, which put them at a distinct disadvantage in relation to blacks who confidently invoked a Christian moral tradition to which whites also claimed to adhere. The distinction between opinion and convenience on the one hand, and conviction on the other, is pertinent also to the continuing struggle over protecting the unborn. Every few months or so, there is another news story about pro-abortionists fretting about the need to recruit religion to their cause. To that end, they appoint "chaplains" to provide a veneer of religious legitimation for the unlimited abortion license. These are typically clerics far to the left of left-leaning denominations. A recent report described one such female chaplain as a "liberal Unitarian." This is religiously thin gruel and a patently desperate effort to counter the profoundly religious conviction driving the great human rights cause of our time, the pro-life movement. As with the segregationists of a half century ago, the pro-abortionists' foundations in American culture are mushy. In time, and given political opportunity to express itself, one reasonably hopes that opinion and convenience will once again be trumped by conviction.

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

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